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Abstract
This study is an analysis and appraisal of the newly established 
central bank in Lebanon. The Charter granting the privately owned 
Banque de Syrie et du Liban the privilege of note issue in Lebanon 
expired on 51st March 1964 and was not renewed. A state owned 
institution, the Bank of Lebanon, was created to take over the functions 
of the Issuing Department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban and was 
given central banking powers. This was the most important development 
in Lebanese banking history since the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956.
When a central bank is newly established in a developing country, 
there is always the danger that it will be domihated by traditional 
notions of central banking, and insufficient regard paid to the 
particular characteristics of the economy in which it is to operate.
The result may well be the establishment of an ineffective central bank. 
The problem considered here is whether in Lebanon there was a need for 
a change from the old system, that is whether or not the Banque de Syrie 
et du Liban was adequate for the requirements of the country, and if not 
what sort of a change was required.
The development and working of the Lebanese banking system is 
analysed with speiial reference to the role that might be required of a
central bank. Particular emphasis is placed on the significance of the 
foreign banks and the very active money market which traditionally 
provided an effective lender of last resort* The problems of economic 
development in the Lebanon are outlined and in the light of these problems, 
of the nature of the economy and of the Government!s economic plans, 
the important functions that could well be served by a central bank are 
discussed.
It is concluded that the Bqnque de Syrie et du Liban, essentially an 
Issuing Bank, was not adequate for the requirements of the economic 
development of the country, and that a central bank was needed. But 
the Bank of Lebanon, as actually constituted will only marginally help 
in the economic development of the country.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I’he purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for a 
discussion of the problems associated with the establishment of a 
Central Bank in the Lebanon, which is described in the latter part 
of the chapter.
I# The fashion1 Of Central Banking
“A central bank is not a natural product of banking development.
It is imposed from outside or comes into being as the result of govern- 
1
ment favour*11 “It is an institutional arrangement that may be made to
serve any one of a number of •purposes1 its essence being11..* the
2discretionary control of the monetary system11* The tasks of such an 
institution “or any other human institution, are surely to respond to
3
the needs of the environment in which they exist.11 However, “looking 
back, it is impossible to resist the statement that the foundation 
of central banks has been partly a matter of fashion11.^ ^he fashion
of central banking has by no means been uniform and does not go much
1* Smith, V. C, The Rationale °f Central Banking, London, King, 1956, 
p. 14©*
2. S^ers, &.S, Central Banking: after Bagehot. Oxford University Press, 
1957, P* 1.
5. NevinjE, in a book review, Economic Journal, September 1965* P* 592*
4* Sayers, R.S* “Introduction11 to Banking in the British Commonwealth 
ed. by R.S* Sayers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, p# xi.
9*
beyond the 1920*s* Ricardo and his age were against what he called
* tinkering with the currency1 by the Company of merchants1 who directed
the Bank of England* Adam Smith's Invisible Hand would regulate - so
it was thought - the monetary systems that adhered to the International
Gold Standard and followed the rules of the game* ^he objective of
monetary policy then was convertibility, but meaning by that word the
avoidance of fluctuating exchange rates which would result from severing
1
the fixed link between the national currency and gold#
The Gold Standard seemed to work until the E’irst World War without 
any regular conscious intervention from the Authorities. There were 
occasions whenenergency measures to protect the convertibility of 
certain currencies were required, but the continuing stability and con-* 
vertibility of sterling or of the currencies of other leading Gold 
Standard countries were never seriously questioned* The modern phenomenon 
of 'hot money1 was known in those days, but as far as the Gold Standard
1# Before the Pirst World War currencies were always freely 'convertible* 
in the modern sense of the word, but not always at a fixed price*
•The normal working of the Gold Standard implied that in a given 
country an influx of gold resulting from an export surplus or a 
certain favourable state of the country's international capital, 
transactions, would lead to an expansion of credit and a reduction 
in interest rates* Purchasing power was thereby increased and more 
imports would come in worsening the trade balance* E'urthermore, 
lower interest rates might cause an export of capital and deter any 
import of capital. In this way, the trend would change and the 
influx of gold would be arrested and possibly reversed#
countries were concerned it was rather of the politically inspired or 
capital flight variety than the destabilizing speculative variety induced 
by expectations of exchange rate movements beyond the limits of the gold 
points* There were virtually no instances of major runs on any of the 
Gold Standard currencies*
However, talk about the merits and drawbacks of central banking 
as contrasted to 'free banking1, began to be heard in the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century at the height of laissez-faire theories and 
policies, but it is significant to note that it was then mainly with 
relation to the control of commercial banks and their note-issuing 
activities* Even the most doctrinaire free-traders, with the except­
ion of Gourcelle-Seneuil in Prance, were unwilling to apply laissez-
faire theories to the business of banking which they regarded as an
2activity requiring some special regulations* But what sort or form 
the banking system should take was still a matter of dispute and what 
regulations should apply to it remained an open question for several
1* Bloomfield, A*I#, Monetary Policy under the International Gold
Standard: 1880-1914* Pederal Reserve Bank of Hew York, October 1959*
2. Smith op. cit* p* 2*
1 mdecades* -the view that central hanking policy could facilitate the 
achievement and maintenance of a reasonable stability in the level of 
economic activity and of prices was scarcely thought about before the 
First ^orld War; prudent banking and the automatic International Sold
1* In his Plan for a National Banka (John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1824) 
Ricardo put forward a plan for ending note issuing by commercial 
banks, including the Bank of England, and the establishment of a
Rational Bank as the sole issuing institution, to belong to the
Ration and to be run by 5 highly independent Commissioners who could
only be removed from office by a vote of one or both Houses of Parlia­
ment. The Plan was published after his death* However, the prime 
motive of Ricardo seemed to be the ending of the privileges of the 
Bank of England, for which he had much contempt; no regulation of 
the banking system was envisaged, nor any intervention in the econ­
omy* The Rational Bank was to be an Issuing Bank only#
It is interesting to note here that in Australia,, as recently 
as 1947 the question of the regulation of banking was widely de­
bated and was subject to Court procedures. The matter arose over 
a nationalisation attempt by the Labour Government* The Australian 
High Court declared that banking was like any 1 trading1 profession 
and should therefore be free of interference. An appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Priyy Council was dismissed, but their 
Lordships, while declaring that nationalisation would be unconstitut­
ional - because it would authorise the total prohibition of private 
banking among the States which would mean restricting inter-State 
trade commerce and intercourse - agreed that regulation of Trade, etc.* 
was compatible with absolute freedom, and therefore banking could be 
subject to certain regulations. Thus the trading banks1 activities 
were regulated by the Banking Act of 1945 Lut the banks could not 
be nationalised, details of the Privy Councils decisions, sees
“Judgement of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council", delivered 26 October 1948*
As will be shown in the following chapter, banking in Lebanon re­
mained regulated by the same laws as any other act of commerce until 
March 1964*
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Standard were still supposed to achieve that unaided* ^
She Gold Standard was suspended during the War with the belief
that as soon as the hostilities ended, it would be reinstated* But
conditions had changed after the War and the financial difficulties
which prevailed during the first years of peace resulted in a severe
strain on the currency systems of the world* These proved unable to
withstand it and were seriously disrupted* Price levels and exchange
rates fluctuated violently everywhere* Countries trying to maintain
a more or less fixed exchange rate to the dollar experienced a serious
decline in wholesale prices which seems to have started in Japan* Others,
pursuing a continuous policy of inflation, saw the value of their
2currencies in terms of the dollar decline rapidly*
However, a quick return to the Gold Standard was still the aim
and in the early 19201 s
"*•• the fashion of central banking was rooted in the broader 
movement of monetary reconstruction after war-time and post-war 
upheavals'*
1* The Federal Heserve System was createdZin 1915 but the primary
motive was really £he creation of a lender of last resort which could 
expand-reserves, the need for which arose in the 1907 crisis* This 
is described later#
2* For full discussion see The Course and Phases of the World Economic 
Depression* Beport presented to the Assembly of the Leqgue of 
IfatTons, First Revised Edition, Secretariat of the League of Rations, 
Geneva, 1951*
5* Sayers, R*S* ed* Banking in the British Commonwealth, 'Introduction', 
op, cit* p* x*
It was felt that central hanks could play a useful role in the re­
establishment of the Standard, and both official and academic expositions 
stressed their importance and the part they could play in bringing 
about a reasonable stability in the level of prices-through changes in 
interest rates and the availability of credit-and in the level of 
economic activity-through discretionary action at the centre aimed at 
preventing temporary disequilibria in the balance of payments from 
causing unnecessary disturbances in the economy* ^he feeling that 
central banks were needed in this context was clearly demonstrated at 
the 1920 Brussels Conference of international experts who, envisaging 
a world of foreign exchange stability proposed without qualification 
that in countries where there is no central bank, one should be estab­
lished.'*'
Ihe enthusiasm for a quick return to the Gold Standard was soon 
followed by disappointment as the world economic conditions seemed to 
deteriorate. A distrust of the central banks of the big countries set 
in with the suspicion that they were enjoying too free a hand in the 
manipulation of the world*s monetary and capital markets. Nationalistic 
feelings were aroused and national independence in monetary affairs 
then became the fashion* Political arguments had made a breach in the
1* de Kock, M.H., Central Banking. 3rd edition, Staples Press, 
London, 1954* P* 19*
economic reasoning that should lie behind the establishment of central 
banks, and these started growing everywhere on a new basis:
"The world-vd.de demand for central banking arose from fundamental 
economic and political trends towards nationalism • •. Any attempt 
to explain the birth of these war babies in purely economic terms 
is bound to be abortive} and equally ineffectual is bound to be 
any attempt to discover whether they would have come into being 
had pure economic reason prevailed* War babies are more often the 
products of impulse than reflections and as for economic reason, 
attempts to make it pure sometimes succeed only in making it 
sterile1**!
bp till then the 1fashion* as Professor Sayers calls it, was to 
insist on the independence of the central banks, i.e., their total free­
dom from any Governmental control or influence. The ideals were the 
privately owned Bank of England - shareholder owned - and the Federal 
Reserve System - bank owned - both of which had no allegiance to any 
Government. This view was strengthened in the 1920*s by the disastrous
experience of some continental countries which subjected their central
2banks to their Treasuries and ended up with hyper inflations. However, 
in the 1930*s the potentalities of central banking were gradually
1. Plumptre, A.P*W,, Central Banking in the British Dominions* University
of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 1940, P* 159* Miss ‘V. Simith says
in this context: "in examination of the reasons for the eventual
decision in favour of a central banking as opposed to a free banking 
system reveals in most countries a combination of . political motives 
and historical accident which played a much more important part than 
any well considered economic principle11* op**r. city p*^2'.
2* Especially in Central Europe where currencies lost practically all
their value. Monetary re-organisation in these countries included 
drastic financial reforms which turned deficits in the public fin­
ances into surpluses and thus reduced the Governmental demand for 
advances from Central banks.
discovered and the Keynesian views on the role of the State in an 
economy were making their impact on the people* The fashion soon reversed 
itself and control of the central banks by the State began to be 
advocated, especially after the Second World War which brought deficit 
financing in many countries and the control of foreign exchange by the 
public authorities* Moreover, on the whole, the role of the State was 
gradually widening, and it was widely felt that a discretionary element 
in the running of the monetary system of the country was not only desir­
able, but also that it should come from the State* And so the world 
witnessed not just a proliferation of central banks but of state-owned 
central banks* Thus in the early 1950fs state-owned central banks 
existed in only ten countries* By the end of the decade their number 
had increased to fifteen* After the War ten central banks were national­
ised while all newly established ones were created as Government -owned 
1
institutions*
In recent years the establishment of central banks has no longer 
been questioned* But the argument for them seems to have shifted 
heavily away from economics towards politics* Part of their role seems 
to have become similar to that of a national airline or a steel mill*
1. ^or more details about the ownership of central banks see Sir T, 
Gregory, The Present Position of Central Banks, Stamp Memorial 
Lecture, 1955* University of London, the Athlone Press*
3LThey have become a symbol of development and of national independence# 
This view is very evident in the following quotation in connection with 
the establishment of a central bank in Syria to replace the privately 
and foreign owned Banque de %rie et du Liban (BSL)s
"The BSL is a foreign bank which came to the country with the 
imposition of the French mandate* How that Syria has attained 
its independence as a result of the evacuation of the French 
troops, it is no longer permissible to keep the right of note 
issue vested in a foreign institute whatever is the degree of 
its loyalty to the Syrian economy; nor is it permissible to 
entrust the function of a governments banker, fiscal agent and 
adviser to a foreign institution however endowed with the 
qualities of honesty« efficienc.v and zeal in pursuing the country1 s 
interests"**
Hot only should central banks be created, but again they should be 
state-owned*
"The Monetary Convention Qf 1938 which delegated to the BSL 
the performance of a basic public service, does not acknowledge 
the right of the State to supervise and intervene in the monetary 
policy of the Bank* And since it is within the competence of 
the State alone to determine what is in the public interest, it 
is therefore necessary that the State should have the necessary 
means to supervise and intervene in all affairs, including , 
monetary affairs, that subject the public interest to danger"*
1* "The creation of central banks •*• is often regarded as being a sign 
of the desire of newly self-governing countries to assert their in­
dependence? it has been interpreted as a political rather than an 
economic development"# Hevin E* Capital Eunds in Underdeveloped 
Countries* The Bole of Financial Institutions* Macmillan & Co* 
Limited, London, I96I, p*22
2* Ashshy G-., The Syrian Monetary System (in Arabic) 3rd ed* Damascus, 
19399 P* 150# My italics*
3» "The reasons for the Promulgation of the Basic Monetary System and 
the Establishment of the Syrian Central Bank" Law Ho* 87 of 28th 
March 1953 Prescribing the Basic Monetary System and the Establish­
ment of the Central Bank of Syria, The Syrian ^pUblic Presst March 
1953* PP* 84-85 (in Arabic)# My italics*
Such political factors, so clearly defined in the quotations above,
X
have been very important in emerging nations and former colonies*
It may be argued that political arguments are irrelevant when
deciding whether to endow a country with a central bank, but public
authorities would find it difficult not to yield to the tide running
in favour of central banks, which tide is caused by the increased
world importance that such an institution seems or is supposed to give
to a country* And for political reasons alone it might be desirable
to establish a State-owned central bank in a country* But on economic
grounds alone a case can still be imagined where a state-owned central
bank as opposed to an Issuing Bank is not necessary* For example, if
one accepts the assertion that lfthe essence of central banking is
2discretionary control of the monetary system", a central bank should
be created only if discretionary intervention in the monetary affairs
of a country is thought to be desirable* If again it is expected that
3
the State would fulfil the role better than a private group, it might 
be preferable if the central bank were State-owned* ^here is no a 
a priori economic reason for a country to have a central bank, nor for
1* ^hey have been important in Ceylon, Burma and some African
territories, all of which have recently established central banks*
2* See footpote 2, p*B above*
3* ^hiw would be the case in a country where the public sector 
is very important in the economy and has the qualified people 
to perform this role*
such a bank to be State-owned*
Because the establishment of central banks became to some 
extent what Professor Sayers calls ,fA matter of fashion11, proper 
thought was not always given to the question whether a particular 
country actually needed a central bank, i*e#, to what such a bank 
could do for the commercial banks and the economy, and how best it 
would perform the role ascribed to it* There was a tendency to 
take as a model the older establishments, and then mainly the Bank 
of England which seemed to work on a mechanical basis; irrespective 
of the individuality of each economy and of the purpose - if any - for 
which a central bank was to be created, its role was visualised in what 
can be called "traditional terms", these being the principles and 
practices ruling in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent in the 
United States in 1913s & central bank should provide the facilities
of lender of last resort, control the commercial banking’ sector and 
dampen the cyclical fluctuations in the economy* ^his implied that 
the various cotintries which were being endowed with central banks 
required an institution to perform these functions* Hot only was 
the role of the central banks visualised in traditional terms, but 
also the powers to be enjoyed by them in the carrying out of their 
responsibilities* Thus, and mainly with relation to the last two 
functions mentioned above, they were granted the traditional powers
that the Bank of England possessed - powers to vary bank rate and to 
conduct open-market operations* Sometimes the power to change 
reserves requirements « as practised in the United States - was 
also granted them. Thus all purposes and all economies were to be 
served by identical central banks in identical ways#
This traditional approach to central banking has often led to 
the establishment - especially in under-developed countries - of 
central banks that are ill-adapted to the requirements of the 
economies in which they were to operate. Thus, for example, in s6me 
British Dominions, the English advisers brought in to help in the 
establishment of their central banks failed
"clearly and consistently to give good advice* They 
recommended the introduction through tigid legislation, 
of the accepted practices of the Bank of England «•#
The advice of more recent years does not generally appear 
to be based upon accumulating experience in the Dominions 
where central banks had already been established. There 
is nothing to indicate that the advisers were aware of 
the anachronisms and anomalies attaching to the Bank 
of England, which they naturally used as their model; 
and the illogic of some of their advice suggests that 
they did not fully understand the technical implications 
of the accepted form of central banking which they were 
inviting the Dominions to adopt. If they were aware of 
the peculiarities of economic development in young 
countries, they made little allowance for them.f,l
1. Plumptre, A»F.W., op.cit* * pp 188-189
Mr. Kevin repeats that last points
"it is generally agreed that the failure to appreciate 
adequately the implications of the differences between 
the state of evolution of the United Kingdom or the 
United States and that of many developing countries 
has resulted in the establishment of unsuitable and 
ineffective central banks in recent years .,fT
In fact, if a glance has been thrown on the earlier history 
of the Bank of England, a lesson could have been learnt to the effect 
that this institution was fulfilling a role that fell to it by reason 
of the circumstances and conditions in which it was working. In 
other words, it had adapted itself to the requirements of the 
country, namely the administration of its monetary affairs and the 
control and regulation of a sophisticated and highly developed 
structure of credit institutions. These requirements are by no means 
common to all countries. One cannot realistically talk of sophisticated 
credit institutions in developing countries! far from giving a central 
bank the powers to control them, it would be more sensible to ask it
1. Kevin E*, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries op. oit 
p. 30
to help in their establishment and development In developing
countries, a central hank will often he less a stabilisation device
2
than a potential agency for development* it may he required to help 
in the creation and growth of a capital market by making it possible 
for the hanks to enter such a market, or it may directly finance 
development projects.
In certain countries with relatively undeveloped commercial 
banks, it may he desirable that the central bank should try to attract 
deposits and engage in ordinary commercial business. It would then 
foster credit to certain sectors. In this context a central bank 
would seek to fill what Professor Sayer calls “gaps unfilled by 
others". In other countries it may not be desirable for it to do 
this as it may affect the willingness of other banks to co-operate. 
$ven in countries with relatively developed commercial banks it may be
1. "... in underdeveloped countries, the role of central banks is not
to any great extent a restrictive one. It is more likely to be in­
volved in expanding the scope of commercial banking and co-operative 
credit, ensuring that facilities are more widely used, and that the 
advantages of a market economy are achieved ••• a tendency for 
general over-expansion of bank credit to the private sector does 
not exist as it does in more developed countries. Bank advances 
are small relative to national income, and tend to be confined 
to financing commerce, especially external trade." Low, A.R*,
*3?he Varied Role of Central Banks1, in ^ oonomic Record. December 
1958, P* 520. Eor case studies of the growth of financial in­
stitutions in various developing countries, see Basch <&., financing 
Economic Development. Macmillan Cq,, New York, 1964*
2# See for example the argument of Newlyn W,E#, and Rowan B.C., Money 
and Banking in British Colonial Africa. Oxford University Press, 
London, 1954) Chapter xiii*
3. Sayers R.S., Central Banking in Underdeveloped Countries. National 
Bank of Egypt, 50th Anniversary Commemoration Lectures, Cairo 195&#
desirable to let a central bank engage in commercial banking to
1provide it with a link with the money market. Such a link would 
provide the central bank with a good chance of finding the technique 
most adapted to its own environment, and of taking the appropriate 
measures at the right time* So here again there is no general rule.
The last point raises the problem of the powers that central 
banks are able to exert in underdeveloped countries* &s noted earlier, 
the tendency has been not only to ascribe a traditional role to the 
central banks but also to give them traditional weapons of monetary 
policy which have often proved ineffective. Bank Hate changes and 
open market operations are not operative in countries where banks do 
not and generally cannot keep stable cash ratios; they are equally 
inoperative when for one reason or another banks do not have much 
reoourse to^the central bank for funds* The maintenance of stable 
cash ratios implies the presence of a developed market for short-term 
money where the banker is able to move in and move out rapidly at a 
low risk of loss. This means of course that the assets obtainable
1. **Being in the market, it [the central bank] would be in a
better position to keep in touch with the market; and secondly, 
it may directly influence the shape of the credit pyramid by 
varying the size of its own contribution." Sea S.N*, Central 
Banking in Underdeveloped Money Markets. Bookland Limited, 
Calcutta, 1952, p. 144*
in that market can easily be disposed of. One way of liquefying an 
asset is to rediscount it at the central bank, which implies that 
this institution should stand ready to buy that particular type of 
asset any time, and to hold an unlimited amount of it. Only if this 
is possible, can the central bank exert any pressure on the structure 
of interest rates, and the availability of credit by using the 
"traditional11 tools of monetary policy*
In some developing countries, e.g. some of the Dominions, central 
banks were established with the authority to rediscount a certain 
class of bills. But as there was no bill or short-term money market,
the central bank was not used as a lender of last resort and its
powers proved useless. In other countries there is an active market 
for a certain type of short-term paper, but of a kind which.ds not 
acceptable to the central bank. This is the case in Lebanon where, 
as will be explained later, banks hold a lot of what is called
accommodation paper, which is not rediscountable at the central:'bank,
finally, it may also happen that although there is an active short­
term money market, banks do not have much recourse to the central 
bank except in emergencies because there is an alternative way of 
liquefying their assets* This is the case when banks tend to offset 
among themselves the surplus funds they hold over the demand for 
them* ’When that happens the money market becomes in normal times the
effective lender of last resort* This point is very important for 
our later discussion on the Lebanon, and for developing economies in 
general; a lender of last resort is not always what is lacking in 
an economy as seems to be implied in the creation of traditional 
central banks, Fr0m this it follows that monetary control which 
is based on the role of a central bank as a lender of last resort can be 
" inadequate, and if it is not to be a lender of last resort, a central 
bank will need a direct link with the money markets this link can (i 
be provided for example by its commercial banking business* It will 
be useful to illustrate this and discuss two examples of money markets 
becoming lenders of last resort* These can be found in the monetary 
histories of the United States of America . and of llcance*
The Federal Reserve System dates back only to 1915* Until then
there was no central banking institution in the United States, although
1banking had been subject of two important pieces of legislation*
1* The Free Banking Act of 1855 adopted by the New York State and the 
National Bank Act of I865* The first one influenced subsequent 
American banking requirements regarding the organisation of banks* 
In the second Act the Federal Government again assumed banking 
jurisdiction after having assumed it iwice before by chartering 
the first and second Bank of the United States (l791~18Hf 
1816-1836)* It provided a national currency and regulated the 
banking profession* For details seeL Wright, C*W., Foonomic 
History of the United States, McGraw-Hill Oo. Inc*, University 
of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1949, pp. 376, 444-445, 671-676.
However, it had sometimes proved necessary to improvise to male© up
for the absence of such an institution, and it is precisely these
improvisations and their limitations that made the need to establish
a central banking institution really felt. The improvisation that
is of interest to us in this context is the correspondent relationship
that was developed to make up for the absence of a lender of last
resort. It started with the need of country banks to maintain balances
with banks in financial and commercial centres on which they received 
1
interest, and the fact that city banks found it profitable to hold 
such balances which they could re-invest at a higher rate of interest. 
The understanding was. that country banks could borrow from their city 
correspondents when for some reason their reserves were temporarily 
inadequate. Such borrowings took place Especially in the summer when 
farmers, generally the customers of country banks, needed money to 
finance their crops. This arrangement made it in fact possible to 
pool the reserves of all the banks and to let the banks work on lower 
cash ratios. On this basis they offset their surpluses and deficiencies 
of cash among each other without recourse to a central bank. This 
correspondent relationship was in fact a form of lender of last 
resort.
But the arrangement could only work in limited emergencies
1. Wright, O.W., Ibid. p. 672.
involving a few banks. In effect it only* made possible the full use 
of existing reserves* 3?he co-operation of the banks could not 
expand reserves when there was a general demand fox^  them from the 
market* In 1906 these reserves were known to be around three billion
 ^ ioas
dollars and that^all banks of the country had access to. 3?he crisis
came in 1907 when there was a general demand for money and the
2
reserves proved inadequate# Banks were reluctant to make advances 
to each other for fear of needing the reserves themselves and this 
of course accelerated the pace of the crisis, ^he inadequacy of the 
correspondent relationship as a lender of last resort was thus clearly 
demonstrated and the need for another form of lender of last resort was 
definitely felt* In I9O8 a National Monetary Commission was created 
by Congress, while the Aidrich-Vree 1 end Act provided for an emergency 
note issue to be retired when the monetary stringency ended. General 
reform came after the appearance of the Monetary Commission1 s Beport 
in 1912, and resulted in the Federal Beserve Act of 191? which 
created the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Beserve Banks»
3
whose fflending power is independent of the funds deposited with them”.
1* Board of Governors of the Federal Beserve System, Banking Studies* 
Washington B.C., I94I, p# 20.
2* For a study of the crises under the National Banking Bystem, see
Sprague O.M.W, *History of Crises under the National Banking System1, 
in Beports of the National Monetary Commission* Washington, 1910*
5. Banking Studies, op* cit. p. 51*
This move gave an elasticity to the currency which was previously 
lacking* The rise of the Federal Beserve System is interesting as 
it is a clear example of a central hanking institution being created 
in response to a definite economic need for it and superimposing itself* 
smoothly on the existing banking structure, which it helped to 
strengthen.^
The same phenomenon occurred in France as in the United States 
in spite of the presence of the Banque de Eb?ance* Terrel and Lejeune 
in their1 Traits des Operations Commereiales de Banques1 described the 
French money market in terms that could be used to describe the 
American correspondent relationships
f,banks have come to offset among themselves the surpluses of 
the supply over the demand for money reaching them, in other 
words the surplus of their loanable funds over their lendings* 
Since it is their holdings of commercial bills that are the 
easiest of their assets to liquify and to transfer, because 
they are rediscountable, they use them for the purpose of such 
offsetting* The name fMarch^"Hors Banque1, or private market, 
is given to the whole of such business taking place outside the 
Banque de France"# 2
Thus, although an institutional lender of last resort existed « the
1# For details of the origin and the early years of the Federal
Reserve System see Willis, H.P«, "The Record of the Federal Reserve 
System", in O.F. Dunbar, Theory and History of Banking* New York, 
1922, and The Federal Beserve System, one of a series of lectures 
prepared for the Blackstone Institute, Chicago, Blaokstone Institute 
1920#
2. H. Terrel and H* Lejeune, Traite* des Operations Commeroiales de 
Banques * Masson & C0# Editeurs, Paris 1926, 5th ed*, pp. 172-175* 
Translation mine#
Banque de France - a money market developed in which the central 
hank did not operate and on which it could not exert pressure in 
ordinary circumstances with the traditional weapons* However, unlike 
the United States, the reserves of the Franch banking sector could 
be expanded because of the presence of the Banque de France. But once 
banks turned to it for redisoounting - as one would think they would 
in emergencies - they were by definition no longer working in the 
March^ Hors Banque, and the Central Bank oould then exert any pressure
it wanted by the traditional tools of monetary policy* The Banque
£
de France is necessary because by itself the Marche Hors Banque cannot 
expand the reserves at the disposal of the banking sector: it only
makes for a better use of them*
The American and French experience just described is useful when
one comes to consider developing economies* Firsif it draws onels
attention to how it may be possible for traditional tools of monetary
policy not to work* In effect these rest on the assumption that banks
i
often resort to the central bank for funds. If they do not, these tools 
cannot be effective. The American and French experience shows us that 
there may be anaalternative lender of last resort in an economy that 
can be totally independent of the central bank. If this is the case, 
the traditional powers of the central bank might well prove inadequate*
Now it is often the case that in developing economies foreign
banks are very important relatively to local ones. They have access 
to practically unlimited funds from their head offices hr branches 
in other countries and thus are totally independent of any traditional 
central banking action including variable reserve requirements, special 
legislation regulating their import of funds could be introduced to 
enforce the traditional tools of monetary policy, but such legislation 
may not always be desirable, and thus other measures may have to be 
adopted. As regards local banks, if there is no active money market, 
they tend to keep high cash ratios,gso that any traditional central 
banking action would take a long time to be effective, if at all.
Thus, for example, in Iraq in the early 1 9 5 ° banks kept high cash 
ratios and it was reported that this
’’serves to explain the f^ ict ... that the commercial banks 
have had ho need to resort to the National Bank for borrowing.•• 
the banks may face a very considerable expansion of their 
lending operations before they become dependent on the central 
bank for additional c a s h " . T
In such circumstances, a case can be made for the use of reserve re­
quirements. But if, at the start, the same reserve ratios are not 
generally kept - as is very likely in underdeveloped countries « it 
would be difficult to impose specific reserve requirements without 
causing- considerable hardship and strain on some banks - which may be
1. Iversen, C.,A Report on Monetary Policy in Iraq, National Bank 
of Iraq, 1954> P* 28#
harmful « while leaving others relatively unaffected. Such situations 
would call for different measures of control depending on the pecul­
iarities of each country#
Another point to notice from the American and French experience 
is that unlike the Bank of England, the Bank of France and the Federal 
Beserve Banks continue to engage in commercial banking, which is 
denied to the majorits  ^of new central banks. This is an illustration 
of the point that here again there should be no general rule#
Before concluding this section there are two points that should
be made with regard to using the central bank as the government bank,
1
and to check the activities of commercial banks* These functions 
have become traditional in central banking prentice. When the central 
bank is the sole custodian of the governments funds it removes one 
very effective means of credit control, By increasing or decreasing 
the proportion of funds held with the commercial banks - or with 
the central bank - the public authorities, who could act on advice 
from the central bank, can expand or curtail the base of the credit
1# The notable exception is Belgium where a Banking Commission performs 
that job# It is composed of a President and five members, one being 
a director of the National Bank of Belgium (Central Bank), two 
appointed from a list presented by the banks, and two appointed 
from a list presented by the National Bank and the Institute fdr 
Rediscount and Guarantee#
pyramid and thus the volume of credit. This measure could he useful
in developing economies where it is intended to encourage commercial
banks in their activities and to keep them under control* It is also
useful when other methods of control are not very effective, for the
authorities can use it in the same way as open-market operations when
these are not possible through lack of a proper money market* This
method was used on and off in the United States until the establishment
1
of the Federal Reserve System in 1913*
Finally, central banks are sometimes thought necessary to prevent
the commercial banks becoming illiquid and insolvent* A constant
watch on their balance sheets is supposed to achieve that aim*
Although this could be an important contribution of the central bank,
it is not a very important argument in deciding whether or not to
create a central bank in a country# In effect, banking sectors have
in their clearing houses a sort of built-in control, for the position
of each bank is known to the others and any signs of illiquidity or
2insolvency is immediately noticeable* If however the clearing house 
is not an adequate check, a banking commission can be formed by the 
Government to look into the balance sheets of the banks#
1# For details of the operations and the attitudes of thendifferent
Secretaries at the Treasury see Banking; Studies, op. cit. pp. 21-25#
2* This is known to have been a powerful check on American banks 
before 1913*
The purpose of this section is to provide a background against 
which the problem of central banking in Lebanon could be approached# 
The role of a central bank is by no means the same in all countries, 
nor is there an eternal set of rules they can all follow# The fashion 
of central banking has often blinded people to the particular require­
ments of the countries in which they were being established, and this 
has resulted in ill-adapted central banks. "When deciding whether or 
not to establish a central bank and what role it would fulfil, the 
question to ask should be, what would this institution do that would 
be required by the economy, rather than, has the country a central 
bank or not? There would then be a much better chance of establish*- 
ing a central bank that could genuinely contribute to the development 
of the economy.
In the early 1960*s Lebanon had to face the problem of whether or
not to establish a central bank as in March 1964 charter of the
note issuing bank, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), a private
1
and foreign-owned bank, expired. The decision was finally in favour 
of a state-owned central bank which started its operations on the 
first of April 19&4, and which Is i :descrihed in the following section.
1. Details of the BSL*s activities will come in Chapter V.
II* ffiie Bank of Lebanon
The charter of the Bank of Lebanon was drawn up in the Law of
1st August 1963? which promulgated what is called the *Code de la
1
Monnaie et du Credit1, which will he referred to as the Code*
^he Bank is created by Article 12* Its general purpose is to 
safeguard the value of the currency with the view of furthering the 
economic and social progress of the country (Art 70)* Its oapital is 
£L 15 million entirely subscribed by the state (Art 15)# A Governor, 
three deputy governors and a Central Council run the Bank* The 
Governor is appointed by the Government for six years and on the 
proposal of the Minister of Finance (Art 18)* The Deputy Governors 
are chosen by the Government but on the proposal of the Minister of 
Finance and the Governor, and for five year terms* All terms of office 
are renewable* Striot conditions regulate the removal from office 
of the Governors and his deputies, who should relinquish all other 
posts while at the Central Bank (Art. 19-27).
The Central Council is composed of the Governor, who presides, 
two deputy governors, and the directors-general at the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of National Fconomy (Art 28)* ^he general 
policy of the Bank is decided upon by the Council (Art 33)* I&
1# Bill promulgated by decree No. 13,313 August 19&3, which
appeared in the Journal Officiel No* 62, on 5th August 19&3*
particular, it fixes the discount rate of the Bank, and it decides 
how best to control the volume of credit* The various ways by which 
this may be done are described in Articles 76-79 3*75* the Bank
can vary its rediscount rate, impose a ceiling on rediscounting, 
operate in the open market for bills, and vary the banks1 reserve 
requirements - to be kept at the Central Bank - which however should 
not exceed 25$ for sight deposits and 15$ for time deposits* The 
Bank is also empowered to restrict hire purchase oredit (^rt 79) 
and to fix and alter cash and liquidity ratios (Art 175)* Commercial 
banks are finally asked to submit their positions monthly to the 
Central Bank (Art 146)*
The Central Council decides on matters relating to note issuing* 
This activity is regulated by Articles 47-*69» In particular, a 
minimum gold cover of 5C$ is required for the currency* It also 
decides on matters relating to the other operations of the Banks 
transactions in the gold market, dealings in foreign exchange and 
co-operation with other central banks (Art 8l)* It should be noted 
in this context that the Bank is not allowed to do any ordinary 
commercial transaction with the private seotor (Art 82)* Its banking 
business can be performed with the public and banking sectors only*
In all its decisions, the Central Council will be helped by a
Consultative Committee of six members which will report to the 
Governor (Art 35-40)* The banking, commercial, industrial and agri­
cultural sectors will contribute one member each, the fifth member 
being from the Planning Council, and the sixth a professor of 
economics* The term of office is two years but it can be renewed 
indefinitely* The Committee has advisory powers only and can give 
advice when asked by the Governor (Art 36) ox when it deems it 
necessary and useful (Art 39*)*
The Bank is the sole custodian of the public authorities* funds 
(Art 85), and it can advise the Government on various measures it 
thinks desirable to adopt (Art 72)* In accordance with the instruct­
ions of the Minister of Finance it will intervene in the foreign 
exchange and gold markets to assure their stability* However, it 
will only be able to deal in foreign exchange convertible into gold 
(Art 75) • Regarding the problem of lending money to the public sector, 
it is explicitly mentioned that the principle is that the Gentral 
Bank does not grant credits to the public sector (Art 89)♦ However, 
the Bank is authorised to grant the Government overdraft facilities 
repayable after four months with amounts not exceeding 10$ of the 
average fiscal receipts over the previous three years (Art 88)* 
Furthermore, in *exceptionally grave circumstances\ the Bank, after 
having studied all other alternatives, is allowed to grant a loan to
the Government# Similarly it is allowed to grant loans to other 
public agencies but in all cases they have to be repaid within ten 
years (Art 91“92)* The rates charged will be the market rates (Art 93)* 
Finally the Bank will help the State in issuing bonds or bills and will 
manage the public debt (Art 97)*
The Bank will also act as a bankers1 bank by allowing them to 
keep accounts with it (Art 98), and by rediscounting their ninety day 
paper bearing three first class signatures (Art 100)* It can also 
offer them the !en pension1 facility, whereby the Bank discounts the 
paper oh the understanding that the commercial banks mil buy it 
again within a month (Art 10l)* Finally, it may grant them credits 
not exceeding twelve months and against the security of first class 
commercial paper, gold, foreign currencies or shares (Art 102)* The 
Bank*s holdings of public securities whether as a result of redis­
counting or of guarantee for a loan should never exceed the amount of 
the capital of the Bank (£L 15 million) and its reserves - accruing 
from profits - (Art 108)* The maximum life of ninety days required 
of a commercial bill to be eligible for rediscounting applies to 
public securities a,Iso (Art 106)#
The control of the banks posed many problems because of the Banking 
Secrecy Law'*' which bankers were eager to preserve* The original draft
1. The Banking Secrecy Law of 1956 makes it an offence to divulge 
information about the credit accounts of depositors# Details are 
given in Chapter II*
of the code had stipulated that inspectors from the Central Baric would 
he able to call at any time at the banks and consult their registers* 
Although the inspectors would respect the Banking Secrecy Law, the 
employees of the banks would not be able to cite that Law as a 
justification for not submitting certain information. This provision 
was bitterly opposed and fought by the Association des Banques du 
Liban (ABL) which emphasised the importance of the Law in the Lebanese
1 meconomy and the need to keep it as it is* The ABL suggested instead
that a banking commission composed of representatives of the commercial
banks, of the Central Bank and of the Ministry of finance be formed
2to which banks would send their statements* This proposition was 
rejected, and the compromise was that a department totally independent 
of the other departments of the Central Bank and attached directly 
to the Governor would inspect the banks* statements? but on no 
account can the inspectors ask for details of crediting accounts, nor 
can they meet anyone but the director of the bank concerned (Art 148^151)*
This is the first time in their history that Lebanese banks have
3
been subject to any sort of control# However, the Code does not
1# Information gathered from the minutes of the meetings held in April 
1963 between the Conseil de la Monnaie et du Cre'dit and the ABL#
These minutes were privately secured* See Appendix for the import­
ance attached to the Banking Secrecy Law by the ABL#
2* This is the practice in Belgium.
5* Details of this will come in Chapter II#
simply create a watch-dog for them. It goes further by laying down 
a set of rules within which banks have to operate* Previously their 
business had been totally unregulated* Ihus, opening a bank needs now 
the approval of the Central Bank (Art 128), and the minimum capital 
allowed is £L 3 million (Art 137) • Originally, it was intended that 
there should be two classes of banks, one specialising in short-term 
credits, and one in long-term credits. But here again the Abl fought 
hard on the grounds that no suitable and clear criteria for distinguish- 
ing the two claseesjof banks were laid down, and the idea was dropped. 
Instead it is simply mentioned that banks must match their assets with 
their liabilities (Art 156)*
Banks are forbidden from running any other business than that of 
banking proper* ^heir participation in any sort of enterprise together 
with all their real estate investments - including their offices ** 
cannot exceed 7W° their own funds, i.e* their capital plus their
reserves (Art 153) ^  ^hey are not allowed to grant loans to their 
Boards of D^irectors, nor to their executives noi? to the relatives of
1* ^his is no more than a compromise figure, the first draft asking for 
a minimum capital of £L 5 million and the ABL insisting thahCL 1 
million was enough*
2* Information gathered from the minutes of the meetings held in April 
1963 between the ABL and the Conseil de la Monnaie et du Credit*
^he minutes were privately secured*
3* Ihis provision is identical to one made in France in the 1945 Banking 
Law, amended in 194&*
these people, unless these loans are approved by the General 
Assemblies of shareholders (Act 152)*"^  finally before agreeing to 
a loan a bank must ask for a detailed balance sheet from the borrower, 
including individual persons (Art 160), and all agreed loans, whether 
used or unused must be communicated to the *Centrale des Bisques1 
run by the Central Baric (Art 147)* ^ke information is pooled and then 
sent out to the banks - which pay for the running of the (Centrale*.
Ihe control of the activities of the Central Bank itself is 
assured by a Commissariat du Gouvernement aupres de la Banque 
Centrals* which is part of the Ministry of finance (Art 43-)* ^he 
functions of the Commissariat are to see that the law is properly 
followed, to check the Bank!s accounts and to report to the Minister 
of finance (Art 42, 44, 45)* It must be kept informed of all the 
Bank*s decisions and it has the right to stop their implementation 
within two days if they are contrary to the Law (Art 43)* It is n°t 
clear whether commercial banks will be able to complain to the 
Commissariat when they think the Central Bank has infringed the law*
If this should develop the Commissariat will be a sort of ombudsman 
of the banking sector*.*
1* A3 will be shown in Chapter II, a few banks were created by people 
beoause they could not acquire credits in other banks. Ihat was 
common in the United States. See reference Chapter II, p. 5*" . Ihis 
measure could not really be taken as a protection to the depositor 
because the shareholders are still usually few and tend to be them­
selves the Birectors and executives of the banks. See Chapter II, Pf6\
2. 3?he * Centrale des Bisques1 is described in more detail in Chapters 
II and Y.
The Code de la Monnaie et du Credit has created a Central Bank 
in a country where the business of banking - as will be shown in the 
next chapter - was totally unregulated save for the Banking Secrecy 
Law of 1956* It has created a Central Bank in a country where - as 
will be explained in Chapter III - laissez-faire has been the creed 
of the people* If one accepts the assertion that the essence of 
central banking is discretionary intervention in the monetary system 
of a country, the establishment of the Bark of Lebanon is tantamount 
to a reversal of previous polioies. Was a change from the previous 
system necessary, and is the new Central Bank well adapted to the 
requirements of the country? The following chapters examine the 
commercial banking sector and the expected future credit requirements 
of the Lebanese economy* In view of these requirements, the important 
functions that could well be served by a Central Bank are discussed 
in Chapter IV* Finally Chapter V discusses whether or not the 
Banque de Syrie et du Liban could have fulfilled the role ascribed 
to a central bank in Chapter IT, and whether or not the new Central 
Bank, the Bank of Lebanon, is able to fulfil it.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
The importance of banking secrecy as seen by 
the Association des Banques du Liban
In view of the importance that the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956 
seemed to have had in the setting up of a mechanism for the control 
of the banks, it may be interesting to reproduce here a letter sent 
by the Association des Banques du Liban (ABL) to the Prime Minister 
who in 1963 was also Minister of finance and therefore ex officio 
President of the Monetary and Credit Council which was preparing the 
new banking law*
In a previous letter to the Prime Minister dated 12th February 
1963, the ABL had stressed that there should be no question of chang­
ing the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956 which apart from the Code of
Commerce, was the only law applying to banking* That law had proven
its worth in 1956, 1958 and 1961 when political troubles would have 
caused massive withdrawals of deposits* The letter pointed out the 
necessity for Lebanon to offer such banking facilities, which necessity
is caused by the very position and smallness of the country.
The same letter then put forward a plan for having two separate 
pieces of legislation, one dealing with "the currency11 and the Central
Bank, and the other with the "organisation" of the hanking profession. 
The basis for this distinction is that the privilege of note issue is 
one of the features of ’’national sovereignty that belongs to the State 
alone, and the Central Bank is a governmental body", whereas the 
organisation of the banking business deals with a ’’free profession 
owned by private bodies"# For this reason, the control of the banking 
business could only be built on this distinction, and so, two bodies 
were required. Finally there follows a comment on various articles 
of the Law.
The second letter reproduced here in full was sent in March 1963• 
Your Excellency,
You very kindly referred to the Lebanese Banks Association 
the projected monetary and credit law prepared by the Monetary 
and Credit Council, asking it to consider it and to comment upon 
it*
The projected law was distributed to all members of the 
Lebanese Banks ASSOciation, and was subject to various comments 
and memoranda from the said establishments. It also underwent 
verbal discussions in numerous meetings arranged by the different 
bodies of the Association.
As a result of studying the project which you kindly 
referred to us, we were honoured to give you a preliminary report 
on 12th February 1963 in which we put forward our points of view 
and our oomments on the establishment of the Oentral Bank.
In the report, we pointed out to your Excellency that the 
banks see that in the foremost it was preferable that the project 
should be tackled with two independent laws appearing together 
or consecutively* The first one would deal with the currency and
the Central Bank, and the second one with the organisation 
of the banking profession#
Our letter of 12th February 1963 explained the reasons 
that lad the Banks1 Association to suggest this course* Tke{3e 
reasons are not concerned merely with the forms they are funda- 
mental to all the resolutions that are subject to discussion*
We added also that regarding the second law, i*e* the law 
regulating the banking profession, the Banks1 ASSOoiation pledges 
itself to put forward its suggestions on it, if your Excellency 
asks for them* And we did emphasize then our readiness to send 
forthwith the second part of the suggestions if and when we were 
asked to do so*
In your letter of 28/2/1963 we were informed that the 
Government does not share the opinion that the projected law 
should be split into two independent laws, the first one dealing 
with the currency and the Central Bank, and the second one 
with the regulation of the banking profession*
At the same time you kindly included new amendments to the 
first project which you had already sent us* These amendments 
embodied fundamental changes regarding the regulation of the 
banking profession* Ag a result we werei forced to revise our 
comments on the part that deals with those regulations* But for 
that we would have sent the following comments immediately on 
receipt of your letter.
Your Excellency,
The Banks1 Association^ memorandum had included the 
reasons that led it to give the first advice which is the division 
of the projected law into two independent laws*
It also included a very clear offer to study the regulation 
of the banking profession to arrive to a law that can be adapted 
effectively to the requirements of an economy that is as structur­
ally complicated and original as that of Lebanon. In all frankness 
that was our aim*
The failure to produce any explanation for refusing to split 
the law into two laws that could be passed concurrently or con­
secutively leads us to reemphasize the desirability of such a
course, which we had explained in our previous memorandum to you, 
and by which we still stand.
The second advice, namely, the respect of the Banking Secrecy 
Law when it comes to controlling the banks, is something essential 
for the Banks* Association. The foundations of the control mechan­
ism as it emerges in the two projects you submitted are in direct 
conflict with Article 2 o£ the Law of 3rd September 1956*
That Law did not create banking secrecy as a privilege to be 
enjoyed by the banks but as a duty the banks must observe, not just 
for the benefit of the banking profession, but more specifically for 
the interest of the public and of those who deal with banks.
The duty of the banks to preserve the secrecy that is imposed 
by Law* for the benefit of their clients makes it imperative that 
details about their clients are known to the directors of the bank 
only*
If such details were known to people outside a bank and not 
part of the Board of Directors, as would be the inspectors of the 
Central Bank, effective professional secrecy and responsibility 
would be libst* Thus would result in a crisis of confidence among 
the people who have used banking secrecy in their interests.
Had the Banking Secrecy Lav/ been no more than a privilege 
granted by the legislature to the banks, it would have been possible 
to reduce its scope to a certain extent* But, and we repeat it 
again, the case here is that of a duty imposed by the Legislature 
on the banks and the contravening of which is severely punishable; 
this duty was imposed in the interest of the general public and of 
the depositors. As a matter of fact the law is the privilege of 
Lebanon*
In which case, any measure aimed at weakening the idea of 
banking secrecy is in contradiction with reality or even a straight 
cancellation of the law that imposed professional secrecy on the banks* 
That law was the one that fixed the present economic organisation 
of the Lebanon and that constitutes one of its main structural parts*
The effects of the Banking Secrecy Law are in fact felt beyond 
the frontiers of Lebanon and reach all those who trust ouk laws, 
their maintenance and stability; and, tilings being what they are,
it is not possible nor can it be thought of touching the rights 
of those who have trusted us* That trust has increased our 
economic resources and has contributed to our development and 
prosperity*
Therefore, the Lebanese Banks* Association consider that any 
attempt, even if indirect or separate, to touch the Banking Secrecy 
Law is an attempt to change the foundations of our economic system, 
of our future wealth and of the well-being of our people*
And considering that some sort of control is necessary and 
useful, it is imperative that clear cut measures are taken to ensure 
that the names of people protected by the Secrecy Law, do not show 
up at all*
This is the most important provision that should be adopted 
in any control mechanism whatever form it may take.
In its previous memorandum, the Banks* Ags0ciation had 
indicated a way worth considering and that would, thanks to its 
very nature, ensure the provision above-mentioned*
If it is possible to go further in the discussions, the 
Association is prepared to take part in such talks ?/ith the people 
responsible for the matter, in order to find a way that is acceptable 
and that is adapted to the principle of banking secrecy*
Finally before we move on to the comments on the texts, we 
should like to refer to the fact that the project ignores the pro­
fessional organisation that exists [The ABL] and which could be 
called upon to co-operate to reach the goals pointed out in the 
legislation* This role of such organisations is recognised in the 
legislations of a great number of countries that have great experience 
in the field of banking.
Therefore, Your Excellency, we allow ourselves to reiterate our 
suggestion that a meeting or a series of meetings be arranged before 
the final texts So to the Council of Ministers.
Awaiting your invitation to the meeting we present our deep 
respects.
The President of the Lebanese Banks* 
Association,
Pierre Egge*
Meetings between the Banks1 Association and the Government were 
arranged, the first one being on 21st March 1963* At the first 3 
meetings were present the Minister of the members of the
Monetary and Credit Council, a delegation of the ABL and a representative 
of the Issuing department of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban* All 
the points subject to dispute were discussed, but important decisions 
were taken in the fourth meeting when only the Minister of Finance and 
Mr* Paul Klat (of the Monetary and Credit Council and himself a banker) 
representing the Government, Mr. Pierre Edde' (President of the ABL) 
and Mr. &lex$n.&ex Sara (Counsellor to the Abl), representing the 
banks, were present. T}le fourth meeting was held on 2nd Ap^n 1963*
The ABL did not succeed in splitting the legislation but won 
many concessions regarding the control of the banks and their organ­
isation. Its position was considerably strengthened as a result.
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CHAPTER XX 
COMMERCIAL RAHKING- IN LEBANON
This chapter starts with a rapid survey of the development of 
commercial banking in Lebanon# Then follows a description of the 
activities of the commercial banks and a consideration of their 
liquidity position* This will be useful for a later discussion on 
financing economic development in Lebaiion.’*’
It is important to note from the start that all the statistics 
that will be used are very approximate# The only official source is 
the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) until March 1964* 
du Liban (Central Bank) thereafter# Other sets of statistics do exist 
but they were compiled privately, and where they differed from the 
BSL ones, no indication was given as to why this should be the £ase*
That is why the official sources only are used* More detailed statistics 
were obtained through an official monetary institution which we cannot 
cite# Where that is the source it will just be mentioned that the 
information was privately secured#
I* ■ Development of Commercial Banking in Lebanon
The Lebanese banking system provides for a country whose area is 
25 times smaller than that of Britain and whose population amounts to
1* In Chapter IV*
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a mere 2 millions* But its strategic position on ancient trade routes,
its particular position in the Middle East context, and the energies of
its people have combined to give it an economic importance quite
disproportionate to its size. Thus it was said:
!lLebanonfs greatest economic advantage lies not in its 
natural but in its human resources. The inhabitants of 
this coastal range of mountains have been traditional
sailors from ancient times, and through their migrations
have kept contact with growing civilizations. This 
outgoing disposition made easy, during the last century, 
an early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon 
a lead in the adoption of Western education and led thus 
to a higher level of education, greater skill and more 
versatility among the population than can be found in 
other parts of the region.1*
The growth of the Lebanese banking sector is very recent. Its 
history goes back over a few decades only. One can however trace the 
existence of banks back to the second half of the XIX dentury. But 
these were mostly foreign both in capital and in management* They 
financed foreign trade, leaving domestic trade to the few and small 
local banks and discount houses. The most important foreign bank then 
was the Imperial Ottoman Bank incorporated by Royal Charter, and which 
had British and French capital. It assumed great importance and this 
led the Turkish Government to recognise it as the state bank which would 
deal with the Treasury. It had branches throughout the Ottoman Empire 
but the most important one was the Beirut branch.
1. F.A.O. Development Project, Lebanon. Country Report. Rome, 1959 
Chapter I, p. 2.
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The other foreign banks operating in Beirut were the Deutsche 
Palestina, the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Banque de Salonique • ^
The first two were German, established respectively in 1889 and 1906.
The third was controlled by the French Societe Generals to start with,
*  s
and then by the Credit Foncier d*Algerie et de Tunisie, which still 
operates in Lebanon*
It is not possible to have details of the activities of local
banks and discount houses, as no information to this effect is
2
available; but it is reported that their main customers were merchants -
presumably for internal trade - and landowners* Thus when the First
World War broke out, the banking sector in Lebanon was still in its
embryonic stage* Credit to farmers or industrialists was practically 
3
non-existent* Industry was still very unimportant in the country and 
agriculture still occupied 75$ °£ population. When in need of 
funds the farmers had to resort to money lenders who charged very high 
rates of interest, sometimes reaching ^Ofo per annum*
When it broke out, the First World War killed the embryo that 
was developing. With the defeat of Turkey and Germany practically
1. Himadeh S* B*, Monetary and Banking System of Syria* American Press, 
Beirut 1955t P* 30*
2* Toak J. W# J. Monetary and Banking Developments in Lebanon. M.Sc* (Econ) 
thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Typescript, I960. Information received from private interview with 
Professor S. B. Himadeh of the American University of Beirut.
5* There was one agricultural bank for the whole Ottoman Empire and it
had agents in the main cities. But it only lent against real estate or 
movable property and not against crops.
all foreign banks in Lebanon had to close their doors, A ffcesh start 
had to be made, The initiative came now from France, The Banque de 
Syrie et du Liban, a Frenoh institution, took over the functions of the 
former Imperial Ottoman Bank while other French banking institutions 
established branches in Lebanon, Banks from other countries followed 
the French example and shared a thriving commercial banking business.
One bank - French - the Credit Foncier d'Alg^rie et de Tunisie, 
specialised in mortgage credit. Alongside the opening up of branches 
of foreign banks, new Lebanese banks were established. These started 
operating in the late twenties. The most important were the Banque
X
Robert Sabbagh and Co,, Banque 0. Trad and Co, and Banque Misr-Syrie- 
2
Liban,
Looking back over this period between the wars, it seems strange
that local banks could survive and prosper alongside foreign banks with
formidable resources and experience in the monetary field. To understand
how they managed it, we might quote Professor R* $* Sayers on the
subject of banking in an economy:
11A banker has two main functions : he is part of the
capital market linking lenders and borrowers, and he
at the same time provides a means of payment , • •, In 
a new field the success of the banker as a provider 
of means of payment depends upon his success as a lender 
and borrower; and his success as a lender and borrower 
likewise depends upon his success in providing a means
1, Row known as Banque G, Trad (Credit lyonnais) S,A,L,
2, Later renamed Banque Misr-Liban,
of payment. The two aspects of his business are 
inter-dependent, *•, Because of this interdependence, 
banking cannot be regarded as the automatic functioning 
of a money machine. The progress of a bank depends, 
more than anything else, on the relations developed 
between borrower and lender - whether the bank is the 
borrower and the customer the lender, or vice-versa*
Banking is thus conditioned by the general economic 
structure, especially in the readiness with which property, 
in goods, lands and other assets, lends itself to the 
creation of security for loans. But everywhere and all 
the time it is a matter of relations between hanker 
and customer and the detailed background of their 
everyday business'*^
This quotation sums up well why local banks prospered alongside 
their foreign competitors, for it is particularly true of the Lebanon 
that the progress of a bank is ,!a matter of relations between people1*. 
There are two reasons for this, and they are worth considering:
(1) Lebanon is a very small country and the business and financial 
community is even smaller; personal relationship is made much 
easier by the fact that people know each other. Furthermore, when 
local banks were first established, their customers were mainly 
merchants and landowners who would know the banker and would be 
known by the banker,
(2) The banker himself was usually a successful businessman who 
considered that having a bank of his own would crown his career.
1, Sayers R, S,^  ed. Banking in the British Commonwealth, Oxford, the 
Clarendon Press, 1952, *Introduction* pp, vii-viii.
Banking had certainly some appeal to the people. The fact
that he was in business before opening his bank made him
known to the people who would actually use the bank* It
was certainly true - and still is - that people used one bank
rather than another not because the performance of that
1particular bank was good, but because the names associated 
with it were known to them. Most banks started as private 
firms and usually bore the names of their founders. Thus, 
people had personal contaots and connections with locak 
bankers, which they did not have with foreign bankers. This 
encouraged them to place their funds with local bankers and 
to deal with them.
Furthermore, the quotation above rightly says that banking is 
“conditioned by the general economic structure, especially in the 
readiness with which property in goods, land and other assets, lends 
itself to the creation of security for loans'*. In the case of Lebanon, 
real estate was the chief tangible asset of most people and lending 
against such a security was quite common as it was considered to be 
the safest. Foreign banks were reluctant to make this type of loan
1* In any case no regular balance sheets were published*
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while Lebanese bankers knowing better the local customers, assessed 
with more confidence their credit worthiness and were prepared to 
accept real estate as a security for loans# As there was no legis­
lation to regulate the banking business, it was left entirely to the 
discretion of the hanker whether or not to grant a loan and on what 
security* With so much being left to his initiative, his credit as a 
banker was established not only with the public, but also with foreign 
banks* This is where the relations local bankers had with the people 
became important# For, funds being limited, local banks had to compete 
for them by offering high rates of interest on sight deposits* But 
foreign banks had access to large funds, part of which came from their 
head offices# They had no intimate knowledge of tbe customers1 credit 
worthiness and were not ready to accept real estate as security for a 
loan. So the Lebanese banker stepped in: he borrowed the money from
the foreign banker, giving him the kind of security he liked to have, and 
lent the funds thus acquired to his customer against the security of 
real estate# This must have been the origin of the highly developed 
Lebanese *Marche Hors Banque* which will be described later in the 
chapter* Thus from both sides - the foreign banks* and the people*s - 
factors favourable to the growth of local banks were at work.
After the Second World War, the banking sector in Lebanon grew
at a pace which made the Governor of the new Central Bank later !twonder
1sometimes whether it has not been too rapid11* Many factors accounted
1* Governor Takla*s speech at the Rotary Club dinner on 25th May 1964, 
reported in L*Orient, of 27th May 1964*
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for its prodigous growths
1* Laissez-faire
There was no restriction whatsoever on the opening up of
new banks, and no legislation regulated their work* The business
of banking was considered an act of commerce* Indeed the 'Code de
Commerce * which regulated all commercial business applied also to
banks* Ho rules governed minimum reserve ratios. Banks x^ ere not
1
even asked to produce regular balance sheets.* This total freedom 
certainly made things much easier for anyone to open a bank*
Furthermore, and as a consequence of this total freedom, the 
same phenomenon that took place in the United States in the XIX 
Century was apparently taking place in Lebanon. In the period 
1816-1860 in the United States 'the organisation of banks •••* was 
often owing not simply to the need of some community for the 
facilities provided thereby but also to the wish of the organisers 
to secure the means for financing some of their own enterprises*
Thus Secretary of the Treasury Crawford writing in 1820 said that 
most of the banks started after 1812 were organised
,l*.. not because there was capital seeking investment, not 
because the places where they were established had commerce and
I The Law of 1959 instituting the Monetary and Credit Council had 
stipulated that the banks should submit regularly to the Council 
statistics to enable it to carry out its duties* The Association des 
Banques du Liban pointed out that the Council not being a banking 
institution could not have access to such information without contravening 
the Banking Secrecy Law. That was accepted by the Council of Ministers 
and a Law on 18th September 1961 altered this provision and said that the 
statistics would eventually have to be sent to the Central Bank. The 
banking profession remained thus unregulated*
manufactures which required their fostering aid, hut because 
men without active capital wanted the means of obtaining loans 
which their standing in the community would not command from 
banks or individuals having real capital and established credit**.1
In Lebanon it was not so much perhaps the case that banks 
refused credit to unworthy borrowers as the fact that these men who 
wanted credit thought they could get it on better terms - and make a 
profit - if they opened their own banks* After all, they could run it 
the way they chose* This factor certainly accounted for the opening of 
not a few banks*
Laissez-faire also encouraged and gave confidence to foreign banks 
to open branches in Beirut* The Middle East is important from the point 
of view of finance, and Lebanon seemed one of the safest places - 
politically and economically - for foreign bankers to work from* Thus among 
others, American (Bank of America, First National City Bank of New York,
o
Chase Manhattan Bank), British (British Bank of the Middle East,
Eastern Bank Limited), French (Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 
1‘Industrie, Credit Foncier d*Algerie et de Tunisie), Italian (Banco di 
Roma), Butch, Belgian, Canadian, Russian and Arab banks opened main offices 
in Beirut* Some banks preferred partnerships with local banks: the
1* Wright, C* W* Economic History of the United States* McGraw-Hill 
Book Co. Inc* 2nd Edition, 1949* PP« 371-372.
2. Now a member of the Hong Kong Bank Group.
Credit Lyonnais of France with Banque G, Trad S*A,L,; Others have just 
representative offices; this is very common with German hanks. The 
representative offices differ from the others in that they deal with 
documentary credits and investment only. This fact stresses and proves 
the importance of Beirut as a trade centre* This brings us to our next 
point,
2, Geographical position of the country .
Beirut is at the doorstep of the Middle East, a developing
region of the world vital for its mineral resources* The Lebanese
always kept close commercial contacts with the West and the Arab
world, and thus channelled Middle Eastern trade with the West 
2through Beirut, This necessitated a great expansion of the port
of Beirut and the growth of ancillary activities* Among the
3latter were banking activities. The importance of this trade 
sector is readily seen from national income estimates; in 19&2,
32fo of the national income was derived from trade alone,^ thus 
making this sector the largest contributor to the national income.
1, The Bresdner Bank, the Gommerz Bank, and the Bayerische Vereinsbank
among others have representative offices in Beirut, Some American
banks have recently opened representative offices; Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Co,, Bankers* Trust and Irving Trust,
2* See, for example, I*B,H,D,, The Economic Structure and Credit 
Worthiness of Lebanon, Washington, B,C, 1952 (Typescript),
3* For a comparative analysis of the growth of commercial banking in the
Middle East, see Ali, A®,, ’Banking in the Middle East*, IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 6 1957-58.
4. See Chapter III pp.irvy
Transport and communications with the rest of the world were easily
1and speedily done through Beirut* Thus beside being in a politically 
stable country and being an agreeable place to live in, Beirut was 
the most convenient city for foreign banks to choose to open a branch*
3* Abundance of Capital
There are about 2 million Lebanese people living outside the
Lebanon* They had left Lebanon to find work and have usually established
prosperous businesses abroad* Every year they repatriated large
amounts of money often used either to open a new bank or to contribute
2
to the capital of an established one. A steady flow of deposits 
into the banks was oreated as repatriation of funds took place*
Besides the emigrants1 repatriation of funds, capital was also 
provided by Arab nationals and especially those of oil-producing 
countries. The reason they chose Lebanon as a haven for their
3
capital was that among the Arab countries Lebanon is one of the
1. These facilities were not available to the same extent in 
neighbouring countries.
2. For example, the Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce, S*A*L., and the 
Bank of Lebanon and the Middle East S.A.L* Rough estimates of how 
much are repatriated are available for 1954-57.
L.L. millions
1954 58.4 Source; Paul Klat, Economics Research
1955 79*5 Institute, American University
1956 87*5 of Beirut, 1958*
1957 95.1
3* The common language and the proximity were the reasons for preferring 
an Arab country.
most stable countries politically speaking and has had total and 
free convertibility since 1950* Furthermore, the economy was 
expanding steadily and Lebanon was the only country in the 
Middle East able to boast a 90$ gold cover to the currency. As 
will be explained later this was an important factor in encouraging 
the inflow of capital#
Finally what encouraged people from all over the Middle 
East to deposit money in Lebanon rather than elsewhere was the 
Banking Secrecy Law of September 1956. Article 2 of the Law 
stipulates that bank employees and managers are forbidden to 
divulge the names of their clients, or to give any details per­
taining to their holdings or their activities, to any private 
person or administrative judiciary or military authority. They 
can only do it if they have the written consent of the client, if 
the latter has gone bankrupt or if there arises a dispute - within 
the context of banking - between the bank and the client* Further­
more, numbered accounts are permitted and this guarantees the 
complete anonymity of the client* Article 8 of the Law makes it 
an offence punishable by imprisonment to contravene the Law.
X
Any complaint is followed by public action against the bank.
1. Switzerland is another country where banking secrecy prevails. But 
it is not a law as in Lebanon. It is an agreement on the scale of 
the 'cantons1, i.e. the Federal Government can force a bank to 
divulge details on certain deposits* In Lebanon it is a law the 
contravention of which is punishable;
In the Middle East context this Law was bound to attract 
capital in need of haven* Moreover, it must have encouraged 
Lebanese people to keep their precautionary cash balances in 
Beirut and not abroad, as used to be the case.
The success of the Law in attracting foreign money was 
partly due to the interest rate policy of the commercial banks*
As we shall see later in this chapter, high rates of interest are 
paid on eight deposits* Therefore not only complete secrecy 
surrounded the identity of the depositor, but he was able to 
receive interest on his deposit and to withdraw it without notice#
4* Internal developments encouraging the growth of banks
In addition to those already mentioned one can add the 
readiness with which the Lebanese people accepted to use banking 
facilities# Thus in 1951 > 45$ total money supply - sight
deposits plus currency circulation - consisted of notes* In 196$, 
the proportion was nearly halved and stood at 2 5$* The reason 
behind this is not only the growing confidence people had in the 
solidity of the banking sector but also the rapidly expanding 
branch banking system as banks went to the country*
Supply conditions were not the only determinants in the 
growth of banks in Lebanon# Demand for funds was also important; 
except for 195$ > economy grew steadily* Its heavy emphasis on
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trade helped in the development of the short-term credit that 
this sector required, and "that is why, heoause of their qualities 
as intermediaries as financiers and as exchange dealers, hanks 
have naturally found a propitious field for their blossoming 
and a favourable climate for their expansion in this region made 
for trade, in this growing country where business is increasingly 
active, in the midst of an intelligent and cultured population 
and sheltered by laws guaranteeing the patrimony, the integrity 
of the currency and the freedom of business"*^*
II The Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector
In this section the activities of the commercial banks in 
Lebanon are described and, for that purpose, their combined balance sheet 
is examined. Wherever possible we shall consider the growth of the 
figures since 1950* Figures before April 1964 were compiled by the 
BSL and are incomplete in the sense that they do not encompass all the 
banks* But as they include the largest banks they can still be used 
for an analysis of the growth of the banking sector* Since April 1964 
the figures have been compiled and published by the new Bank of Lebanon 
(Central Bank)# They are comprehensive in the sense that all banks are 
included* But as we shall see there are still many imperfections in 
their compilation.
1* Saadia E, Article in Action (Lebanese Journal) 1955* Translation 
from French is mine*
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1. Liabilities
A* Capital. The total capital invested in banks operating
in Beirut - foreign and local - amounts to £L 436*516 million.
But that amount is not fully paid. £L 581*220 million had been
paid in August 1964* Although local banks are now public companies
2
with limited liability, they are still owned by big shareholders
who usually direct and manage them too. This is due partly to the
origins of the Lebanese banks described earlier in the chapter, and
partly to the unsatisfactory working of the Bourse of Beyrouth where
wild speculation - which can be harmful to the clients1 confidence
x
in the bank - goes on unchecked. This discouraged many banks from 
having their shares quoted on its floor. The capital of local banks
was provided mainly by Lebanese businessmen, by Arab nationals - 
mainly from oil producing countries - and by Lebanese emigrants.
Until April 1964 there was no minimum capital required for a bank* 
Since that date a minimum capital of £L 5 million has been required.^
1. Figures applying for August 1964# Source t Banque du Liban (Banque 
Centrale). (The capital distribution of the banks has been impossible 
to obtain).
2. That was made compulsory by the fCode de la Monnaie et du Credit*.
Art. 126, the details of which are given in the preceding chapter.
5. More discussion on the Bourse will come in Chapter III.
4* A 3-yeax period of transition has been provided.
As regards foreign banks operating in Lebanon, the same 
rules applied: no minimum capital had to be earmarked for
Lebanon until April 19&4* Since then £L 5 million is the 
minimum that must be committed to the country*
B* Deposits * Commercial banks in Beirut offer demand, time 
and saving deposits facilities in Lebanese Bounds or in any other 
currency. Before April 1964 statistics relating to the banking 
sector were compiled by the BSL in a very haphazard way* The 
figures include certain interbank deposits and are not inclusive 
of all banks* However, they can be used to get an idea of the 
growth of deposits between 1950 and 1965*
(a) Demand Deposits
In Lebanon, banks compete for d eposits by offering 
high rates of interest even on demand deposits. Rates vary 
from bank to bank and within one bank from one depositor to 
another. The rate is often the result of bargaining between 
the banker and the depositor, but in fixing it the banker 
will have regard to the amount deposited and to its 
fluctuations. Rates vary from 2^ to 5$* 7$ is sometimes
offered but this is rare.
Column 1 of Table I shows the growth of demand deposits 
in Lebanese Pounds from 1950 to 1965* From 252 million 
in 1952 they rose to £L 1,419 million in 19&3* From 54*7$
1
of the total money supply In 1952 , demand deposits were
up to 75*2$ in 1965# The increase in the proportion was
gradual and constant except for the last quarter of 1956
and for the third and fourth quarter of 1958* The political
events accounted for the drop in demand deposits in these 
2
periods# People ran down their deposits in Beirut, 
preferring to hoard their money or alternatively deposit 
it abroad#
The figures given in Table I are yearly and not
seasonally adjusted* The reason is that we found no regular
seasonal variations in demand deposits* Adjusted figures
were on the whole very close and almost identical to actual
3
figures* Where they did vary, political factors were the 
obvious reasons*
Money supply beings demand deposits plus currency outside the 
banking sector#
In 1958 the Suez War and in 1958 the civil disturbances in 
Lebanon* Details in the Appendix*
Unusual falls were recorded in Novemeher and December 1956 and 
in the second half of 1958.
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T A B L E I
DEPOSITS IN LEBANON* JS L*L* MILLION*
End of Private Demand Government Time Currency
Deposits Deposits Deposits Circulation*
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1950 210* n* a* 6 190
1951 253* n* a* 6 199
1952 232 73 12 192
1953 219 109 19 195
1954 246 126 27 232
1955 299 67 39 255
1956 307 147 42 320
1957 447 120 30 343
1958 443 152 54 384
1959 621 170 78 385
i960 716 254 113 399
1961 796 503 138 403
1962 971 n*a* I84 440
1963 1,419 n*a* 261 466
Sources I*M*F* International Financial Statistics
* Includes Government Deposits 
+ i*e* currency outside Banks*
More detailed figures of demand deposits are
available for the period after April 1964* They are
now broken down in two figures according to the ownership
of the deposit* Thus there are checking accounts -
column 2 of Table II - which are defined as "accounts of
individuals, accounts that are generally fed by remittances
of funds"; and there are current accounts - column 3 o f ■
Table II - which represents "professional deposits,
1
accounts fed generally by remittances of bills". No 
comparison is possible with the figures of Table I for 
the following reasons:
(1) Figures in Table I include certain interbank 
deposits which in Table II come under 1 Banks and 
Correspondents*. Interbank demand deposits were 
not given separately before April 1964*
(2) Certain banks must have included their savings 
accounts in their demand deposit figures before April 
1964 as no separate figures were given for these 
before that date.
(3) Figures in Table II inolude deposits in foreign 
currencies.
1. Both definitions come from Statistiques Bancaires. Instruction No. 
1/62 published by the Lebanese Ministry of Finance. It was the 
first attempt to standardise the banks' balance sheets.
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T A B L E  XX
DEPOSITS SINCE ABRIL 1964 
ITT L.L. MILLION
Month Saving Checking Current Time Banks & * Misc.
Accounts Accounts Accounts Deposits Correspondts. Creditors 
(1) (2) (5) (4) (5) (6)
April 571*1 618,0 660.8 427.5 918.6 389.8
May 606*7 627.8 64I.I 408.7 908.3 373.5
June 655.2 619.2 643.1 403.9 994.7 361.1
July 687.9 614.6 624.6 414.3 1,031.5 373.4
August 716.5 611.4 629.7 410.9 1,058.9 288.3
Sept* 735.5 635.6 612.3 4OO.7 1,074.2 380.3
Oct. 769.6 612.9 618.3 389.3 1,032.5 389.7
Nov. 793 722 614 375 1,057 400
Dec. 8354 641.3 644.8 387.9 1,098.9 428.7
Source i Bulletin Statistique Mensuel. published by the Direction Central© de 
Statistiques.
* These are interbank d eposits and include amounts due to the Bank of 
Lebanon which stood at L*L. 64*5 million in April and L*L* 65.1 million 
in September* I^ These figures were privately secured)*
Movements of checking and current accounts can be
seen in Table II# The drop in the summer may be due to the
considerable political uncertainty that prevailed pending the
election of a President at the end of August* This caused
a slowing down of economic activity, which refleoted itself
in lower business deposits. Moreover a certain amount of
private capital must have gone abroad. Not much more can he
said as yet of demand deposits as they are presented now, for
we have no adequate series of them* Of especial significance
is the importance of current accounts - professional accounts -
in the totals they vary around half the total figure, and this
1
is important to remember for later analysis#
(b) Savings deposits or accounts
These deposits are s imilar to demand deposits in that 
they can be withdrawn without notice. But they differ in 
that the holder of the savings deposit cannot use it as a 
means of payment i.e. he cannot draw a cheque on that deposit*
He can only cash it himself over the counter at the bank.
This form of deposit is half-way between demand and time deposits 
It is immediately available - and thus it is on demand - but
1* The proportion of demand deposits in total deposits is in the 
subsection on time deposits*
it cannot be usdd for cheque payments - and here it is
1like a time deposit*
The similarity of savings accounts and the other 
two forms of deposits might explain the absence of separate 
figures for them before April 1964. Borne banks must 
have added them to their demand deposits whereas others 
left them out of the commuhicated statistics altogether*
Generally speaking savings accounts receive a higher 
rate of interest than demand deposits and the interest is 
free of tax. The rate is higher because these accounts 
are not expected to fluctuate as much as demand deposits: 
on the one hand, their administrative costs are thereby 
lower, and on the other, a smaller reserve ratio has to 
be kept towards them. Their non-fluctuating character can 
be seen in column 1 of Table IX* Whereas other deposit 
accounts fluctuated between April and September, savings 
accounts rose all the time. The very large increase over 
this short period - over £L 160 million - is puzzling but 
it may be due to a better compilation of the figures.
1. Theoretically time deposits cannot be used for cheque payments* 
They can only be cashed by the depositor after he has given the 
minimum period of notice.
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(c) Time Deposits
These usually take one of two forms* Either they 
are fixed, in the sense that there is a redemption date - 
three months, six months or one year - beyond which no 
more interest is payable unless the contract is renewed.
Or else, thejf are withdrawable any time, but with an agreed 
period of notice.
Rates of interest vary from bank to bank and from 
customer to customer and are higher than for the other forms 
of deposits. They vary between As &&d 6|fo* Higher rates are 
sometimes offered, but this is rather exceptional.
Column 3 of Table I shows the growth of time deposits
in Lebanese Pounds since 1950* Prom £L 6 million in that
year they rose to £L 261 million in 1965* The increase was
more than forty-fold and larger by far than that of demand
deposits shown in column 1. In 1952*** they were 4*9?^  o£ total
deposits, while in 1963 they were 18*3$. The increase is
2
substantial but the proportion is still quite low Compared 
to other countries*
1. We take 1952 because demand deposits figures for 1950 and 
1951 include government deposits.
2* There is the qualification however, that figures include inter­
bank deposits and we do not know to what extent these swelled 
one kind of deposit more than the other.
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Column 4- of Table II gives data on time deposits from
April to September 1964* great difference between the
figures for December 19&3 figures for April 1964 is
due to a wider coverage of banks and better compilation#
The proportion of time deposits to total deposits is now
18*6$, Sometimes savings deposits are considered as one
form of time deposits and then the ratio is computed by-
adding them together* This gives a ratio of 4 which is
quite high when compared with other countries. However, it
is not totally* justifiable to lump together savings and time
deposits, for although they share certain characteristics,
1
they are not identical# A savings account could be used 
like a demand deposit, and thus it|i.s not entirely certain 
that one could identify it with a time deposit#
The 18*6$ ratio of time deposits to total deposits is 
quite low and one reason for this very low proportion is the 
interest differential between demand and savings deposits on 
the one hand, and time deposits on the other# This differential 
is not high enough to make up for the inconvenience and risk 
of having one!s account on a term basis# This suggests that
1* See p# 68*
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demand deposits are interest elastic, and a fuller discussion 
of this point will come up later#
Certain hanks refuse large funds unless they are 
deposited on term# Others, even more cautious, refuse large 
deposits altogether on the grounds that if the depositor asks 
for immediate repayment the hank cannot turn him down on 
grounds of notice# But from private interviews I have had 
with hankers it seems that the latter case is rare#
(d) Foreign Currency Deposits
As stated earlier, any person in Lebanon can open an 
account in any currency he chooses in any hank in Beirut# 
Foreign exchange transactions are totally free and thus the 
currency is chosen purely on the grounds of convenience, 
confidence and risk. Although it is believed that most 
deposits in foreign currencies are owned by foreigners, 
Lebanese people do own a substantial part of them too* The 
reason is often that they keep proceeds in foreign currency 
in that same currency for some future payment* This action 
is a safeguard against exchange risks. For example, an 
exporter of cotton fabrics to Cyprus or India, will be paid 
in Sterling, part of which he will keep as a Sterling deposit 
to pay for the importation of machinery from Britain# This 
practice is also very important in triangular trade#
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Deposits in foreign currencies can be either on 
demand or on term# Separate figures for such deposits exist 
for the years 1955-1962 only# How in the official statistics 
they are added to deposits in Lebanese Pounds* Interest 
rates received are usally slightly higher than for corres­
ponding deposits in Lebanese Pounds# The reason why this is
1
the oase is explained in a later chapter.
Table III shows the growth of deposits in foreign 
currencies between 1955 and 1962# The increase is remarkable 
as can easily be seen# Demand deposits still constitute the 
most important portion, varying around 82$ ©f the total#
Data for the period after 1964 (April), do not mention
separately foreign currency deposits, but reliable sources
put private - non-bank - deposits in foreign currencies at
2over £L 600 million; this is quite a large amount as it is 
equal to 26*5$ of deposits in Lebanese Pounds# The importance 
of these foreign currency!deposits and the total freedom to 
move from the Lebanese currency to foreign ones, will clearly 
emerge in a later chapter#
1# Chapter IV.
2. Figure privately secured#
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T A B L E  IXX
Deposits, Advances and Discounted Bills in foreign currencies
In £L thousands#
End of DEPOSITS INVESTMENTS
Fixed Sight Total Advances Bills
Discounted
1955 12,661 58,516 71,177 41,102 5,105
1956 16,266 65,756 82,022 57,318 8,591
1957 18,252 97,085 115,317 73,512 31,454
1958 17,000 120,000 137,000 72,000 5,000
1959 33,000 132,000 165,000 91,000 6,000
i960 53,700 314,900 368,600 147,700 11,600
1961 72,000 380,000 452,000 146,400 15,100
1962 78,500 380,100 458,600 124,900 14,237
Source: BSL, Rapports.
(e) Banks and correspondents
Table II gives the available figures for interbank 
deposits in the column f Banks and Correspondents1. They 
are put alongside other deposit figures for comparison: they
are equal to over half the total of column 2, 3 and 4*
Data relating to interbank deposits before April 19&4 
do not exist, but the amounts revealed in the new statistics 
lead us to think that they must have been substantial.
The magnitude of these deposits is important as it
gives an idea of the activity of the money market in Beirut*
The chief function of this money market is to enable the banks
to cover theirrcash requirements or to employ their excess
1liquid resources among themselves. Thus, Bank A in need of 
Lebanese Pounds contacts Bank B which, if it has the required 
amount, will deposit it with Bank A and receive interest on it* 
The deposit can be on sight, at notice or with a fixed maturity. 
The operation may take place in any currency, and the liquid 
resources of the banks do not have to be limited to the ones 
in Lebanon. Thus foreign banks may and have brought in funds 
from their head offices abroad which they have injected into 
the Lebanese money market* Alternatively, Lebanese banks can 
ask for funds directly from non-resident banks* For example, 
if resident bank A is in need of £L 850,000 and it has no
1. There are no Treasury Bills and no short-dated Government 
Securities in Lebanon.
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adequate paper for rediscounting, it may ask non-resident 
bank B for, say, £100,000 which, if B is willing, will be 
deposited with A* This latter will deposit the £100,o00 
with the Central Bank - previously with the BSL - and get 
a loan of £L 850,000 which is roughly the equivalent. When 
payment falls due, A will give the £L 850,000 back to the 
Central Bank, and withdraw its £100,000 which will be returned 
to B.
1According to very reliable figures, £L 469*6 million 
were due in April to non-resident banks, and £L 552.5 million 
to resident banks. The Bank of Lebanon was owed £L 64*5 
million. We notice that the sum of the three items comes 
to £L 1,086*2 million which is above the corresponding figure 
given in Table II* The reason is that in the latter figure 
amounts due to head offices, subsidiaries and agencies outside 
Lebanon are not included: they come under another section
called 1miscellaneous creditors1. The difference of £L 167 
million between the two totals, must be then what banks, with 
head offices or subsidiaries or agencies abroad, brought 
into the country.
1. Privately secured.
The importance of the money market in Beirut should 
by now be clear: it enables banks to meet sudden shortages
of cash or liquidity without having to ask for the help of 
the Central Bank (or previously of the Banque de Syrie et 
du Liban). Its activities are tantamount to those of a lender 
of last resort. This money market is somewhat similar to the
American correspondents relationships, or to the French
/  1 
1 Marche Hors Banque* described in the first chapter. But
the Lebanese Marche Hors Banque or MHB differs in ome
important way from the American and French arrangements. In
the United States, banks could only make full use of existing
reserves. They could not expand them when the need arose.
Put simply, they just made the best of what was available.
Although their activities looked somewhat like those of a
lender of last resort, they could not meet a general crisis
in the banking sector. The inadequacy of this system was
clearly demonstrated by the 1907 crisis. In that year,
faced with an unusual demand on their reserves, and unable to
acquire extra ones, city banks froze on to what they had,
1* See Chapter I pp. 3. ^ 2#*.
hoping to remain solvent* Country hanks could not get
the help they had expected from their city colleagues,
and they had ho alternative source of funds* It was then
1that the real need for a lender of last resort was felt*
The French MHB provided also a better use of the 
reserves held by the banking sector, and it was quite useful 
in normal times* But just like the Correspondent Relationship 
in the United States, it could not by itself help the banks 
in times of crises* The difference from the United States, 
however, was that the Banque de France stood ready to rediscount 
paper when the need arose* But when the banks went to the 
Banque de France, they were no longer operating in the 
Marche Hors Banque by definition*
The difference between the Lebanese MHB and the 
American and French arrangements is that foreign banks take a 
very active part in it* Theoretically, their presence makes 
possible unlimited supplies of money for all practical purposes 
as they can always ask for funds from their head offices to 
deposit or to relend to Lebanese banks, which are in difficulty*
).* The outcome was the Federal Reserve Act of 1913* An outline of the 
steps leading to it was presented in the first chapter*
The figures given above are evidence of that sort of 
thing happening. The presence of the foreign banks makes 
the Lebanese MHB a proper lender of last resort, and one 
that can cope with emergencies because the reserves of the 
banking sector axe not limited by the domestio supply but 
can be expanded with more funds from abroad. This is the 
great importance of foreign banking in Lebanon. A foreign 
banker in Beirut told me that $Ofo of his credits go to 
Lebanese banks.
It is very important to stress here the magnitute of 
what one could call ’foreign intervention* in the Beirut 
money market* The fact that so much money can be made 
available from abroad - £L 469*6 million in April and 
£L 614*0 million in September 1964* whether from non-resident 
banks or from overseas head offices subsidiaries or agencies, 
is very important and has implications for monetary policy*
The rates of interest paid on interbank deposits vary, 
depending on the currency used, the origin of the funds *
i.e. where they came from^the nature of the deposit, the 
standing of the bank, the supply and demand positions, and 
finally the amount of redis countable paper held by the 
borrowing bank. The first factor needs to be explained: if
the funds deposited are surplus liquid resources in 
Lebanese Pounds, the rate paid is lower than if the funds 
were in foreign currency or had to be brought from abroad* 
The reason is that to discourage the foreign investment by 
a bank of foreign currency acquired in Lebanon, or to 
encourage the import of funds from abroad, the rate offered 
in Lebanon has to be higher than the one that those funds 
would yield abroad* Funds in Lebanese Pounds can only be 
invested in Lebanon; if they are converted into foreign 
currency, they can be invested abroad* But such investment 
has to yield a rate of return that takes into account the 
exchange risks incurred in converting Lebanese currency into 
foreign currencies* Banks may not always want to take such 
exchange risks and thus they are willing to deposit their 
surplus Lebanese currency with other banks in need of them 
and at a rate that satisfies the other factors involved.
The amount of rediscountable paper held J.s important,
for if bank A needs Lebanese Pounds and holds such paper,
*it can rediscount it at y/o at the BSL* Therefore bank B 
with surplus Lebanese Pounds at its disposal must accept 
less than 5 on the funds it can deposit with A* Otherwise 
the latter would prefer rediscounting*
This means that the BSL rediscount rate sets an upper limit on the rate 
that banks would charge each other on rediscountable paper. The rate on 
other paper could be higher0
(f) Miscellaneous Creditors
This is an item that appears in the new set of 
figures* Apart from the credits granted by head offices 
subsidiaries branches or agencies of banks outside Lebanon, 
are included here the accounts of directors and associates. 
Other such creditors are debtors accidentally creditors of 
the bank, i.e* who have been authorised an Overdraft and 
suddenly deposit more than they have withdrawn* Also under 
this heading are included guarantees received by the bank 
in cash, sums blocked by virtue of a regular contract as 
guarantee for current risks, or because of a le&al case, 
and finally fees and taxes collected by the bank from a 
third party on behalf of the fiscal authorities*
Column 6 of Table II shows the amounts due to 
miscellaneous creditors from April to September. As is 
clearly seen they are substantial* With the data available 
we cannot explain the sudden drop of nearly £L 100 million 
in August which was more than compensated for in September.
2* Assets
Although very detailed data are available to the new Central 
1
Bank, they are not published in a very enlightening way, and as
See Statistiques Bancaires Instruction No l/62« published by the 
Ministry of Finance*
mentioned earlier, private sources had to be used*
A. Cash
Cash ratios for the period prior to April 19&4 cannot be
calculated for lack of sufficient data. The exercise is however
possible for the period after April on the basis of privately
1secured information*
For April 19&4 cash in tills and with the Bank of Lebanon
amounted to £L 105*4 million while holdings of foreign currency
and coins were £L 5*7 million* This makes total cash holdings 
equal £L 109*1 million. These figures and the corresponding ones 
for September can be seen in Table IV*
The cash ratio is seen to be very low compared to other
countries* Thus it was 4*5?^  in April and only 2*5?^  in September. 
This compares with an average of &fo for the United Kingdom. There 
are two main reasons for the very low ratio in relation to other 
countries. One is the high liquidity ratio maintained and the 
other is the fact that banks do not really need to keep more. Both 
of these will be discussed l^ter.
1* Cash and liquidity ratios have never before been compiled for the 
Lebanese banking system*
B , Liquid assets
Money at call is added to cash holdings in the official 
figures. These can be seen in Table IV. From £L 1,070*5 million 
in April they rose to £L 1,140*9 million in July and they fell 
back to £L 1,075*7 million in ©ctober, probably due to a fall in 
the cash holdings which in turn was reflection of the fall in 
demand deposits. Money at call represents sight assets at other 
banks which, with uncleared cheques, amounted to £L 959*8 million 
in April and £L 1,056*0 million in September*1
Table IV gives also figures for the commercial bill portfolio
i •.
of the banks* There was one slight decrease in May but otherwise 
increases in absolute terms were recorded. It is interesting to 
note how commercial bills have been faring. Table V shows this for 
the period before April 19&4* The proportion in the total money 
lent fell steadily from 50*7$ to 22*2$. Although the data in Table 
V are not complete in that they do not encompass all banks, the 
ratio and the trend seem correct because if we consider the data 
for April 1964 the ratio stood at 16*9$.
The liquidity ratio can now be calculated. For April 1964 
it was 42*1$ end for September 45 • 2$*^ * In the numerator we included
1* Figures arrived at thanks to privately secured data.
2. The ratio may be overstated because only gross figures are available for 
the interbank business, and a large part of the bills portfolio held by 
banks is in the form of accommodation paper not rediscountable at the 
8L in__prdxnary circumstances but are negotiable at other bankso To the 
extent that such bills are not as liquid as rediscountable bills the 
liquidity ratio is inflated.
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T A B L E  IV
EXTRACTS EROM THE BANKS' ASSETS IN L.L* MILLION
Month Cash and Portfolio Advances and Portfolio
(1964) at call Bills debiting a/cs Securities
(1) (2) (?) (4)
April 1*010*5 442.4 2.166.7 182.6
of
which
of
which
cash 
at call
109.1
959.8
to non- banks
to banks
1,518.8
647.9
others 1.4
May 1,086.8 441.8 2,131.0 165.9
June 1,095*0 445.9 2,206.9 158.5
July 1,148.9 448.4 2,247.6 161.3
August 1,045.6 462.6 2,306.0 161.1
Sept* 1.099.6 479.1 164.7
of
which
of
which
cash 
at call 
others
62*6
1,056.0
1.0
to non­
banks
to banks
1.553.3
820,2
Oct* 1,075.7 475.2 2,369.1 164*5
Nov* 1,158 475 2,379 I63
Dec* 1,244.5 492.0 2,387.7 170.5
Sources Bulletin Statistique Mensuel* and on basis of privately 
secured information.
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T A B L E  V
ADVANCES AND DISCOUNTED BILLS IK 
LEBANESE POUNDS 
(L«L« Million)
End of Advances to Discounted Total Ratio
private sector bills 2/3
(1) (2) (3) ?6
1955 272 121 393 30.7
1956 285* 164 447 36.6
1957 561 155 516 30.0
1958 369 159 528 29.0
1959 469 180 649 27.8
i960 659 233 892 26.1
1961 739 265 1,004 26.4
1962 900 257 1,157 22.2
Source; BSL Ramaorts# The figures exclude advances to the public 
sector those granted in foreign currencies#
* This figure is misleading as advances fell sharply in November and 
December following the recall of some loans during the Suez crisis#
cash, balances at the Central Bank, money at call and short 
term commercial bills# The denominator had all six items of 
Table II. The ratio is thus higher than is normal in developed 
monetary systems, but of course the cash element in it is quite 
small# By comparison with traditional practice**- this may seem 
abnormal* But traditional practice should not serve as a guide 
in this subject: this ratio should be considered in the light of
the Lebanese monetary system which will be done later in the chapter#
The liquid assets of the banks are held largely in foreign
exchange. In April 1964 'the very liquid foreign assets amounted
to £L 1,005*8 million and in September they amounted to £L 1,270#5 
2
million# This represents more than double the banks liabilities 
to non-resident banks. Bata on deposits held by non-residents 
other than banks, are not available, but such deposits are known 
to be substantial - as can be seen roughly from Table III' which 
gives deposits in foreign currencies r  and probably exceed the 
deposits of foreign banks# As the practice of most banks in
1# By traditional practice we mean here the practice that prevails in 
to-day!s developed monetary systems which are often taken as models# 
That was explained in the first chapter, p. \t#
2# Bata privately secured#
3# These figures include a certain amount of deposits owned by residents#
That is why they are only a rough guide#
Lebanon has been to maintain foreign assets roughly equal to 
their total foreign liabilities, these non-bank foreign deposits 
must be in the region of £L 600 million*
It Should be mentioned finally that the Lebanese Government 
has a very small debt which was entirely held by the BSL and now 
by the Bank of Lebanon* There are no short dated Treasury Bills 
banks can take up with their surplus cash and no government bonds 
for investment*
The discount rate applicable to commercial paper is shown in 
Table VII*^ It went down from 6*9?6 in 1950 to 5•'W0 in 1955? Then 
it fluctuated, but until 1964 the trend was upwards* In the last 
quarter of 1964 it was 7*3$* The factors influencing the discount 
rate will be considered later in the ohapter*
C. Advances
Credit operations of the banks are concentrated mostly on 
financing trade, both internal and external* Data relating to 
sectoral advances axe not available in detail for the period before
1* See p.^Cbelow*
2* Since then it has fallen to below the Tfo mark*
1964* What is available are rough estimates for two years - 
1954 a&d 1957 * compiled for the American Embassy in Beirut.
They are only available in percentages and are reproduced in 
Table Via. Trade takes the lion’s share of advances, although 
its share seems to have fallen between the two years* Advances 
to industry are not mentioned separately. These must have been
quite small early in the period considered, as industry relied 
heavily on self financing. But it seems safe to assert that one 
of the reasons why the ratio of advances to land and buildings 
increased was not only the fact that this sector boomed considerably; 
advances to industry were becoming more important and less and 
less of a short-term mercantile character, so that banks must 
have gradually included them under the section 11 advances to 
buildings11 •
Table VIbgives estimates as compiled by the Bank of Lebanon*
The figures are available for December 1964 on y^» One can
easily see that trade still occupies the first place with
£L 987 million being lent to that sector (68/0 of the total given)
industry coming second with £L 236 million, building third with
1
£L 141 million and agriculture fourth with £L 124 million.
1* Source: Bank of Lebanon, Annual Report 1964*
T A B L E  VI 
DISTRIBUTION OF ADVANCES AND DISCOUNTS
(a)
Sector
Percentages.
1954 1957
Trade 60 40
Land & Building 20 55
Public & Government 
agencies, municipalities 20 25
TOTAL 100 100
Sources U.S. Embassy* Beirut*
(b)
Sector December 19^4 " ln millions.
Trade 987
Indus try 236
Building 141
Agriculture 124
These credits are those extended to residents only (See Statistiques 
Bancaires Instruction No l/62 p* 22)
Sources Bank of Lebanon, Annual Report 1964
Advances are granted against the asecurity of some asset 
or are unsecured. The security accepted varies. Banks accept 
shares, bills, stocks of goods or even real estate as collateral 
for their advances* Real estate used to be prominent as a 
collateral because cautious banks preferred to lend against the 
security of a tangible asset and because people offered that 
security5 in their minds it was the safest of all collaterals*
It may seem strange that banks could lend against the security of 
such an illiquid asset, and in traditional terms - as defined in 
the first chapter - it looks risky and unsafe. But the reason 
banks could do it was simply that in the depositors1 minds too, 
real estate was the safest security, and as long as depositors 
did not feel nervous about such loans banks could go ahead with 
them.
Unsecured advances are called 1lines of credit1• A 
borrower can draw money up to an agreed maximum mentioned in a 
contract*
Rates of interest charged vary between 5 &ud op/0t Determinants
of the rate include the quality of the borrower, the amount
borrowed, the collateral offered, and the maturity of the loan.
It may seem strange that banks can charge such rates when they pay up to 
62^ 0 on deposits: it would then be relatively easy to borrow from one bank 
and deposit with another at a profit. This may be happening but not to 
any significant extent because of the imperfection of the market: banks 
which offer the highest rates on deposits do not command the same confidence
as the others* Besides, if a businessman can borrow at low rates of
interest he may well find alternative investment opportunities with higher 
profit margins.
The terms of loans are usually short. No proper medium - or 
long-term credit is granted by the commercial banks. The only 
form of credit approaching medium-term credit is the short-term 
loan tacitly renewed when it matures. One semi-public institution 
specialises in medium-term credit but we shall consider it later on.
Table V shows how advances in Lebanese Pounds - including 
interbank advances - moved between 1955 and 1962. The increase - 
nearly fivefold - is startling. It is a reflection of the pros­
perity of the economy and the increasing importance of advances 
relative to commercial bills. Thus, while the ratio of discounted 
bills to advances was 44• 4$ in 1955 it was 28.5$ in 1962,
The statistics compiled and communicated by the Bank of 
Lebanon also include inter-bank advances. They are shown in Table 
IV. The great increase since 1962 is not real. It is simply that 
the latter figures are more comprehensive and include all interbank 
advances - except money at call - and not just a few, as in the 
previous statistics.
Privately secured information gives us more detailed figures 
for April and September 1964* In April advances to the non-bank 
private sector were £L 1,518.8 million, which leaves £L 647*9 
million as advances to banks. The corresponding figures for 
September were £L 1,555*5 million and £L 820.2 million. This shows 
again the extent of co-operation among banks.
We have not got sufficient data yet to adjust for seasonal 
variations. However, we tried to do it for the figures before 
April, 19649 and there was no sign of seasonal factors at work*
Banks can grant advances in foreign currencies. These are 
quite important and are normally equal to about 15$ of advances 
in Lebanese Pounds. Prom £L 41 million in 1955 they rose to 
£L 125 million in 1962.^ The banks used part of their foreign 
currency deposits to grant such advances repayable in the same 
currency. We have no separate data for advances in foreign currencies 
granted after April 1964# Ihey are added to advances in Lebanese 
Pounds.
The ratio of advances to deposits can mow be calculated.
It is not worth doing it for the period before April 1964 because 
some - and not all - interbank advances were included in the 
estimates, and deposit figures included some interbank deposits.
For April and September 1964 ratios of advances to the non­
banking private sector to non-bank deposits - including some of 
the miscellaneous creditors - are 60.7$ ajcwl 60*5$ respectively.
Here banks aeem to stick to the general rule of trying to maintain 
a 60$ advance to deposits ratio.
See Table III p. 75*
D. Portfolio - Securities
These are the least liquid assets held by banks. No data 
are available before April 1964 so we concentrate on those 
figuring in Table IV. They comprise securities issued by the 
Lebanese and foreign public sectors, Lebanese and foreign 
investment and participation securities, and cashable coupons 
and securities.
Resident banks do not hold Lebanese government securities 
but may hold foreign ones. The domestic investment portfolio 
amounted to £L 75*0 million in April and £L 56*4 million ih 
September. The foreign investment portfolio was equally important 
with respectively £L 75*1 million and £L 56.4 million. The fall 
in these two components, which constitute the main part of the 
total, was responsible for the decrease in the latter between 
April and September* Participation in industrial ventures is 
thus quite small*
The reason for the fall may be attributed to the banking
difficulties in the spring of 1964 following the failures of two
1
banks, and a fear of a credit squeeze by the new Central Bank* 
Rather than caql back their advances, banks preferred to sell
This caused certain withdrawals from other local banks.
some of their investment portfolio, which they could replenish 
onoe the difficulties were over* This move is clearly seen in 
the fact that in September the figure was increasing again, for 
by that time things were back to normal.
The ratio of such investment to total deposit liabilities 
can again be calculated* In April it was 5*1$ and in September 
4*2$• If we exclude interbank deposits the ratio becomes 7*5$ 
and 6*4$ respectively* These can be seen to be quite low* The 
reason for this low ratio is that part of the illiquid investments 
of banks goes into building. Thus the figures for April and 
September are £L 125*4 million and £L 141*2 million respectively. 
The ratios of these to total deposit liabilities are 5*3.$ and 
5*7$* Thus if we include - the investment in building we get 
a more accurate investment ratio of the banks. It varies then 
around 8$.
k
E. The Discount rate
Before leaving our discussion of the banks’ assets we must 
consider briefly what determined the discount rate during the 
period 195Q-1964* determined solely by market
conditions and no intervention to influence its movements took
i. vk* m W  ^
place, unlike most countries where central banking action can
influence its fluctuations* The trend was downward until 1955
and then upwards to reach 7*3$ in 19^4 • The factors determining
the very small and gradual changes - as can be seen in Table YII -
were economic and political. The economic factors were deposits,
currency circulation, claims on the private sector and state
finance. Political factors were important in so far as they
1
affected the economic ones and especially deposits.
Ill OTHER FEATURES OP THE BANKING SECTOR
Before moving on to an appraisal of the liquidity position of the 
banking sector it may be interesting to consider briefly interbank co­
operation. One aspect of it is, of course, the Marche Hors Banque, which 
allowed a full use of the reserves of the banking sector. Its importance 
as a lender of last resort and as a ’hidden money market1 has already been 
discussed and measured. The function served by the Marche Hors Bank has 
been completely overlooked by writers on Lebanese banking. Another aspect 
is the Gentrale des Risques designed tb help the banks assess more accurately 
the credit-worthiness of borrowers. The Gentrale is described in more 
detail in Chapter Y.
1. See Appendix for more details on the movements of the discount rate.
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T A B !  E VII
AVERAGE MARKET DISOOTOT BATE 1990-1964..
Quarters
Year I II III IV
1950 6.905 6.843 6.703 6.746
1951 6.677 6.625 6.660 6.556
1952 6.466 6.520 6.416 6.44O
1955 6.215 6.156 6.110 6.153
1954 5.896 5.566 5.406 5.050
1955 5.186 5.165 5.206 5.233
1956 5.246 5.253 5.330 5.220
1957 5.556 5.256 5.273 5.326
1956 5.493 5.505 5.620 5.700
1959 5.886 5.900 6.080 6.060
i960 6.020 5.970 5.733 5.666
1961 5.66 5.60 5.65 5.70
1962 5.70 5.70 5.76 5.91
1965 5.96 5.99 6.26 6.69
1964 6.94 7.03 7.3
Source s International Financial Statistics
Finally there is the Lebanese Banks* Association. This body 
has been growing in influence in recent years* It may be compared 
with the Committee of the London Clearing Bankers or with the Belgian 
Banking Association in that it represents the interests of the banks 
in negotiations with the Government, and more recently with the Central 
Bank. But it differs from them in that it does not fix a scale of 
deposit rates. This is important to remember.
As noted in Chapter I the Association was consulted closely 
when the Code de la Monnaie et du Credit was being drafted* It 
exerted great influence in the setting up of the new Central Bank and 
in determining the power to be given it* However, it has no powers 
over banks, nor does it fulfil any educational or examining functions.
IV APPRAISAL OF THE BAKKXKG SECTCR
A consideration of the liquidity position of the banking sector 
is useful for three reasons. One is that it will help in a later 
discussion on whether banks can contribute to the financing of the 
economic development of Lebanon* Another reason is that it may throw 
some light on whether a Central Bank was needed to control the liquidity 
position of the banking sector, for as already described the banking 
profession was totally unregulated in Lebanon and this has been the 
cause of widespread criticism* Finally it will help later to assess 
the scope for monetary policy*
The cash ratio kept by the banking sector as a whole was 4*W° 
in April and 2*5$ in September 1964* On the one hand this figure 
seems low if compared to other countries, and on the other it seems 
to fluctuate sharply* Could this be held against the banking sector 
or is there nothing dangerous about it? In other words why can the 
banks keep such low cash ratios? To answer this question an examination 
of the nature of deposits and of the liquidity ratio is necessary*
1* Nature of deposits
Time deposits constitute only 18*6^ 6 of total deposits*
1Considered as it is, this is a low proportion and would traditionally 
imply that banks should keep higher oash ratios than they do at 
present* But two factors militate against this; the proportion 
of savings deposits in the total deposits and the use made of 
demand deposits*
A. Savings deposits
Savings deposits, constituted in September 1964 50*8fo 
of total private and non-bank deposits* From the point of 
view of the banks' need for ready cash they are closer to 
time deposits than to demand deposits* The time deposits 
proportion of 18*6^ is thus misleading when taken by itself*
The nature of the savings deposits reduoes the need for a 
higher cash ratio*
1* See footnote 1 page 84 for meaning of traditional*
B* Demand, deposits
These deposits constitute the largest proportion 
of deposits* Geherally speaking, depositors keep on 
demand what they think they will need for transactions 
purposes plus a varying amount to hedge against unforseen 
expenditure* Their surplus liquid resources are either 
invested in stocks, shares or real estate, or deposited 
on term to receive interest* The extent to which depositors 
behave this way can be judged by consideration of the 
annual turnover of demand deposits* When deciding whether 
the turnover is high or low due regard should be given to 
the average income payments intervals in the country* If 
the payments interval is long one would not expect a large 
turnover figure*
To compute the turnover of demand deposits we can divide the total 
debits figures of the banks over periods of one year, by the corres­
ponding amounts of demand deposits. But for Lebanon no data relating 
to debits are available, and we shall use an alternative method* This 
consists in using clearing figures instead of bank debits* It is less 
satisfactory as it does not include direct encashments over the banks1 
counters, and clearing within one bank. To make up for this we propose 
to increase the clearing figures by 50$* This seems adequate as in the
Lebanon branch banking is not predominant yet -> when there are many 
banks there is less likelihood of clearing within one bank*
Sable VIII shows the turnover of demand deposits in the years
1950-1963• She adjusted figure is computed by increasing total
clearings by 5C$. She turnover, or crude velocity, is shown in
column 4 1 a turnover of 3 means that the deposits are used once
every four months* Shere are very few weekly wage earners in Lebanon
and the income payments interval is either two weeks or one month*
"When this is compared to the turnover figure, it is immediately noticed 
1how low/it is*
Shere is however one reservation that has to be made* She 
turnover figures given in Sable VIII are too low because the deposits 
data are swelled by some interbank deposits and by some savings deposits* 
A more accurate figure can be found for the year ending in April 19&4* 
and here we include current accounts and checking accounts in the 
deposits figure* She turnover then is 4•5> which means that total 
demand deposits are used only once about every two and a half months*
Shis is still a very low figure when compared to the income payments 
intervals•
1* She grea$ increase in 1951 was not due to an increase in
commercial transactions in Lebanon but to speculative financial 
operations caused by the Korean War, which were reflected in the 
exchange market where the dollar rate rose Considerably (LL. 3*87) 
as a result of large imports and stock piling*
T A B L E  VIII 
TURNOVER OF « H D  DEPOSITS
IN L.L. MILLION
Year Total Clearings Adjusted figure Bern* Deposits Tumove
1950 364 546 210 2*6
1951 553 1,229 255 4*8
1952 722 1,085 501 5.5
1953 574 862 524 2.6
1954 639 959 562 2.6
1955 926 1,592 444 5.1
1956 1,222 1,855 440 4.1
1957 1,454 2,181 551 5.9
1958 1,370 2,055 559 5.6
1959 1,941 2,911 778 5*7
i960 2,228 5,541 955 5.4
1961 2,413 5,620 1,082 5.5
1962 2,593 5,889 1,268 5*9
1963 3,617 5,425 1,402 5.8
Sources For clearings and deposits Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel.
The adjusted figure is total clearings increased by 50fo* The 
turnover is obtained by dividing the adjusted figure by the 
demand deposits.
This suggest that demand deposits are not used in Lebanon the 
way they are used in more developed monetary systems, and therefore 
a traditional approach to them is misleading* a large part of the 
demand deposits are carried forward all the time without being used*
This is very important as will emerge later and it is worth considering 
why demand deposits have this characteristic*
(a) Interest rate policy
The structure of interest rates is a very important factor. 
Demand deposits receive high rates of interest ranging between 
3 and So one of the reasons why people deposit on sight
more than they actually need for transactions purposes is the 
fact that the difference between the rates offered on demand and 
on term is not large enough to make up for the inconvenience and 
sacrifice of having the deposit on term* The difference within one 
bank rarely exceeds 1$, while demand deposits in one bank receive a 
higher rate than time deposits in another* This is confirmed by 
the fact that when the rate on a demand deposit is fixed, the banker 
has regard to the frequency of use of the deposit* the higher the 
balances kept, the higher the rate*
The conclusion that demand deposits in Lebanon are interest 
elastic can her£ be drawn, and it can be assumed that if less 
interest - or no interest - was paid on them, savings and time
deposits - which are less liquid - would increase* Therefore, 
a large part of the demand deposits are just a form of time 
deposits, which in ordinary circumstances are not used for 
current transactions, and which, in more developed countries 
might have been invested in stocks and shares, and which finally 
swell the denominator of the ratio giving the turnover, producing 
a very low figure for the latter.
(b) Banking Secrecy
Another factor accounting for the very low turnover of 
demand deposits is the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956 which attracts 
foreign deposits to the country* 'Conditions are ideal for:
(i) anonymity is secured
(ii) interest is paid on demand deposits
(iii) funds can be deposited in any currency.
In the Middle East these conditions are important for
depositors, and their funds, while swelling the demand deposits
total, are not currently used* In Switzerland where no interest
is paid on demand deposits, a lar&e part of these funds would
1
have been deposited on term, or invested in securities*
Even then, owing to the vast amounts of foreign capital Switzerland 
receives,( the crude velocity of sight deposits never reached the 
figure iof.d. in the period 1950~63: it fluctuated between 0*5 (1958) 
and 0*8 (1963). Figures based on statistics for the largest 62 banks, 
published in Bulletin Mensuel by the Banque Rationale Suisse.
(°) Social Causes
Generally speaking, the development of welfare institutions 
tends to increase the velocity or turnover of demand deposits.
The reason is that less money is then needed to he kept on sight 
as a precautionary measure against illness, unemployment, and the 
like. Social and medical insurance which usually appear at some 
stage of development, tend to affect the sight balances Carried 
forward from one income payment period to another. In Lebanon 
welfare institutions are still in their embryonic stage, and their 
effect is not felt yet. Therefore morejpalances are kept with a 
precautionary motive than in those countries which are taken as 
models of banking behaviour*
(d) Lack of alternative safe liquid assets
The third factor mentioned raises a question: if people
wish to keep certain liquid balances for unforseeable events why 
do they not acquire liquid assets or shares which could be sold 
easily, and with no great capital risk? The reason lies simply 
in the fact that such assets do not exist in Lebanon. There are 
no Government securities yielding a relatively fixed rate of 
interest. The Stock Exchange or the Bourse as it is called, is
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badly organised and very narrow: this affects adversely the
liquidity of shares. Moreover the capital risk is great as the
1shares are subject to dangerous speculation. Liquid investment 
lacking, people, Lebanese and foreigners alike, resort to the 
liquid, safe and interest-yielding demand deposit.
(e) Business deposits
In the statistics communicated by the Bank of Lebanon, 
business deposits are mentioned separately. Their proportion in 
total demand deposits varies around $Ofo9 but their absolute 
magnitude will not help us in our discussion until we have separate 
figures for their debits# Businesses always have to keep certain 
cash or very liquid balances, the magnitude of which is determined 
by the nature of their activities, their expectations of future 
cash requirements and the ease with which they can acquire funds 
for investment relatively cheaply and quickly# One can assume 
that with experience firms know roughly how much they need with 
respect to the first two factors, and thus one would assume that 
very little of such cash is carried forward from one period to
1# See Ghapter III for details
another* The third factor - namely the ease with which firms 
can acquire funds releatively quickly and cheaply - is important 
and deserves consideration. Credit is usually available ffcom 
banks, but on short-term only. Medium-term credit is available 
from two sources, but both are unsatisfactory. The first one is the 
commercial banks, and it takes the form of three monthly bills 
renewable over a certain number of years* It is unsatisfactory 
because it is expensive. Fiscal legislation in Lebanon imposes a 
stamp duty of 2f/o (&fo per year) on the creation or extension of any 
bill* Thus for a five-year term credit stamp duty alone would add 
40$ to the cost of hiring the money.
The second source of medium-term credit is the Banque du
* 1 
Credit Agricole Industriel et Foncier, or in short the B.C.A.I.F.
But this institution:. ;
2
(i) has very limited funds at its disposal,
(ii) must abide by very strict rules which discriminate
against medium and small-size enterprises, and
(iii) cannot help in the provision of working capital which
firms might need.
1* Founded in 1954 with a capital of £L 5 million 2/5ths of which is 
subscribed *>y the State. Its resources come from borrowings 
guaranteed by the State. The law stipulates that 2/5ths of its 
advances should go to agriculture, 2/5ths to industry and l/5th to 
hotels.
2. Advances increased from £L 4«®50 million in 1955 to £L 56.900 million 
in 19591 but are still very small when compared to total advances by 
the commercial banks.
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In contrast to the money market, the capital market is
very undeveloped, and as will be explained later,'*’ is inefficient
in the provision of adequate funds and does not provide adequate
investment opportunities for investors. Therefore this leaves self-
finance, and businesses keep reserves for that purpose. In
countries with more efficient markets these reserves would have
been invested in very liquid assets until they were needed. But
such assets do not exist in Lebanon as explained earlier, and the
2
only alternative is deposits. Some reserves are kept as time 
deposits and others as demand deposits. But the latter are preferred 
for reasons already explained, and the funds thus deposited account 
partly for the very low turnover of the demand deposits.
For all these reasons, demand deposits in Lebanon are not 
used in the traditional way, i.e. for transactions purposes onlys 
it is highly probable that a large part of them would, but for these 
factors, have featured as time deposits, or would have been invested 
in stocks and shares, for the purposes of liquidity. Thus demand 
deposits are not as high as the figures seem to show them, and their 
apparent magnitude is no argument for a higher cash ratio.
1. See Chapter III pp.^-'^s
2* This applies also to reserves kept for pensions, gratuities, etc.
Having considered the nature of the non-hank private 
deposits in Lebanon, we notice that although technically the 
largest part of them is on sight * withdrawable by cheque or 
over the counter - savings deposits - practically the largest 
part can be considered as time deposits* When looked at from 
this angle, the cash ratio does not appear very low*
2* Liquidity Ratio
Although the cash ratio is very low - or seems very low, the 
liquidity ratio is quite high, if compared to that prevailing in 
developed money markets* It Is not only high by international comparison, 
but also because of the nature of deposits in Lebanon which has just 
been considered* Thus, banks can claim a high ratio of readily and 
easily realisable assets, which reduce* further the necessity of 
maintaining a higher cash ratio*
How it may be possible to answer one of the questions asked at the 
beginning of this section: was there any need for a central bank to
control the liquidity position of the commercial banks? If we consider 
the commercial banking sector as a whole, it seems to have been highly 
and safely liquid so far, and thus control seems unnecessary* But 
there is a reservation in that wb have been dealing with global figures 
only* The ratios computed on these figures do not actually reflect the 
positions of each individual bank, as they were free to fix their own
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ratios* The ones calculated are really averages which implies that 
certain hanks kept higher whereas others kept lower ratios* So although 
we have given an answer for the banking sector as a whole, nothing has 
been said about banks individually*
But a rough answer to the last point can be found in the consideration 
of the performance of the banking sector* On the whole confidence in its 
stability - for*getting political stability - never faltered, and there 
has been only one major bank failure - in March 1964* The directors of 
that bank were too reckless and took too many risks*
What prevented other bankers from taking similar risks are two
powerful checks on their activities. First is the Clearing House where
each bank sends two representatives. If any bank postpones a payment or
shows signs of difficulty, it is immediately known and other banks can,
1at once, withdraw their deposits from that bank* As the banking sector 
in itself is a very important lender of last resort, a bank in this 
position will have difficulty in finding the required funds, especially
if it holds no rediscountable paper* So every day each bank has to
convince the others tint it has enough liquidity* The second check is 
public opinion. Lebanon is a small country with a small financial 
community where rumours propagate themselves rapidly. Any doubt about
1* That is exactly how the Banque Fonciere .failed in March 1964* This 
is the same sort of check as was being exercised on American banks
in the XIX Century. See Chapter I jpp*^ l
the liquidity position of a hank can easily be translated into a run 
on the deposits it holds#
Since April 1964 Bank of Lebanon has received monthly data 
on the positions of the banks, and although there are still no statutory 
ratios to abide by, this is now a further check on the banks.
So on the whole the banking sector in Lebanon was generally very 
liquid, and the control of its activities and especially its liquidity 
position by a Central Bank should not haye been the determining motive for
X
establishing one, as has sometimes been suggested.
1. See Toak, J. W* J. op. oit. p. 149*
Yaffi, T* °A Case for Banking Reform in Lebanon11 in Middle East 
Economic Papers* pp. 109-10.
Mahmassani, Y* A. A Central Bank for Lebanon. FeghaB Rress, 
Beirut, 1958> P* 93*
no.
Appendix to Chapter II
Movements of the market discount rate
1Many writers on "banking in Lebanon have mixed up the market
discount rate with the BSL rediscount rate, and have said that the
2rate moved cyclically and not anticyclically. It was stated that 
when profit is a primary motive, this is bound to happens in a 
recession the rate goes up because profits still have to be earned 
for shareholders, and in a boom the rate goes down to take advantage 
of the increased demand for funds* Thus fluctuations are exaggerated* 
It was claimed that this was happening in Lebanon, and it was then said 
that a central bank was necessary to influence the discount rate in a 
way more conducive to the public interest.
Beside the fact that no evidence was presented to demonstrate 
that Lebanese banks behaved in this fashion it is contrary to what we 
would expect from the relation between supply and demand in the cycle. 
If interest is paid for the hire of finanoe, movements of supply and
1* Yaffi, T. op* cit*, p. 105, Mahmassani Y.A*, op* cit* p. 64,
Toak J* W* J*, op* cit. pp. 121-125*
2. Having said that the same writers then attacked the BSL for working
against the public interest. The rediscount rate of the BSL was
fixed at 5pf° ln 1955 &^d remained unchanged all the time.
1X1.
demand would tend to make it move anti-oyclically. When the demand for 
funds increases relatively to their supply - in a boom - banks become less 
liquid and the market is then more a sellers1 than a buyers1 market: in
this case interest rates will tend to rise.
There are, unfortunately, no index of industrial production or other 
indices of output to which movements of the discount rate can be compared 
and judged. What we shall do is to compare those movements to the 
fluctuations of other economic factors which give an idea of the economic 
activity of the Gountry*
The best indicator of economic activity - and the most reliable «
that we have found is the claims on the private sector. These include
advances and discounted bills* We plotted the values on a log graph
alongside total currency supply,"** state revenue and expenditure and
national income. The discount rate values are not on a log scale, as the
2
chgnges are very small. The values can be read in Table VII, IX, X, XI 
and XII. Where available, quarterly figures were used.
A word of warning should be voiced here regarding the reliability 
of the statistics. Although all care possible was taken in their selection 
and verification, we should concern ourselves more with trends and 
movements than with actual magnitudes.
1* i.e. currency circulation plus currency held in banks.
2. On p. 95 above*
11?.
T A B L E  IX
CLAIMS OK THE PRIVATE SECTOR (L.L. Million)
Year IX III IV
1950
1951
1952 
1955
265 f-
-> 303 f
-> 336 (■
360 4
1954 ------ ) 370 < r
1955 334 353 337 593
1956 424 428 451 447
1957 434 478 512 516
1958 542 565 549 528
1959 529 556 596 650
i960 762 847 918 1,002
1961 1*091 1,097 1,111 1,108
1962 1,133 1,136 1,128 1,137
1963 1,451 1,506 1,652 1,733
1964 n.a. 1,856 1,910 1,945
Sources: 1950-56s 
1957-648
BSL Rapports 
IMP International Financial Statistics
1950-54 figures are averages for the year
Advances in foreign currencies are included from i960 onwards*
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T A B L E  X
TOTAL CURRENCY SUPPLY IN LEBANON* 
IN L.L. MILLION
Year Quarters
I II III IV
1950    196
1951   208
1952   200
1953   I99
1954   225
1955 243 252 264 266
1956 270 282 300 333
1957 328 342 347 356
1968 356 407 424 399
1959 594 394 397 400
i960 400 416 427 431
1961 431 431 431 437
1962 437 442 455 470
1963 470 485 493 505
1964 522 '
Souroei BSL Rapports, Figures for 1950-54 are averages for the year
* i.e* including currency held by banks.
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T A B L E  H
EFFECTIVE STATE KBVEMDB AHD EXPENDITURE - (L.L. Million')
Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus ( ) 
or
Deficit (-)
1950
1951 105.5 90.0 15.5
1952 124.9 88.5 56.4
1955 141*2 96.5 44.9
1954 157*4 111.1 46.5
1955 178.8 152.5 46.5
1956 191*9 161.5 50.6
1957 209.9 192.4 17.5
1958 225.4 181.6 45.8
1959 250.4 198.5 51*9
I960 316.5 245.0 85.5
1961 313.4 269.2 44.2
1962 360.1 415.2 -55.1
1965 412.7 450.5 -17.1
Source: Cloture des comptes du service de la oomptabilite du Ministere
des Finances. Secured from the Ministry of Finance.
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T A B L E  XII 
NATIONAL INCOME OF LEBANON (L»L> Million)
Year Estimate
1950 1,042
1951 1,086
1952 1,115
1955 1,168
1954 1,256
1955 1,374
1956 1,417
1957 1,503
1958 1,325
1959 1,490
i960 1,562
1961 1,610 1,789
1962 1,650 1,868
1963 1,951
1964 2,038
Figures constant at 1954 prices
Sourcess 1950-58 A* Y* Badre
1959-62 American Embassy, Beirut
I96I-64 (Bight column), Ministry of Finance, (No mention
whether at constant or current prices. Probably 
current prices)*
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The most significant years to consider are those after 1958 
because the data are then more complete and, as we sh&ll see, many 
factors were at work influencing the discount rate. 1958 is an 
interesting year because at first glance it seems that the discount 
rate rose when claims on the private sector fell. It rose from 5*326$ 
in the fourth quarter of 1957 to 5*700$ a year later. In the same 
period claims on the private sector rose by 8*9$ only, while the average 
per annum increase between 1950 and 1965 was 41$* Furthermore in that 
same period national income fell by 11.8$.
How can we account then for this seemingly abnormal movement of 
the discount rate? The reason it moved the way it did was because the 
crisis was more of a political nature than of an economic one. In that 
year politic&l disturbances brought the country to a stand-still for 
six months. Nothing could be done to the economy until the political 
crisis was solved. In the banking sector "the crisis took the from of 
a general withdrawal of deposits while repayments became increasingly 
difficult". This is clearly seen by the great increase in the total 
demand for currency and by the fall in the deposit figures. From
1. BSL^Rannort 1959.
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£L 55^ million in the first quarter of 1958 the currency issue rose to
£L 424 million in the third quarter thus increasing at a yearly rate of
58$, when the average annual rate for the whole period (1950-64) was
11*7$* Currency circulation rose from L*L* 541 million to L*L. 408
1
million in the same period, reflecting the great demand by the public*
The increased currency circulation was entirely due to a lack of confidence 
in the ability of the banking sector to withstand the severe strain caused
by the political crisis, to doubts about the solvency of debtors, and to
a greater meed to have cash readily available* This caused people to 
withdraw their deposits and to discount the bills they held. Sight 
deposits fell from £L 605 million in the first quarter of 1958 to £L 468 
million in August* Demand for funds might have slackened but their 
supply became very short, and it was normal that the market discount 
rate should rise.
It is doubtful whether had the market discount rate been managed, 
it would have been made to move very differently from the way in which 
it did move* There was no recession that oould have been cured by 
economic measures* Confidence had to be restored and people had to be
1* Sources I,M.F. International Financial Statistics*
convinced and encouraged to keep their deposits in the banks, and 
not to discount their bills* A lowering of the rate might have 
accelerated the withdrawal of deposits and the discounting of the 
bills*
In 1959 claims on the private sector started rising at the 
very rapid rate of 51$ annum, while the total currency issue fell 
steadily**' until the end of the second quarter of 1959 > at which level 
it was kept practically constant until the first quarter of I960* 
Moreover, since 1957 ike State budget surplus had been increasing. 
Finally sight deposits, which were the main part of total deposits, did 
not reach their pre-crisis level until April 1959* These factors put a 
heavy strain on the liquid resources of the banks which did not have 
much excess liquidity after 1958 anyway. In those circumstances the 
discount rate rose - as would be expected when left to market forces - 
from 5*7$ iJC the fourth quarter of 1958 to 6*80$ in the third quarter 
of I960.
The rise in the discount rate, though modest, was not unwelcome, 
as there were obvious signs of overheating in the economy after the 
long stagnation of 1958: for example, credit to the private sector
1. To relieve the banks of the considerable strain they experienced, the 
BSL must have rediscounted !en pension1 or made loans to the banks.
Such advances were repaid when deposits came back, thus making possible 
a withdrawal of the emergency currency issue which had to be done*
was rising one and a quarter times faster than the average for the 
period 1950-64#
In i960 currency supply started growing again at the rate of 
7*75$ a year* At the same time currency held by hanks inoreased from 
L#L. 15 million in the fourth quarter of 1959 to L#L. 52 million in the 
fourth quarter of 1960#^  This eased the pressure on the liquid resources 
of the hanks, and the discount rate fell hack to 5*60$ in the second 
quarter of 1961.
But on 51st December 1961 an attempted coup d*etat caused considerable
uneasiness in the country# The revolt was crushed inside a few hours with
about five deaths, and was therefore too short-lived to have much immediate
effect on the economy# But as a report on the Lebanon said '*##•• damage
to the Lebanon*s main commercial asset - confidence in the country*s
2
stability - is inescapable'1. This was bound to have its first reper­
cussions on the banking sector, and private (non-bank) deposits are known 
to have left the country in substantial amounts#
So although in that period there was a fall in the rate of increase of 
credit to the private sector, the discount rate remained stationary as 
banks felt some strain on their liquid resources. There was no real need
1# Sources£ International Financial Statistics
2# Economist Intelligence Unit, Three Monthly Economic Review#
No. 24 February 1962, p. 6#
for a reduction in the discount rate as there was no real recession*
In fact national income was growing at 5*6$ a year which is only 0m6fo 
slower than the average 6.2J& for the whole period if 1958 is excluded*
An increased currenoy issue followed, easing the strain on the 
liquid resources of the hanks* But money remained very tight, which was 
strongly felt at the end of 1962 when credit to the private sector started 
growing at the annual rate of 52$. This fantastic increase must have come 
as a result of a budget deficit - there had always been surpluses~before - 
and a great increase in investment and demand for goods bought on hire 
purchase, which had been held up to a certain extent during the political 
uncertainty of 1962*
The result was a gradual rise in the discount rate* Prom 5*7^ in 
1962 it was 6.69^ at the end of 1963, and had passed the T/° mark in 
1964, thus reaching the levels of the very early 1950*5 -
In summary there are two points to make:
(i) the discount rate behaved as one would expect it to behave 
in response to economic circumstances.
(ii) its movements, conditioned by economic and political factors, 
though small and very gradual, certainly did not accentuate 
booms and recessions in the country. On the contrary, if 
they had any effect they were in the right direction, i.e. the^ 
#3523? dampened down the fluctuations. It is a perfect example 
of a rate determined solely by the market forces and by 
competition*
CHAPTER III
THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE FLANS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT
The aim of this chapter is to discuss briefly some of the main 
• characteristics of the Lebanese economy, the problems that fact it and 
how it is thought they should be tackled* finally, the financial 
difficulties that may appear in the course of the development of the 
economy are considered*
I. ^he Lebanese Economy
"The Lebanese economy is as close to the classical 1 Laissez-faire1 
model as one can expect in the modern world."'1’
"Les operations qui sfy realisent, si elles ne jeuvents etre 
ni analysees ni comptabilisees, car leur caractere principal 
est d*§tre secretes, sont nombreuses et porteuses de richesse, 
d*une richesse toujours renouvelee puisqu1elles doivent reussir 
en quelques heures, quelques semaines ou quelques mois, le 
long tenne et le moyen term© semblant ici sans interet."^
^ese two quotations summarise quite well the Lebanese economy because 
they bring out clearly the spirit of economic liberalism abd the 
mercantile character which have been its chief characteristics, and 
have actually helped to shape it in the form it is today.
1. F.A.O. Mediterranean Development Project, Lebanon* Country Report, 
Rome 1959* t Chapter I, p. 6.
2. Institut de formation en Vue du Developpement, Le Liban Face a son 
fleveloooement (Etude IRFBDBeyrouth 19^5» Imprimerie Catholique, 
p. 4*
^here axe unfortunately no reliable and official national income 
estimates for Lebanon, but a study undertaken at the American University 
of Beirut in 1952 estimated the national income to be £L1,115 million. 
The figure has been extrapolated since with, of course, a considerable 
and cumulative margin of error and in 1962 the estimate was £L1,650 
million at 1954 prices*^ A recent study of the national income of 
Lebanon published by the Ministry of finance gives the following 
estimates
1961 - 1,789 million
1962 - £L 1,868 "
I965 ~ £L 1,951 "
I964 &L 2,058 »
^he study does not mention whether the estimates are at constant or
current prices, but it says that they are based ,!on serious studies
2
and not on official statistics". If the above figure for 1964 is
correct, the per capita income of Lebanon is £L 1,019 0r $540 a year*
However, some economists at the same Ministry believe these estimates
to be too low and that in 1965 the national income was about £L 5>000 
3million. If the latter figure is right, the per capita income is
1* See Table XHfor National Income estimates*
2* Ministry of Finance, Expose des Motifs de la Loi de finances pour
lfExercise 1966, Presses de la direction Centrale de Statistiques 
au Ministere du Plan* Beirut.
3* Information received from private interviews with them*
£L 1,500 or nearly ^500 a year which places Lebanon in the intermediate 
stage of development according to the United Nations classification#
2
Recent estimates of the contribution of the different sectors 
of the economy to the national income put services as the most important 
contributor and responsible for 'JQffo of the total# Next comes agricul­
ture with l&fo and finally industry with 12^ # Within the services sector, 
trade seems the most important item for, according’ to the American 
University estimates trade contributed 52$& of the national income in 
1962, and according to the finance Ministry estimates its contribution 
was 25^* Whichever estimate is right it is still the largest contributor# 
^he other main services are finance - thanks to the highly .developed 
banking sector - insurance, transport and 1other services1*
The importance of the services sector can also be seen if one 
considers the balance of payments of Lebanon* In 1965, while imports 
stood at 1,179 million, exports were £L 525 million,leaving an
1# ^here is no regular census of the population in Lebanon but the
latest estimate of population based on the registrar for births and 
deaths is 2 million people#
The U#$# dollar rate for the Lebanese Pound is 508 piastres for 1 
dollar. (lOO piastres to one pound)#
2* Corm, (*., !Le Citoyen Libanais Pace a Son Economie1# 5 articles in 
L1 Orient* 4^  and- 6th September, 1965* It is not mentioned
which estimates of national income Mr. Corm used to obtain these 
percentage contributions of the different economic sectors, but as 
he works for the Ministry of Pinance one can assume that he used 
the Ministry*s figures#
adverse trade balance of £L 856 million**1* In 1962 the deficit was
£L 757 million and in I96I £L 813 million. It is the net earnings from
services estimated at £L 644 million in 1963* and £L 615 million in 1962
that covered the largest part of the deficit in the trade balance. Thus
if one considers the balance of goods and services a deficit still
appears but it is considerably reduced, as is shown in Table XIIIt
o
£L 219 million in 1963 and £L 130 million in 1962* Donations and a
net inflow of capital of £L 130 million in 1962 and 115 million in
1963 wiped out these deficits. Thus services do not simply contribute
the largest part of the national income of the country! they are also
a valuable source of the foreign exchange required to sustain the
level of Lebanese imports. Moreover, the inflow of capital - mainly
from the oil-producing countries of the Middle East - is clearly very
important in the balance of payments. This capital is either invested in
real estate and banking institutions, or simply deposited in the banks
5at sight or at short notice. Such deposits are quite large and 
demonstrate the importance of the banking sector in the economy*
1* A reservation should be made here in connection with the trade 
deficit. Lebanon receives a large number of Arab tourists who 
consume on the spot large quantities of the goods imported, or else 
take them back home, where import restrictions prevail.' Such re£ 
exports do not appear in the trade figures.
2. ^hese came from Lebanese emigrants and are usually sent to their 
relatives still living in Lebanon.
3* See Chapter II page ^ 6 .
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Why the Lebanese eoonomy evolved that way is explained mainly by 
the pattern of natural resources with which the country is endowed - 
e.g. geographical location and climate - and v/hich are more conducive 
to the promotion of services than to the production of goods. -An 
experienced class of merchants entrepreneurs and bankers was thus 
created, increasing the trend towards such an economic structure. 
Moreover the economic policy pursued in the country rft&a made for the 
promotion of trade and services. Agriculture and industry received 
very little government attention, whether through the pattern of 
government expenditure (emphasizing the development of an airport, 
ports, telephone servioes and the like, instead of agricultural and 
industrial development projects proper, like irrigation, power 
generating plants or state-promoted industries), through government 
trade policy (no protection to home produced goods but revenue tariffs 
only) or through monetary policy (complete freedom of exchange and 
capital movements). Lebanese economic policy has been very much influ­
enced by the Liberal theories of the nineteenth Century, according to 
which the state should keep aloof from the economy doing the minimum 
required to keep security and order within the realm. Ifhe state was 
not to compete with private enterprise for the factors of production, 
nor was it to regulate the working of the economy. Activities under­
taken by the state were in general considered to be less likely to be
128.
productive than those undertaken by private individuals* ^he pursuit
of self-interest was widely believed to be conducive to the interest
1
of all, and so it was believed in Lebanon. So strong was this distrust 
of the State in Lebanon that public funds were considered as something 
that had better be kept in reserves lest they be wasted, and so, instead 
of following a striotly orthodox budgetary policy (by balancing its 
budget) as the adherence to government neutrality would imply, 
successive governments accumulated surpluses every year by not spending 
appropriated credits which then went into a Reserve ^und* ^he official 
reason was given in an interview which the then Director-General at the 
Ministry of Idnance had with a newspaperman:
"It may happen that the State is not equipped and does not 
possess an adequate administrative machinery to carry out 
all the expenditure necessary to the welfare of all* 3?his 
had been the case in Lebanon*.."2
®hat was the official reasons but if the need for such an administrative 
machinery had been felt, there was no reason why the State should not 
have got it* ^he result was a deflationary policy until 1962 irrespective
1* The same sort of attitude seems to have prevailed in the United States 
in 1816-60: "Although the part played by the State and political in­
stitutions in this economic progress must not be overlooked, the policy 
of1laissez-faire * and freedom of individual initiative was dominant 
at this time (1816-1860). ^here individual enterprise seemed unable 
or unwilling to finance undertakings deemed of great importance the 
people fell back upon the resources and credit of the State now 
greatly strengthened, and without which many of the undertakings would 
have been impossible at the time.11 C.W. Wright, Economic History of the 
United States. McGraw-Hill Book Go, Limited, 2nd edition, 1949» P» 408*
2. Interview with Mr. A. Hueni, Director-General Ministry of finance,
now retired, LfOrient, 50th January, 1965*
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of the economic conditions prevailing in the country, though perhaps 
inconsciously* Between 1945 and 1961 £L 497*5 million had been 
accumulated* No wonder it was saidt
"Although statistical studies are not advanced far enough yet 
to allow a mathematical study of economic cycles in Lebanon, 
one is not exaggerating when one affirms that without the dynamics 
of the private sector and especially the formidable expansion of 
the banking sector, the rate of growth of the [Lebanese] economy 
would have been much lower during all those years because of the 
financial policy of the State"
However, in the late 1950*8, despite the apparent prosperity of 
the country and especially relatively to most of the immediate neighbours 
which adopted socialism and a larger amount of State control, extreme 
economic liberalism was being questioned, and the weaknesses of the 
Lebanese economy were pointed out# ^he weaknesses were seen with regard 
to the future development of the economy and the question was whether 
what was called the "Lebanese economic miracle" would continue, and 
whether it was not preferable to change the bases on which the economy 
rested before it was too late* ^his meant a change of attitude towards the 
economy. What led to this change was an awakening to the new conditions that 
were going to face Lebanon in the future and which were already making them­
selves felt. Changes were occurring both at home and abroad, and especially
I* Corm Gr*,"Bilan des finances Ihibliques Libanaises 1945-65"* Le
Commerce du Levant, Yearly Supplement, March, 1965* Translation 
is mine.
in the Arab world from which Lebanon derived a large portion of its 
national income* So question was whether the Lebanese economy 
could continue to prosper under the new conditions with the same spirit 
of extreme 1laissez-faire' that characterised the past* This question 
called for an analysis of the weaknesses of the economy.
Much criticism has centred around the dominant role of services 
in both the national income and the balance of payments* The economy 
is found to rely too heavily on that one sector alone which after all 
depends so much on factors outside the Lebanon* The abstract form of 
this argument, namely that the economy must be diversified, because a 
slump in that one sector alone could cripple the economy, is put 
forward, but it cannot be used as a proof of weakness in the Lebanese 
economy* Most economies rely more heavily on one type of activity 
than anothers Venezuela on Oil, Britain and the United States on the 
motor car industry* In all these economies a slump in that one 
activity could seriously disrupt the economy*
A similar argument is that the future of the services sector is 
very uncertain and that it would be unwise to go on relying on it to 
provide a large proportion of the national income and enough capital 
to finance the trade deficit* This argument could be pointing to a 
weakness in the economy if by it was meant that Lebanon should not go 
on relying on the same services and especially to the same countries as
in the past* ^he main recipients of these services have been the 
neighbouring countries which are changing their economic systems - 
©*g* Syria, Iraq - and tend to provide these services for themselves, 
thus bypassing the Lebanese intermediary* A typical example is the 
use made of the port of Beirut: formerly the largest part of the
Syrian and Jordanian trade with the West used to transit in Beirut? 
Jordan now restricts all her imports to her port of Aqaba, while Syria 
restricts hers to her port at Lattaquieh, and goes further by putting 
great difficulties on goods in transit between Beirut and Iraq*
But so far this weakness has not been serious, for, in spite of 
difficulties encountered in some of the traditional services provided, 
the services sector ** excluding tourism - has been financing a larger 
part of the deficit in the balance of trade* Thus in i960 the balance 
of total goods and services (Table XIII) showed a deficit of £L 310 
million* In 1961 the deficit was reduced to £L 245 million and in
q
1965 to £l 219 million in spite of the increased trade deficits* This 
shows that the services sector is highly adaptable and flexible, and 
that as conditions changed and certain services slackened or became
1* 1962 was rather exceptional as economic activity declined in that
year* As a result imports which are linked to it rose very little* 
Exports continued to rise and the trade deficit was reduced from 
£L 813 m* in 196I to CL 75Siwin 1962.
diffioult to provide, others were offered* Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to say which declined and which were introduced, as statistics 
are not detailed enough on this subject* But one can say with some 
certainty that the growth of banking^ and finance must have offset 
the decline in other services*
therefore the heavy reliance on one sector has not so far proved 
to be a, major weakness in the Lebanese economy, for, as conditions changed, 
far from declining iniimportance, this sector has in fact increased in 
importance thanks to its adaptability*
Recently, discussions on the Lebanese economy have centred around 
the social problem that seems to have arisen as a consequence of its 
structure* Such discussions have pointed to two major weaknesses* the 
sectoral distribution of income and the ability of the economy to 
provide employment for all the Lebanese who will be seeking work in 
the future*
^he sectoral distribution of income in Lebanon was one of the
2
main weaknesses pointed out by the IREUD mission* Except for 1958 the 
1* ^escribed in Chapter II*
2* In March 1959 President Chehab of the Lebanon asked the Director of 
the Institut de Recherches et de formation en vue du Developpement 
(IRIED) in Paris to set up a technical mission whose terms of refer­
ence were to undertake a general study of the situation and needs 
of the Lenanon, and to make recommendations on the possibilities of 
economic and social development* ^he Government appointed the mission 
officially in September 1959* It reported first in October I960 and 
then in May 1961*
national income of Lebanon grew throughout the period 1950-64, ^ut 
expansion has been largely limited to the tertiary sector of the economy, 
i.e. the trade and services sector. Thus oriented, the expansion in­
tensified a disproportion in the distribution of income and employ­
ment in the economy. While trade and services account for 70$ of the 
national income, agriculture 18$ and industry $, the first employs 
only 3&fo of the working population, agriculture employs 50$ and industry 
12$. Thus productivity and incomes are very low in agriculture and 
much above average in the tertiary sector, while in the industrial sector 
they are about average. However, the IRFED Mission claimed that industry*s 
record could certainly be improved.
The great accumulation of wealth in the tertiary sector which is 
active mainly in Beirut and around it, has led to the geographical 
maldistribution of income in the country, and as pointed out in the 
IRFED Report there is a wide gap between the standard of living in 
Beirut and that in the country. Beside the problem of income distribut­
ion, the very heavy concentration of activity and wealth in Beirut has 
led to*
i. an overcrowding of the city where amenities were not 
conceived for such a large population
ii. great differences in educational, sanitary and leisure
conditions, as everything has had to be done in Beirut first.
1* More details of this point can be found in the IRFED Report, Le Liban 
Face a 8on Developpement, op. cit. pp. 145-175
iii. a depopulation of the countryside
Had the State realised ten to fifteen years ago that it could 
intervene in the economy to modify these tendencies, Lebanon might 
have had a more equitable pattern of income distribution to-day* But 
the *laissez-faire1 attitude described earlier in the chapter was too 
deeply entrenched in people *s minds for anything like that to happen* 
However, it is now realised that the problem of income distribution is 
one in which the State has a role to play, and a new attitude towards 
its responsibilities has thus emerged*
This new attitude has been strengthened by still another factor,
namely the employment problem that Lebanon may have to face in the
future. Although no proper population census has been undertaken in
Lebanon since 1951* it is estimated that the working population which
numbers now about people, should reach the million mark by 1980.
This means that the number of jobs will have to be doubled in about
fifteen years* The problem is sometimes minimised with the suggestion
that, as in the past, emigration will act as a safety valve* It is
doubtful, however, whether emigration will occur at the same rate as
in the past as the countries to which Lebanese used to emigrate are be-
1
coming increasingly difficult over immigration# Thus the problem of
1* This is particularly the case in West Africa where there is what is 
called a ‘Lebanese problem*. For details of this problem in Sierra 
Leone see "Tensions Persist in Sierra Leone11 The Times# 6th May,
I964, p. 13*
employment may beoome acute if nothing is done about it, and it is 
one of the reasons why a new attitude towards the economy and the 
role of the State in it has developed. It is now realised that the 
foreign sector is prospering and that obviously Lebanon has a compara­
tive advantage in it. But it is also believed that agriculture and 
industry can develop in the future in a way that would solve the social 
and employment problems without affecting the foreign sector, which 
implies that if such a development does not take place the economy 
would be working at sub-optimum levels. It is with this in mind that 
plans for the economic development of Lebanon have been put forward*
II Plans for the Economic Development of the Country
This section vri.ll deal with how it is thought the Lebanese economy 
should develop to help resolve the social and employment problems that 
face it and with the financial difficulties of such development. At the 
moment the official policy towards the economy in Lebanon is that while 
agriculture and the tertiary shctor should be strengthened and improved, 
industry is the sector that should be relied upon to provide enough 
jobs for the future and to modify the sectoral maldistribution of income. 
This policy was adopted after an analysis of the potential growth of 
each sector.
Taking agriculture first, on the one hand land tenure by small 
holdings reflected by the very low employee to employer ratio (0.76 in 
Table XIV), prevails in Lebanon, and on the other hand, it is estimated 
at the Ministry of Agriculture that only 350,000 hectares of land can 
be cultivated in Lebanon; this is not very much more than the 325,000 
hectares which, according to the same source, are cultivated now.
T A B L E  XIV
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY. COMMERCE £ AGRICULTURE
Nature of activity Employers Employees Ratio
(including self- Employee/Employer
employed)
Agriculture 125,000 95,000 O .76
Industry
Handicraft
Construction
12,000 75,000 6.2
Transport
Commerce
Banking
26,000 53,000
1.7
Other services 20,000 28,000
Source s IREED Report
It is therefore thought unlikely that agriculture will help much in 
the provision of enough jobs to employ a sizeable proportion of the extra 
working population in the future. Howevex*, agricultural development
can help to improve the conditions of* those already on the land and 
it is with this in mind that development plans for that sector have 
been put forward*
Secondly, the tertiary sector is not expected to solve satisfactorily 
the employment and social problems thought likely to arise in the future* 
^his sector is composed mainly of self-employed as the employee to 
employer ratio (l*7) in Table XIY shows* importance of self-
employment in this sector is further shown by the relatively low 
proportion of wages and salaries in the income generated within the 
sector - it does not exceed 10$ compared to 36$ in industry* On 
the other hand trade and services are already quite developed as shown 
above ahd it is therefore thought doubtful that a large enough expans­
ion of this sector would take place to provide the jobs necessary to 
employ the extra working population that will appear. Moreover, even 
if it were possible for that sector to employ the bulk of the extra 
labour becoming available, which would help to solve the employment 
problem, it would not help to solve the social problem# Expansion of 
this sector would imply the accumulation of more wealth in and around 
Beiruts far from solving the present geographical maldistribution of
1. Gannage l^a redistribution des revenus au Liban1, in Semainea 
Sociales de Beyrouth, 1955-
income and the social problems it raises, such an expansion would 
accentuate it* But here again this sector should not be neglected 
because as shown earlier, services pay for a large part of the deficit 
in the trade balance and they have proved themselves highly adaptable 
to the changing economic conditions. Services are still very lucrative 
and should be given the opportunity of staying so.
Industry is thus thought to be the most likely sector to help in 
the solution of the problems set out above, ^he employee to employer 
ratio estimated to be 6.2, is highest in industry# Compared to developed 
countries, the figure may seem low, but it must not be forgotten that 
industry is relatively new in Lebanon - mainly since the Second ^ orDd 
War - and that on the whole, firms still tend to be of small to 
medium size as is evidenced in Table XY. Not only are there possibil­
ities of new industries being created but also of expanding existing 
ones.
An expansion of the industrial sector would then be likely to 
provide exployment for the future expected labour increase, and 
permit a better distribution of income both structurally and geograph­
ically, as investment would not then be concentrated in Beirut since 
the location of industry can be more easily diversified than that of 
services.
1. See Sable XVII below
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T A B L E  XV
INDUSTRIAL CENSUS FOR 1955 IN LEIBAHON
Description and Number fo of total turnover fo of Turnover
number employed number in £L#m. turnover plus stocks
£L,m.
Small handicrafts
5 - 9 persons 1051 56 45*7 H  63.3
Large handicrafts
10-25 persons 581 31 74.9 19 101.7
Small firms
2.6 - 50 persons 149 8 63*9 15 82.8
Medium firms
51 - 100 persons 60 3 46*0 11 62,2
Large firms
over 100 persons 40 2 168.9 44 243.9
Increasing productivity in agriculture to improve the standard of
living in that sector, strengthening the tertiary sector where services
are essential to the economy, and developing industry to help Lebanon
face up to the problems that may arise in the future: these are in
broad terms the paths along which it is thought desirable that Lebanon
should develop. In all this the State has a new role to play and a plan
1
has been prepared with this in mind, What should be considered now
1, It is interesting to note that in the United States the shift away from 
laissez-faire was also caused by social reasons in the second half of 
the nineteenth century* See Weight, op. cit. pp* 715-17*
are the credit problems that may arise if this programme is to be 
fulfilled,
1* Agriculture
The IREBD Mission which undertook a study of agriculture in 
Lebanon as part of its survey of the Lebanese economy put forward 
various suggestions to increase the revenue from land and thus 
bridge the gap between the rural and urban standards of life, Both 
public and private sectors have responsibilities in this direction, 
the public sector concentrating more on infrastructural projects - 
irrigation, education, communications « and the private sector being 
more directly concerned with the reconstitution of land for improve­
ment, the setting up of co-operatives, slaughter houses, wholesale 
markets and regional credit: institutions. All these responsibilities 
involve considerable investment and the problem is whether the 
necessary types of credit axe available to carry them out* Whether 
the State has access to the types of credits which it would require 
is considered in a later section. The credit problems of the private 
sector are here considered,
The IRFED Mission estimated that the private agricultural sector 
would require about £L 65*7 million - over O^fo of the total out­
standing debt of the agricultural sector to commercial banks in
December 1964 - in the period 1964-68 for the purposes defined 
above* details of the estimate, which refers only to new invest­
ments, thus excluding credits now available to the agricultural sector 
which will show an increase of their own, are shown in Table XVI.
But the most important thing is that these funds would have to be 
available on medium- and long-term and the problem now is whether 
the agricultural sector is able to generate these funds within 
itself and failing self-finance, whether these medium- and long-term 
credits could be made available by credit institutions*
It is generally thought doubtful that the agricultural sector
could generate the funds required for its development and the main
reason given is that the farmers1 incomes are on the whole too low
1
to leave any appreciable surplus for investment*
The poverty of the sector is evidenced by the average income 
in agriculture, which, as noted above is much lower than the 
national average income* The incomes of farmers are often increased 
by remittances from parents and relatives living in towns or 
abroad:
1* Nasrallah P#, Le Credit \  Moyen Terme au Lib an. Librairie
Generale de Proit et de Jurisprudence, R. Pi chon et R* Durand,-. 
Ausias, Paris, 1961 pp. 94-98*
IRFED Report, Le Lib an Face a Son, Developpement, °P* oit*, p. 23O
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"It is particularly rare to discover farmers in Lebanon 
who do not have some connection with other activities in 
the country, and from which they do not derive a part of 
their revenue'1.^
But, as Mr# Uasrallah mentions, such revenue merely complements
income derived directly from agriculture and helps to keep the
2
"farmer*s head above water level".
So the farmers will have to be provided with medium- and long­
term credit if the official development plan for agriculture is to 
be carried out. At the moment there are three sources of credit 
in the agricultural sector; the family and acquaintances, commercial 
banks and the Banque de Credit Agricole Industrial et Foncier 
(BCAIP).
Credits granted from the first source are not well known, but 
when they are granted it is often not on any economic basis, but 
more on a family or religious basis. Such credits are a transfer 
of funds between sectors because the funds usually come from 
relatives or acquaintances working, in industry or in toms or 
even abroad. Although the granting of such credits is supposed to 
be based on a spirit of solidarity, interest rates are generally 
believed to be quite high and especially when they originate not
1* Saade P., Semaines Sociales de Beyrouth, 1955* translation is mine.
2. Nasrallah P., op.cit., p. 9&* translation is mine.
from relations but from acquaintances. In this latter case the rate 
may reach 10$ per month.
Commercial banks grant some short-term credits to farmers# 
Unfortunately, not much data are available to show the growth of 
these credits# The only figure that is known relates to December 
1964 and amounts to £L 124*216 million# These credits are usually 
given for nine months and are used for current production* The 
rate of interest charged varies between 10 and 12$^ year*
The B*G#A.I#F. described in an earlier chapter is empowered 
to give medium- and long-term credits* Its total credits to 
agriculture - including short-term « amounted to £L 27 million in 
1955 which represented a tenfold increase over 5 years earlier*
The rate of interest charged - 5s$ ~ Is quite low relatively to 
the banks1 advances rates in Lebanon#
finally credit is also available from merchants who sell seeds, 
fertilisers and insecticides, and who grant some short-term credit 
facilities to the farmers at rates varying from 10$ to 18$ a year#
It is not known exactly how much is granted this way but it is 
estimated to be in the region of £L 15 to £L 20 million a year#
1* Sources IRESD Report, Le Lib an Face a son Developpement, op# cit* 
p* 250*
2* Sources Bank of Lebanon, Annual Report 1964
3. The maximum legal rate in Lebanon is 9$* But commissions and 
expense charges raise the effective rate*
.So at present the only significant source of medium- and long­
term credit available to farmers is the B.C.A*I*F. Family acquaint­
ances and merchants Gan hardly be relied upon to grant such 
credits in the amounts thought to be required and at reasonable 
rates of interest* Oommercial banks are reluctant to lend on longer 
than short-term bases, partly because the risks of lending to poor 
farmers - who in fact are in majority in the agricultural sector - 
are too high; this is one of the reasons why money lenders 
charging exorbitant rates of interest can flourish* As to the
B*0*A.I*F. it has proved to be totally inadequate, to the require-
1ments of agriculture* Its resources are very limited and are not
easily expandable; it is not present in many regions of the
country, and besides, it is believed that only the few wealthy
2landowners have been able to get assistance from it* iigriculture 
^111 thus lack the medium- and long-term credits that will be 
necessary to carry out the development plan that has been envisag­
ed for it# It may seem strange that in view of their liquidity, 
and the fact that they still compete for deposits, banks are not 
prepared to grant such credits and face the risks involved, or 
that special institutions have not grown to meet the demand* This 
is a point which will be encountered many times and which will be
1* See Chapter II, p.
2* IRFED Report, Le Liban Face a son Developpement* op. cit*, p* 230
discussed in detail in the following chapter. The main reason 
is, briefly, that banks and any financial institution can always 
invest abroad what they cannot invest in Lebanon at a satisfactory 
degree of risk or rate or return*
Therefore if agriculture is to receive the medium- and long­
term credits that it will require to develop along the path set 
for it, new institutions will have to be brought into being, or 
new conditions will have to emerge to induce existing credit 
institutions to provide them. How could this be done is considered 
in the next chapter*
So far, we have discussed the credit requirements of agriculture
with regard to the development plan. There is one important aspect
still missing, namely, the adequacy of the short-term oredits
which are now available to this sector* These credits, which are
granted by commercial banks for nine months, are used for current
1production* According to a report at the Ministry of Planning the 
nine months period is not long enough for the produce does not 
appear on the market within that period* The result is that the 
producer often has to repay his loans before or while he is selling 
his produce* Accox'ding to the same report, this has often resulted 
in considerable financial pressure on the producer and that is
1. Republique Libanaise, Ministere du Plan, Projet pour le Creation 
d1und Banque de Developpement. Typescript, 19^3* ' ~
another reason why he has to resort for a short time to money­
lenders who charge high rates of interest* ^he same report re­
commends that an extended short-term credit be made available to 
improve the conditions of the farmers and the period suggested is 
eighteen months. Thus it seems that all types of credit will have 
to be made available for agriculture*
Before leaving this section it might be useful to show the 
urgency of adequate credit facilities to farmers by quoting Mr* 
Nasrallah and the IRKED Missions
"This lack of credit is at the same time the cause and 
consequence of poverty, it is the cause in so far as the 
farmers lacking liquid money, are unable to invest in the 
land* It is also a consequence or a symptom of poverty 
because a high rate of interest and heavy indebtedness are 
signs of a chronic insufficiency of the farmers* incomes 
and of a permanent tendency for their consumption to exceed 
their production.
The lack of credit is
"killing the farmers* initiative, leading to emigration 
and even provoking the abandonment of land*"2
2. Industry
Although industry contributes 12$ to the national income of 
Lebanon and £L 840 million are invested in it, it is of very recent 
origin, its history going back over a very few decades only as can 
be seeb in the following Table:
1* Nasrallah P., op* cit* pp 9T-98* Translation is mine*
2* IRKED Report, Le Liban fface a son Developpement. op. cit., p. 2^0 
Translation is mine*
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Firms which in 1955 Cumulative Humber Cumulative Percentage
were less than
5 years old 450 23$
10 years old 830 44$
15 years old 1,030 57$
22 years old 1,570 75$
32 years old 1,570 85$
42 years old 1,861 100$
Source: Compiled on the basis of^the industrial census of 1955^ hy Mr*
P. Nasrallah, Le Credit a Moyen Terme au Li ban, op. cit* p. 116.
Its growth has not been easy. It encountered many difficulties 
before the Second World War from the French occupants who, it is 
claimed, were busy trying to sell French products. But in 1945
3
industry received a new impetus: independence and large capital
profits made during the War from appreciation of stocks, encouraged 
Lebanese businessmen to create new industries. As they grew,
1. There has not been an industrial census in Lebanon since* The
Industrial Association estimated that there were 6,000 firms in 1965*
See Le Commerce du Levant Yearly Supplement, March 1965*
2* Nasrallah, P., op* cit.. p. 116.
5* Independence was granted in 1945 but foreign troops did not evacuate
the country before the end of the War.
difficulties started appearing, some of them common to other 
under-developed countries, others peculiar to the Lebanon. Among 
the first there is the problem of an infant industry still relatively 
inexperienced and too small to reap the economies of large scale 
production. Moreover, Lebanon is not yet adequately equipped with 
all the basic, services that the State usually provides and which 
industry often has to provide for itself. That is one of the 
reasons why industrial activity tends to be concentrated around 
Beirut where these basic services are relatively easier to acquire 
but which accentuate the geographical maldistribution of wealth in 
the oountry. Costs are therefore high and furthermore local pro­
duction is not protected against foreign competition - which is a 
difficulty particular to Lebanon rather than to all under-developed 
countries. Tariffs are raised for revenue rather than for protection* 
The reason is the belief in complete •laissez-faire1 which was describ­
ed earlier in the chapter and the fact that that policy has been very 
successful and lucrative in the past. The result is that Lebanese 
industry has had to face from its earliest stages very stiff com­
petition from abroad and in an already very small market.
But the attitude towards industry has changed recently with
1. A typical example is a firm just outside Beirut which has to have its 
own power generating units, its own water wells and many messengers 
because it cannot rely on constant and efficient electricity and 
water supplies and on a proper and efficient postal and telephone 
service.
the new approach to the economic problems of Lebanon. As noted 
earlier industry is now looked upon as the sector that is most 
likely to absorb the working population increase, and there are 
plans for its development involving responsibilities for the State 
and the private sector although the responsibilities of the latter 
are not as clearly defined as for agriculture*
Apart from fiscal policy, the State!s responsibilities are 
here again mainly related to infrastructural projects? these 
should improve the provision of basic services to industry and 
should help them to reduce their costs. Such projects include 
the provision of electricity, transport facilities and technical 
colleges, also involving heavy investment the financing’ of which 
is considered later* As regards the private sector it is hoped 
that existing industries will complete their capital equipment, 
modernise and scrap obsolescent machinery, and adapt themselves 
to modern lines of production - for example a textile business 
moving away from cotton into man-made fibres* It is also hoped 
that the industrial sector will expand by the creation of new 
industries in all parts of the country. This will increase further 
the number of jobs that will become available, and will relieve 
the increasing pressure from Beirut#
From private interviews with businessmen it seems that the
official policy is well supported, and given that the State is
prepared to adopt a more positive policy towards industry - which
again seems probable now - the problem will'be that of finance#
Industrialists complain about the lack of medium- and long-term
credits in Lebanon? their Association lists the absence of such
1
credits as ohe of the difficulties that they have to fight*
The non-availability of such credits to industry from
2
banking institutions was discussed earlier# Vi/by banks do not 
do better in the provision of such credits when there seems to be 
a demand for them is again partly due to the competition of foreign 
investment as will be explained in the next chapter# The capital 
market is inadequate# On the supply side, people at large are 
afraid of the wild speculation that takes place? it was recently 
reported that:
11 the present crisis at the Bourse is primarily one of 
confidence: the fancy and authoritarian behaviour of large 
holders, the lack of an official control when the rules are 
breached every day do not encourage the small savers who
\
1# l,Lf Industrie Libanaise, Espoir d*un Avenir Prospers", Le Commerce du 
Levant* Yearly Supplement, 3?d March, 19&5* Also in a letter to 
the Prime Minister on 10 Jan# 1966, reproduced in Le Commerce du 
Levant, 5th March, 1966*
2* See Chapter II pp*vo^.o4
do not !play (speculate) at the Bourse1, and who consequently 
are alone able to provide the market with the stability that 
it needs ..."l
The political atmosphere in the Middle ^ast also has caused large
2
speculative movements in the past. Oh the demand side it must 
he realised that industry is of recent origin in Lebanon and 
that firms on the whole started as private companies relying 
mainly on self-finance, ahere public companies were created 
entrepreneurs preferred to keep the shares within the family or 
very close friends, and so on the one hand did not sell their 
holdings in the Bourse and on the other never liked to nor did 
divulge much details about their activities or their balanoe 
sheet positions. This last factor was important in deterring 
small investors from entering’ the market* This has also meant 
that there are very few companies v/hich are actively traded, and
1* Hxtraot from L*Orient June 7th 1965* translation is mine.
The growing disinterest in the Bourse and its speculative character 
are clearly shown in the fluctuation of the volume of business in 
the years 1960-65? 1960s CL. 65 m. 1961s £L. 72.5 m.
1962s £L* 28.5 m. 1965s £L* 75 m.
1964s £l . 71*4 m. 1965s £l. 50 m.
2. ^or details see H. Pringuey, Le Marche des Valeurs Mobilieres \
Beyrouth, T^esis por a fpoctorat1 submitted at the laculte de Broit 
et des Sciences Koonomiques de Beyrouth, Imprimerie Catholiqjie, 1959 >
pp. 121-150.
5* This point is immediately apparent to anyone who conducts business in
Beirut and was discussed in an article by C. Toma, !Les Causes Profondes 
du Marasme a la Bourse de Beyrouth1, L*Orient, 10th February, 1966, 
p. 12. See also L!Orient 5th February, 19&5
given the very large amount of money in Lebanon seeking investment
1 2 
opportunities a very disorderly capital market ensued. This has
further encouraged small savers from entering the capital market 
and instead they invest intangible, safe and unproductive assets 
such as real estate, or else are oontent to deposit their money 
in the banks# There is thus a climate of distrust and apprehension 
at the Bourse which, even if a re-organisation of the exchange was 
oarried out, would take a long time to disappear# Therefore, 
entrepreneurs would still have to fall back on self-finance or on 
a renewable three monthly credits when in need of medium- or 
long-term credits, unless other institutions were created to pro­
vide them# The kind of institution that could be created is dis­
cussed in the next chapter*
Before leaving this section the hotel industry should be
3
mentioned* A study conducted at the Ministry of Planning, has 
shown that it is essential for tourism that credit facilities be
1. See Chapter II
2# See R# Pringuey, *La Bourse de Beyrouth* Perspectives d!une Nouvelle 
Reorganisation*, L*Orient# 16th December, 1965# It is the 3^d of 4 
articles* One of the examples he gives is that of the Compagnie 
Libanaise des Petroles which since 1957 Rets been responsible for 
40^ of all dealings on the floor of the Bourse#
%  Pro.iet pour la Cre'ation dfune Banque de Peveloppement# op# cit*
The importance of tourism and especially of hotels and their need 
for medium-term credits were recently stressed by Gannage E#,"Besoins 
et Objectifs du Developpement Economique1', L*Orient# 22nd 2 3rd 
April, 1966#
made available# At present, apart from self-finance, the only 
sources of finance available are the banks, which are willing to 
grant three monthly credits and the B#C#A.I.F# whioh earmarks 
4 million a year for new loans to hotels# Only the B.C.A.I.F* 
is willing to extend medium-term credits, and for reasons already 
discussed it is not able to be of much help#
According to the same report, three types of credit are 
required*
i# short-term credits up to nine months to help
mountain hotels, where work is highly seasonal, in 
the trough months,
ii. medium-term credits to modernize and expand existing 
hotels,
iii# long-term credits, to open new hotels# These are
considered essential if, as is hoped, there is going 
to be an expansion of tourism# As commercial banks 
are again not ready to grant medium-term credits 
other institutions have to be created#
3# The public sector
"it is a society in transition, dominated still by an intense 
individualism* • • "I
1# IRFED Report, Le Liban ^ace \  son Peveloppement, op. cit# p# 3* Ii 
is the opening sentence of the report#
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This quotation reflects quite accurately the attitude in Lebanon
towards the economy# It is in transition for, as explained
earlier, a new approach in the study of the Lebanese economy has
shown the possibility of problems arising in the future and in
which the State has a major responsibility# Various reports and
studies on the Lebanese economy have thus underlined the necessity
for the State to intervene in the economic life of the country,
but at the same time have stressed the importance of liberalism
and 1laissez-fairef* ^his explains the latter part of the quotation.
The importance given to liberalism is dictated by the fact that it
is still deeply entrenched in the peopled minds and that any
sudden and violent change of economic policies would change the
expectations of many Lebanese and foreigners, and might undermine
X
confidence in the country!s stability# Thus one can read Professor
/ ■< \Bourguinat who speaks of the narrow path (*voie etroite'; of the
Lebanese economy which consists in nursing confidence while at
the same time endeavouring to re-adjust the economy to modern 
2 mconditions* This point is also emphasised by the IRKSD Mission
1# The importance of liberalism in the Lebanese economy was stressed
again recently by Mr. P. Edde^  who is a former Minister of Tlnance 
and the President of Lebanese Banks1 Association (ABL) and a banker 
himself. See his article in L!Orient, 21st April, 1966*
2, Professor H* Bourguinat, *Regards sur l*Economie Libanaise*, LTOrient,
9th, 10th and 11th June, 1965.
which said that:
’’State planning has to he original and adapted to the 
Lebanese reality, allowing the State to intervene directly 
onlyian the field of infrastructural investments, and in 
the establishment of the ruling and administrative machinery! 
it is with tariffs and financial incentives that the State 
should encourage the individual man to co-operate in the 
economic development designed to achieve an optimum use of 
the soil, an expansion in industry, handicrafts and tourism, 
all of which are here [in Lebanon] sources of a prosperous 
and adapted economy.’1^
This attitude towards the State explains why for agriculture and 
industry, its responsibilities were mainly concerned with the 
provision of infrastructural equipment. The State is no more 
simply an Etat-Gendarmes it is to create those conditions under 
which private enterprise and the economy can prosper and develop.
It is with this in mind that the five year plan 1964-68 was prepared, 
and to which we turn now to try to find out what financial problems 
may face the public sector in the future so that we may discover 
what a Central Bank could do in this direction* Details of the 
plan and statistics relating to it were privately secured from an 
unpublished report prepared by the Planning Commission for the 
Ministry of Finance in 1964^65, and from private discussions with 
a member of the Commission,
A* State Expenditure
State expenditure is divided into two main parts:
1* IRFED Report, Le Lib an ^aoe a son Developpement, op* cit., p. 6.
a* 'Budget de fonctionnement' or ordinary budget* 
b. Development Budget*
The emphasis on development projects, which reflects the new 
attitude to the economy discussed above, will clearly emerge,
a* Ordinary budget
In the four-year period 1960-65 the ordinary budget 
increased on average by 15*8^ a year* This is not expected 
to continue in the future because in that period the State was 
widening its range of activities very rapidly and had to 
increase its expenditure at a very high rate* In the five- 
year plan a levelling off is expected and two alternatives 
are put forward. One is given by the finance Ministry and it 
plans for a 9*5$ annual increase in the ordinary budget. This 
would mean a total of £L 2,057 million earmarked in the 1964^68 
plan for the ordinary budget alone* The Planning Commission 
finds this rate rather excessive and suggests instead a 6fo 
annual increase which it thinks possible if a higher product­
ivity and more efficiency can be secured from the administration* 
If the Commission's rate was adopted the ordinary budget would 
absorb £L 161 million less than it would if the Finance Ministry's 
estimate prevailed, details are shown in Table XVIII below, >
At the time of writing no decision has apparently been made.
158.
from £L 336*5 million in 1964 the ordinary budget is estimated 
to reach £L 424*85 million in 1968*
T A B h E XVIII
STATE EXPENDITURE Ilf THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 1964-68 
in £L millions
Planning; Commission hypothesis of 6fo yearly increase in ordinary Budget. 
Type of expenditure 1964 1965 1966 1967 1988 ^otal
A. Budgetary Expenses
Ordinary Budget 336.50 356.70 378.10 400.75 424*85 1,896.90
Development Budget 148.60 128*30 136.60 124*10 133*95 671*55
tfotal A 485*10 485*00 514*70 524*85 558.80 2,568.45
B. Treasury Advances 92.00 48.50 21.00 20.00 15*00 196*50
TOTAL A & B 577flo 533*50 535*70 544*85 573*80 2,764.95
Sourcet Planning Commission Report to the Ministry of Finance, 1964-65 
Unpublished.
B. Development Budget
The development Budget is divided into two parts* One that 
has already Been approved and another that is new and has not
yet Been adopted*
There seems to Be a disagreement over the cost of the projects 
that have Been approved* While the IRFED Mission estimates they 
would cost £3j 584*9 million (£L 459*7 million if t r e a s u r y  
advances are excluded), at the Ministry of Finance it is 
expected that they would cost £L 868*05 million (£L 671*55 
million if Treasury advances are excluded) » Details of the 
Treasury advances as conceived By the Finance Ministry are shown 
in TaBle XIX* Details about the IRFED estimate of the cost of 
the approved projects can Be seen in TaBle XX - which gives the 
absolute amounts ** and Table XXI - which gives the percentages* 
Table XXII shows the details of the approved projects as con­
ceived By the Finance Ministry, which is confident that its 
estimate is the right one, and which therefore we shall adopt 
later*
The new projects plan submitted By the IRFED Mission and 
which is expected to cost £L 568*8 million (Table XX) complements 
the approved projects But places a heavier emphasis on social
1* The two sets of figures are not strictly comparable as the latter 
inolude certain amounts earmarked for social and cultural subsidies* 
But even if these are excluded the latter set is higher*
160
T A B L E  XIX 
TREASURE ADVANCES IB £L MILLIONS
Item 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total
Army Cooperatives 3 2 1 - *■» 6
Litani Project 51.5 6*5 M - m* 38
Autonomous agencies 2 2 2 2 2 10
Railwayss Buses 10 2 - 12
Port of Beirut 16 16 - 32 '
Government Gity 10 4 - - HP4 14
Electricity fte# 10 10 10 5 35
Green Plan 2 4 6 6 6 24
Pruit export co. 5 *■* M - - 5
Staff indemnity 8*5 - - -
LT\*
00
National development Bank 2 *04 “ - - 2
TOTAL 90.0 4^.5 19 18 15 186.5
Miscellaneous 2 2 2 2 2 10
TOTAL 92 48*5 21 20 15 196.5
Sources Planning Commission Report to the Ministry of Einance*
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T A B L E  m i
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET* FINANCE MINISTRY’S ESTIMATES OF APPROVED PROJECTS
In £L Millions
Item 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Sotal
Expenditure on equipment 
for administration and 
certain expenditure on 
large projects 65.9 70.5 86.5 95*0 114.4 450.5
Project of £L 62 m* Water 6.2 1.0 - - - 7.2
Project of £L 84 m* Roads 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 7.0 57.0
Project of £L 450 m* of 
which*
Irrigation 64 m* 
drinking Water* 76 m* 
Electricity* 72 m* 
Hoads* 124 m* 46*0 50.5 51.5 12.0 8.0 128.0
Water ducts* 9 nu 
Antiquities* 10 m* 
Buildings* 20 m* 
Rebuilding fund* 75 nu
Fair of Tripoli 8.0 4 .0 mm mm 12.0
Green Plan 0*5 1.0 1*5 2.0 2.2 7.2
Modern Prisons 6*6 5.5 •M - 10.1
Cadastral Survey 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.1 11.4
Min* of Refence Bdgs* 2.0 5.0 2*5 - m 7.5
Min* of Information 0.2 0 .2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0
Refrigerated Wagons mm •• mm - mm -
T O T A L 148.6 128.3 156.6 124.1 155.9 671.5
Sourcei Planning Commission Report to Ministry of Finance, 1964-65* 
Unpublished*Gr# Corm, Politique Eoonomique et . Pland-fication 
au Liban 1955-65 Beyrouth, Imprimerie Universelle, 1964*
expenditure, which reflects the new attitude towards the social 
problem in Lebanon* Roads and electricity still absorb the 
largest percentages of the total, 16*4$ ancL 15*7$ respectively 
(last column of Table XXI) but education comes third with 11*5$ 
as against 0*8$ in the approved projects plan*
Thus adopting the Finance Ministry’s estimate for the 
cost of approved projects - £L 868*05 million - total State 
expenditure for the five year plan is expected to reach £L 3»493*3 
million on the Finance Ministry’s estimate of 9*5$ annual increase 
in the ordinary budget, or £L 3>333*7 million on the Planning 
Commission’s estimate of 6$*
B* State Receipts
The question that arises now is whether the State will be able 
to finance the five year plan from tax receipts alone* The Planning 
Commission considered the various alternatives open and finally 
came out against any major increase or reform in the tax system* 
Instead it recommended a change in the methods of tax collection 
and a more efficient collection* Having adopted this alternative 
it then projeoted tax receipts over the period covered by the plan 
taking into consideration a slight decrease in oustoms revenues 
following an expansion in industrial production,**' the exemption
1* This does not seem entirely justifiable because the increase in income 
which industrial expansion might bring about would increase imports*
from customs duties of raw materials going into industry, and a normal 
increase in oil revenues* The estimates are shown in Table XXIII*
The total expected return amounts of 2,670*2 million* This 
figure now has to be compared with the expenditure estimates*
A 9*5$ annual increase in the ordinary budget would produce 
a total State expenditure of £L 3*493*3 million and therefore a 
budget deficit of £L 823*1 million over the five year period* A 
6$ increase in the ordinary budget would make State expenditure 
amount to £L 3*333*7 million and would therefore produce a deficit 
of £L 663*5 million over the five year period*
The Services Sector
Earlier it was pointed out that Lebanon relied for a large part 
of its revenue on this sector and that with the changing conditions 
in the Middle East this sector has kept up its importance by being 
highly adaptable* Today banking and finance are very lucrative 
activities because capitalists of the Middle East have been deposit­
ing their funds in Beirut, which Lebanese bankers have been able 
to invest at home and abroad* But these same capitalists are 
gradually becoming more sophisticated in their investment decisions 
and now tend to by-pass Beirut by investing in the developed capital 
markets of Europe and America* On the other hand they are encour-
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T All IE  XXIII
EXPECTED STATE RECEIPTS ON BASIS OF PLANNING COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS, 1964 - 1968
1964 196S 1966 1967 1968 TO TAL
In EL In In CL In In CL In In CL In In CL In In CL In
I. DIRECT TAXES AND STAMP AND M illio n s % M illio n s 9i M illio ns % M illio ns « M illio n s % M illio ns "4
REGISTRATION DUTIES
A . jD k c c ^_ X A il2 2 _
1. Tax on b u ilt -u p  properties 26 . 5 6 .3 35.0 7.4 40 .0 7.8 4S.0 8 .2 50 .0 8.4 196.5 7 7
2. Idcoiuc Tax 46 .0 11.0 60.0 12.8 70 .0 13.8 77.0 14.0 85 .0 14.3 338.0 13.3
3, Registration o f private cars 8.B 2.1 9 ,0 1.9 9 .7 1.9 10.5 1.9 11.2 1.8 48.9 1.9
4, Transfer duties 2.S 0 .6 2 .5 0 .5 3 .0 0 .6 3 .0 0 .5 3.5 0 .6 14.6 O. 6
5. Other duties 0.1 0 .0 0 .2 0.1 0 .2 0 . 1 0 .2 0. 1 0 .2 0,1 0 .9 0. 1
T O T A L (A ) 83 .6 20 .0 106.7 22.7 122.9 24.2 135.7 24.7 149.9 25.2 598.8 2 3 .b
B . _Stamp_and RSiQstr:^lm;_DuU£5
1, Stamps 15.0 3.6 16.5 3 .5 17.0 3.4 18.7 3.4 21.0 3 .5 88 .2 3.5
2 . Registration Duties 16.5 3.9 18.0 3 .8 20.0 3.9 22 .0 4 .0 24.0 4 .0 100. 5 4 .0
3. Road Tax 3 .0 0 .7 3.5 0 .8 3 .5 0 .7 4 .0 0 .7 4 .0 0 .7 18.0 0. 7
4 . Other duties 6 .1 1.5 6 .7 1.4 7 .3 1.4 8 .0 1.4 8.4 1.4 36.5 1.4
T O TA L (B) 40 .6 9 .7 44 .7 9 .5 47.8 9.4 52 .7 9 ,5 57.4 9 .6 243.2 9.6
TO TAL (1) = (A  + B) 124.2 29 .7 151.4 32.2 170.7 33.6 188.4 34.2 207 ,3 34.8 842.0 33.2
II.  INDIRECT TAXES
I . Customs Duties 137.5 32.9 144.3 30.7 151.5 29.8 159.0 28.9 167.0 28. 1 759 3 29.9
2. Fuel Tax 46 .0 11.0 49 .2 10.5 52.6 10.4 56.2 10.2 6 0 .1 10. 1 264. 1 10.4
3. Tax on Tobacco 33.0 7 .9 40 .0 8 .5 41 .0 8.1 4S.0 8 .2 49 .0 8.2 208,0 8.2
4. Tax on Cement 4 .0 1.0 5 .5 1.2 5 .5 1.1 6 .0 1.1 6 .5 1.1 27.5 1. 1
S. Other taxes. 5 .6 1.3 5 .0 1.1 5 .7 l . l 6 .3 t . 1 7 .0 1.2 29.6 1.1
T O TA L ( II) 226.1 54.1 244.0 52 .0 256.3 50.5 272.5 49.5 289.6 48 .7 1, 288.5 50.7
I I I .  RECEIPTS FROM STATE PROPERTIES 11.5 2 .8 12.0 2 .6 13.0 2 .6 13.5 2.5 14.0 2,4 64 .0 2 .5
T O TA L (10) 11. S 2 .8 12.0 2 .6 13.0 2 .6 13.5 2.5 14.0 2.4 64 .0 2.5
IV . MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS
1. O il Revenues 2 4 .0 5 .7 26.4 5 .6 29.0 5 .7 31 .0 5 .6 34.0 5 .7 144.4 5 .7
2. Other receipts 32.2 7 .7 35. 6 7.6 38.5 7 .6 45 .0 8 .2 50.0 8.4 201. 3 7 .9
T O TA L (IV ) 56.2 13.4 6 2 .0 13.2 67.5 13.3 76.0 13.8 84 .0 14.1 345, 7 13.6
T O TA L OF BUDGET RECEIPTS 418.0 100.0 469.4 100.0 507.5 100.0 550.4 100.0 594.9 100,0 2 ,540 .2 100.0
( I  + I I  + I II  + IV  )
V , F15CAL CHANGES
1, Supplementary tax on Income - 3.5 4 .5 6 .0 7 .6 21.6
2 , Supplementary registration tax 1.5 3 .0 4 .3 5 .5 6 .8 21.1
3, Supplementary stamp duty 3 .5 8 .0 13.5 18.8 23.5 67.3
4 . Supplementary tax on cem ent 2 .0 3 .0 4 .0 5 .0 6 .0 20 .0
T O T A L  (V) 7 .0 17.5 26 ,3 35.3 43 .9 130.0
TO TA L ( I  + I I  + I I I  + IV  4 V  ) 425 .0 486 .9 533.8 585.7 638.8 2 ,670 .2
Sourcei M in is try  o f Planning, Beirut
aged to do so by the foreign hankers who go straight to them to
encourage them to invest in their respective countries* These
capitalists do not now find in Lebanon the investment opportunities
they seek because the capital market is underdeveloped, and thus
capital which would previously have come to Beirut is now going
X
straight abroad* If banking is to retain its importance in Lebanon 
a capital market with suitable investment opportunities should be 
created in Beirut, to attract the funds which at the moment tend 
to go to the financial oentres of Europe and ^merioa* Not only 
would this help the banking sector but it would also yield great 
amounts in invisibles which would help the balance of payments*
In this chapter the problems that Lebanon might have to face 
in the future were considered and the various official plans for 
the development of the country and credit requirements that would 
ensue were described# How they oould be met and the implications 
for a Central Bank are the subjects of the next chapter#
1* It seems that even in the field of deposits, Beirut is losing the 
previous natural appeal it had for Middle ^astern capitalists, 
as banks in Beirut have had to increase their foreign currency 
deposit rates by ^  to ifo to compete with the recently increased 
rates in New York, London and other finanoial centres* See 
LTOrient* 23rd April, 1966*
CHAPTER IV
FINANCING THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LEBANON
This chapter starts by considering whether the commercial banking 
sector in Lebanon can provide the type of credits required for the 
economic development of the country as outlined in the preceding 
chapter. Then how it can provide these credits is analysed and finally 
the role and responsibilities of a Central Bank are considered,
I# The Potentialities of the Lebanese Banking Sector
As noted earlier^ the ratio of cash to deposits kept by banks 
in Lebanon is low and unstable when compared to that of other countries - 
for example it was 4*5^ i*1 April 1964 and 2#5% in September of that same 
year - and the liquidity ratio is high - 42•!$> in April 1964 and 43*2$ 
in September, It was also noted that most of the liquid assets of the 
banks are held abroad: their foreign investments amounted to &L 1,005*8
million in April 1964 and £L 1,270,5 million in September of that same 
year,
VO04
Since it the practice of commercial banks in Beirut to maintain 
foreign assets roughly equal to foreign liabilities, the total foreign 
liabilities of the Banks for April and September 1964 ~ i*e., liabilities
1, See Chapter II p ,^7
to banks and non-banks in foreign currencies - were rohghly equal to 
the two figures just given* Part of these liabilities are owed to 
private individuals - Lebanese and foreigners - who are able to deposit 
their money in the banks in any ourrency they choose j as most of the 
deposits are in fact savings depositors can be influenced to some extent 
on the choice of currency# On the whole banks prefer that people choose 
foreign currencies rather than Lebanese Pounds, and in fact higher rates
1 mare paid on foreign currency deposits* This is explained by considering
the six graphs below* These show the relationship at equilibrium between
the various rates of interest and rates of return in the money marketf
and the conditions under which the banks would pay higher interest
rates on deposits in foreign currencies than on those in local currency*
We start by assuming that banks incur no costs and make no profits
so that the rates of return can be made equal to the corresponding
deposit rates* W© assume this for simplicityfs sake as it will make
2
the graphs easier to construct*
Figure 1 shows the relationship that exists between the supply 
of the foreign securities that banks look for and the demand for such
1* Information obtained from private interviews with several bankers 
in Beirut*
2* Alternatively we could change the scales so that for example a rate 
of return Rfr corresponds to a maximum deposit rate of LR^ but then 
we would have to assume constant costs and profit margins*
Supply of foreign securities 170# 
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securities by the banks* The Y axis represents the various rates of 
return, and the X axis the amounts of funds available for foreign 
investment. The supply curve RfSfg is perfectly elastio at the rate 
of return Rf which the banks expect to get because the world supply 
of such securities is presumably much larger than the demand for 
them by Lebanese banks* RfC is the amount of such securities demanded 
by banks* This amount is determined by the relationships described 
in figures 4 an& 5* ^he curve % s is the locus of C for different 
values of Rf given that the shapes of the curves in the figures 
following are unchanged* It is one of a family of curves.
In private interviews, bankers said that their practice to 
keep their foreign assets rodghly equal to their foreign liabilities, 
but they said also that if people cannot be persuaded to deposit in 
foreign currencies, they consider the possibility of converting some 
of their funds acquired in Lebanese Pounds into foreign currencies 
so as to invest them abroad, and the fact is that some bankers are 
increasingly tending to do so* The reason is that there is a shortage 
of demand at the rate of return banks are prepared to accept in Lebanon* 
But in spite .of the shortage of demand for loanable funds by the public, 
banks still qompete for deposits* This leads us to think that the rate
*v\» t~>q o J r
of return on foreign securities|jsa higher than the local rate of return/_ 
because when they convert their holdings of Lebanese Pounds into foreign
10 may be above, below or equal to R . For illustrative purposes it is 
assumed in this section that is above
currencies, 'banks run exchange risks which make them expect a higher 
rate of return abroad# Ag the supply of the type of foreign securities 
they require is completely elastic at the expected rate Rf, whatever 
they cannot invest in Lebanon at an acceptable rate of return, can be 
invested abroad# If the total exchange risk# incurred by converting 
Lebanese Pounds into foreign currencies is denoted by E, the foreign 
rate of return Rf sets a minimum acceptable rate of return Rh in the 
domestic market that is equal to Rf minus E* In other words there is 
no supply of loahable funds in the Lebanese market at rates of return 
below Rh*
As it was assumed that banks incur no costs and make no profits 
Rh sets a maximum equal value LRh to the rate of interest that banks 
are prepared to pay on deposits in local currenoy* This is shown in 
figure 2 where rates of interest appear on the J axis and amounts of 
funds on the X axis. It is reasonable to assume that owing to the very 
stiff competition that no doubt exists in the Lebanese banking sector 
the maximum rate of interest DRh is paid on deposits# At LRh the banks* 
demand for deposits is completely elastic as what they cannot invest in 
Lebanon oan always be invested abroad at Rf* The demand curve for 
deposits is therefore the flat DRhLdb* The supply of deposits by the 
public S<ip is an increasing function of the rate of interest# The curve 
does not start at the origin as even if no interest were paid on deposits
1 o I fh loh is here assumed to be positive, although it could be negative or 
zero depending on whether the exchange rate of the Lebanese Pound is 
expected to appreciate, depreciate or remain stable#
people would still find it convenient to deposit a certain amount of 
funds in the banks for transactions purposes* At the start the curve 
is quite elastic because in Lebanon banks do not have to compete with 
alternative liquid investments to acquire funds, because such invest­
ments do not exist# But soon, whatever can be deposited with banks is 
deposited and the supply of deposits curve becomes rather inelastic 
as banks gradually have to acquire funds which would normally have gone 
into more illiquid investments* The intersection point of BR^D^h with 
determines the total amount of funds in Lebanese Pounds that are 
available in the banking sector# This amount is OA*
The amount OA determines in figure 5 the supply of loanable funds 
in Lebanese Pounds to the local market. Here rates of return are 
plotted on the Y axis# The supply of such loanable funds by the banks 
is an increasing function of the rate of return but there is no supply 
at a rate lower than R^ determined in figure 1 by the foreign rate Rf 
and the exchange risks element E# Thus the supply of loanable funds 
curve is RhPSj^# The curve is asymptotio to the perpendicular from A 
as OA is the total amount of funds available, and gradually banks have 
to be paid more and more interest to forego some of their liquid funds# 
The demand for such loanable funds by the public Dh, is a decreasing 
function of the interest rate. How, at the minimum rate of return R^
Om funds are demanded while Qm1 are offered. The shortage of demand for
Lebanese Pounds at Rh referred to earlier, is here shown by the existence 
of the excess supply mm1* As these funds can be invested abroad at an 
acceptable rate that takes into account the exchange risks involved in 
converting Lebanese currency into foreign currencies, they create a demand 
for foreign securities pictured in figure 4* Here the rates of return are 
again plotted on the Y axis. Ag in figure 1 RfSfg is the supply curve of 
foreign securities at the rate Rf, and is completely elastic* The demand 
curve is RfBD'fg. The ^portion of the curve RfB is perfectly elastic as 
banks invest at Rf all the amount mm* that is not demanded in Lebanon* At 
3 , however, the curve becomes completely inelastic as mm* which determines 
the length RfB is essentially a residual of what is not demanded in the 
local market* Banks will try to satisfy the home demand first at the rate 
Rh so as not to encourage new banks to get into the market and make 
deposits even harder to acquire. Although in figure 4 Rf is the rate 
of return that banks obtain on their investments, it is equivalent to the 
lower rate Rh which they oould obtain locally had there been a demand for 
such funds, as Rf needs to be discounted for the exchange risks element E#
How figure 5 shows the relationship that exists between the supply 
of foreign currency deposits to banks, Sf0p and the demand for such 
deposits by the banks, BRfRfcb* The former is an increasing function 
of the rate of interest, and the curve does not start at the origin as 
people may wish to keep certain funds in foreign currencies for foreign
trade purposes even if no interest were paid on such deposits# The 
rate of return on foreign securities Rf sets a maximum limit to the 
rate of return that banks are willing to pay on deposits in foreign 
currencies* As we assume that banks incur no costs and make no profits, 
here again we can think that the very stiff competition that exists in 
the banking sector has pushed the deposit rate to the maximum limit 
of LRf equal to Rf. At the rate LRf the demand for foreign currency 
deposits by the banks is infinitely elastic* however much they can get, 
they can invest abroad at a rate of return Rf# The point of intersection 
of the two curves determines the amount OP available to banks in foreign 
currencies and which they can invest abroad without incurring exchange 
risks#
This leads us to figure 6 which is similar to figure 1* At Rf the 
supply of foreign securities Sfs is completely elastic* The amount of 
foreign securities demanded by the banks is RfC* The length of RfC is 
determined by the amount of OP* available for foreign investment and which 
amount is composed of OP available originally in foreign currencies 
(fmg* 5), and of FP* equal to mm1, being the residual of Lebanese 
currency not demanded in the local market at R^ and converted into 
foreign currencies for investment abroad (fig# 3 and 4)#
Although the rate of return on all the foreign investment is Rf, the
amount OP bears no exchange risks while the amount PPr - equal to mm1 - 
incurs the exchange risks denoted earlier by E. It is now evident 
why banks try to influence depositors in their choice of currency, for
the larger the amount OP in the total 0Pf, the less exchange risk they
incur# Therefore they are willing to pay a higher rate of interest on 
deposits in foreign currencies h which they are able to because the 
foreign rate is higher than the local rate - and let the depositors bear 
the exchange risks# Iteom this model it should also be clear how a 
movement in the rate of return abroad can influence interest rates in 
Lebanon#
How if we go back to figure 3j it is clear that the local demand
for short-term funds can be increased to Om1 without affecting the
supply conditions# As a matter of fact if the curve is shifted to 
the right, which an increased demand .at Rfo would imply, as it gets 
closer to m f, banks might then be disinclined to pay more interest on 
foreign currency deposits5 this might induce people to deposit in 
Lebanese Pounds instead in order to avoid exchange risks# Were this 
to happen S^p in figure 2 would shift to the right increasing the 
amount OA and thus Om1 in figure 3 available in the domestic market*
If Lh is shifted to the right the amount mm1 becomes smaller and this 
in turn affects the demand for foreign securities by the banks* The 
amount now demanded decreases and1 R^C in figures 1 and 6 become smaller
while Lfg moves to the left* As long as Bh 5) intersects
Rh^LL a^ a P°Tnt between Rh and P no change in supply conditions
should occur as banks would repatriate funds invested abroad# Only
if the point of intersection is beyond P would the equilibrium of
interest rates be upset* Therefore unlike mose underdeveloped countries
of the world Lebanon does not suffer from a scarcity of finance. In
other words an increase in demand for funds at home could easily be met
1by the banking sector by diverting investment from abroad**
But it may be asked whether it is not idle to consider shifting 
Dft to the right and asking the banks to divert some of their investments 
from abroad when there seems to be a deficiency of demand at home at the 
minimum rate of return Rh as shown in figure 3* In fact, it is not, 
because figure 3 shows the supply and demand for funds in the money 
market, i«e«, for short-term loans only# Therefore, the deficiency is 
in the demand for short-term money, and it is the consideration of the 
supply and demand conditions for medium- and long-term loans that makes 
it necessary to see whether nothing could be done to use the vast resources 
of the money market to satisfy the demand for these loans# In effect 
as explained in Chapter III at the longer end of the market there are 
no adequate credit facilities, and a growing demand from both private 
and public sectors# It may seem strange that institutions
1* The problem of inflation is dealt with at a later stage*
did not appear at an earlier date to meet the growing demand. Why 
they did not, oan he attributed to several factors, the most important 
of which being the traditional feeling that banks should not tie up in 
illiquid medium- and long-term advances funds which they have acquired 
on sight or at short notice| and moreover, they could always invest 
profitably and safely abroad. Besides, the demand for such credits 
is relatively recent, and it was generally known that the Government 
had plans for a Development Bank: this could have discouraged people
from creating such institutions before knowing what that bank was 
going to do. Finally uncertainty about what the new Central Bank 
would be like could have created an attitude of wait-and-see and 
therefore delayed any such plans.
Conservative banking practice would in fact exclude at all times 
the possibility of using the banks* resources in medium-term credits 
or bonds, and would confine them instead to very short-term bills and 
self-liquidating paper# It would also require banks not to lend against 
the security of real estate which they have been doing in Lebanon. This 
is no more than the orthodox financial policy summarised in one of the 
Annual Reports of the Bank of International Settlements which says:
"Even when the credits granted by banks may be said to have 
had their counterpart in genuine savingsaa there is still the 
very real risk that the banks may become more and more involved 
in the long-term financing of industry, with the result that 
their balance sheets will mount very rapidly - as has recently
1* See Chapter III
been the case in Germany. If business oontinues to prosper, 
all may be well, but should there be a turn in the trend, losses 
are more liable to be suffered in the case of long-term investments 
if the depositors think they have reason to fear for the amounts 
entrusted by them to the banks and therefore become nervous, the 
ground is prepared for a financial crisis, which may be difficult 
to overcome."!
The problem now is whether there is a case for the banks to
deviate from orthodox financial policies in the Lebanon, i.e., to
use money acquired mostly on short-term, to grant long- or medium-
term credit or to buy long-term bonds or whether they are justified
in granting credits against the security of real estate# It will be 
2
recalled that banks are very liquid not only because a large part of 
their deposits are time and savings account, but also because demand 
deposits show a very low turnover. In the year ending in April 19&4» 
for example, demand deposits were used only once every two and a half 
months. We came to the conclusion then that a very large part of 
demand deposits can be looked at as a disguised form of time deposits 
or even investment in shares and bonds* Therefore, demand deposits 
are not used in what has been called the 1 traditional* way - i.e. the 
way that prevails in more advanced countries - and there is then no 
reason why orthodox financial policies should apply in their extreme 
and strictest form* This point is supported by the Chief General 
Manager of the Union Bank of Switzerland when he describes the nature 
of deposits in Continental Europe:
1*. Banks of International Settlements, 23 Annual Report. 1953* P* 73 
2* See Chapter II, p^>,
"A further belief is that bank deposits and credit extended must 
in no way completely ooincide vdth regard to time. Wherea,s, for 
example, in the countries of Continental Europe the public prefer 
to place its savings in banks, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, it 
would rather make use of the share and bond market for the 
purpose of savings. Because in both cases no significant differ­
ence exists in the character of the invested money, it would
appear appropriate for the European commercial banks to lend ^
part of their deposits on an intermediate or long-term basis*1
Since by far the largest part of deposits in Lebanon are left unused
in the banks for long periods and therefore are no more than savings,
part of them can be used to meet the unsatisfied demand for medium- 
and long-term loans* Therefore banks are able to assist the private 
and public sectors in the economic development of the country by pro­
viding them with the types of credit which they require* If that were 
done, the foreign securities requirements RfC in figure 1 would decrease 
and 3)fs would then shift to the left as demand for medium- and long-term
1* Dr. A. Schaeffer, * Commercial Banking in the Financing of
Industrial Investments* 9 Lecture given at the 16th International 
Banking Summer School at Semmering Austria, in 1963* published with 
other lectures read in Commercial Banks in Relation tff Medium- and 
Long-Term Credits* Bruden Rossenbraum, Vienna, p. 200*
In February, 1958* Mr. Zolotas, Governor of the Bank of Greece 
went as far as to suggest that in under-developed countries banks 
should not merely wait for businessmen to demand funds but should 
"effectively suggest and recommend the establishment, modernization 
or merger of business and even, if need be, participate indireotly 
in productive enterprises"# Reported by A.R. Low, *The Varied Role 
of Central Banks1, Economic Record* December 1958* P* 321, who 
expresses the same v i e w : ( i n  under-developed countries) the idea 
which is widely held in more developed countries - that commercial 
banks should not provide long-term finance for fixed capital purposes 
is much less appropriate"#
credits in Lebanon gets satisfied. The deficiency of demand for short­
term loans mm1 (figure 3) would then help to provide finance in the 
capital market in Lebanon#
The same argument can be used to justify the practice of Lebanese 
banks with regard to lending against the security of real estate#
Besides the banks had to do it as real estate was the chief asset that 
people could offer#
However demand deposits may be left mused in the banks, but they 
are still withdrawable without notice* Savings deposits are withdraw­
able on demand too, while time deposits, although technically withdraw­
able only after a notice can in practice be withdrawn on demand, the 
interest for the period of notice being automatically deducted* There­
fore any nervousness of depositors could cause a financial crisis if 
banks have invested their deposits in medium- and long-term paper 
which they cannot liquefy easily. The wisdom of permitting such a 
risk can be questioned, but in a period of recession or when depositors 
become nervous, the danger of illiquidity involves not only long-term 
but also short-term credit if there are no proper rediscounting 
facilities, and therefore what is needed is the provision of adequate 
redisoounting facilities for long-term paper, if long-term credits are 
to be made. As the only final source of cash is the Central Bank, it 
is this latter that will have to provide these facilities*
"There is a presumption,'a strong presumption, against long-term 
lending by banks. Traditionally this has been argued from the 
faot that most of a banker's liabilities are payable on demand 
or at short notice, and that, therefore, his assets must be 
correspondingly short-term. Put in this extreme form, the 
argument is fallacious: the banker is able to make a living
because he knows that repayment of his deposits is in fact not 
required in total at any one time, and he could not make any 
living by matching his assets precisely to his liabilities* On 
the other hand, he cannot behave like an investment trust* The 
liquidity he has to maintain is a matter of degree • « • The 
upshot is that the Central Bank, though especially cautious in 
its own business with the general public, should adopt no rigid 
rhle against medium-term and long-term lending by commercial 
banks» Even the smallest barks must lend for longer terms than 
would match their assets and the Central Bank must be prepared to 
supply liquidity in case of emergency. "I
A banker does not make plans as though an emergency was always round 
the corner. His plans are based on the normal behaviour of people, 
but safeguards are taken should people deviate from their normal be­
haviour* The old concept of banks having to hedge against a sudden 
and heavy withdrawal of deposits is now outdated in most developed 
banking systems, partly because of the central bank backing which they 
enjoy, and partly because the risk of such a massive withdrawal has 
generally receded as deposits are looked upon as a highly convenient 
and increasingly safe method of payment* Therefore, the danger in 
allowing the banks to provide long-term credit is not really in the 
illiquidity of such investments as in the consequences that would follow 
from rediscounting medium*- or long-term paper*
1* Sayers K.S, Central Banking in Underdeveloped Countries* Rational Bank 
of Egypt, 50th Anniversary Commemoration Lectures - Cairo I956* My 
italics.
The first such new danger is the risk involved in lending over 
such a long period. As the credit is granted over a number of years 
the risk element is correspondingly bigger because of the difficulties 
involved in forecasting the outcome of such an investment so far ahead#
Another such new danger, but now involving the whole economy,
is inflation# Once the rediscounting idea has been adopted one can
easily see how inflation can come about* Banks grant a *- say - five 
year credit, and rediscount the paper signed by the debtor at the 
'central bank# If the banks then expand advances on the basis of their 
new reserves there is an additional injection of cash into the economy 
which might be used for advances which the normal bank multiplier working
as a result of the first advance would not have made possible# This
will increase the inflationary danger unless there is a greater leakage 
in the multiplier* As the rediscounted paper has a five year life, the 
cash injected into the economy is not likely to he withdrawn from 
circulation before five years - unless the borrower decides upon an 
early repayment# However, in ordinary circumstances, rediscounting of 
long-term paper should not be heavy because of the nature of the banks* 
deposits# These are not only a convenient means of payment but also a 
store of value, for whether on term or on sight, they are to a large 
extent left unused in the banks and have much the same characteristics 
as funds that would normally have been invested in shares and bonds#
The facilities provided would be more an insurance for an eventuality 
than a source of permanent finance. Thus banks would be using savings 
in their lending activities and no inflationary consequences of a 
monetary nature should occur as long as this is the oase. But if the 
paper is used as a means of expanding reserves and to make further loans 
new circumstances would emerge and safeguards could be taken against 
such occurrences* Moreover, the danger of inflation is not confined to 
medium- and long-term credituonly, but to all types of credit# As 
the French Lorrain Committee reported*
"A credit operation does not become inflationary simply because 
the life is longer than what is commonly called short-termj the 
risk of inflation cannot in effect be assessed as a function of 
the lives of the credits, but rather as a funotion of their nature 
and their healthy character* The danger of inflation starts 
appearing when the volume of the means of payment exoeeds the 
value of the goods and services available in the economy, or 
likely to be produced by it in the immediate future* All types 
of bank credit can be the origin of such an excess of demand*"!
On the other hand banks have invested abroad a large part of their 
funds* Such foreign investment is deflationary in terms of demand on 
resources* How if they divert some of their foreign investment to Lebanon, 
which they would have to if they are to grant long-term credits, the 
increased activity might exert pressure on some employed resources*
Any such development activity will be inflationary, and hence finance
1* Comite charge df g'tu&ier le financement des investissements, Rapport 
May 196^* Appeared in the Supplement to Statistiques et Etudes 
FLnancieres. Hovember 1963? Ministers des finances, Paris .(Translation 
is mine)*
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from bank credit for this should not be permitted to have any secondary 
monetary effect* Now there are certain conditions everywhere for re- 
discounting short-term paper# Other conditions could equally well be 
set for the rediscounting of medium- and long-term paper to prevent 
abuse and to ensure that these credits are granted carefully and in an 
orderly way.
How the banks could provide those credits and what safeguards 
could be adopted to prevent abuse will be discussed in the following 
sections# But before moving’ into that, the implications of such a 
new attitude to the operations by the banks should perhaps be considered* 
Bank lending in Lebanon will tmdergo some transformation if banks are 
to start providing medium- and long-term credits in one way or another, 
because then their operations mil no longer be concentrated on the short 
end of the market# Moreover, a new feature for the Lebanon is that banks 
will also be financing the public sector. The extent to which this will 
be done depends on the pace at which public expenditure will grow and the 
development plan outlined in Chapter III will be implemented; but there 
is no doubt that this part of the banksr business can be substantial*
This change in banking practice is not peculiar to the Lebanon. It is 
in fact a stage in the evolution of the banking mechanism with relation 
to economic development as was indeed pointed out at the Sixth Inter­
national Banking Summer Schools
“Bank credit has lost to a great extent its self-liquidating and 
self-securing character. It is now being called on to play an 
extremely important part in the financing of the expenditure of 
the State and of the public authorities, while its relative im­
portance for the financing of the private sector has diminished ..• 
The prime mover in the evolution of credit has been the general 
economic change of our time* In this the most important factor 
has been the enormous growth in State spending and the penetration 
of State intervention into every sector of economic life. A 
second reason lies in the fact that the services required of the 
banks by the various sectors of the economy have undergone changes 
and a demand has arisen for althgether new services. Finally, 
the banks, seeing only a reduced possibility of employing their 
resources profitably in their traditional fields of activity,^ 
have been led to extend their operations into new territory.”
The difference in the case of Lebanon, however is that banks started 
looking for Operations into new territory1 before they dould be pro- 
vided 'to their satisfaction' in the country itself and so looked 
abroad and found them abroad. So the point to remember is that if 
such operations are going to be made possible in the Lebanon, they 
would have to be made competitive with the opportunities abroad.
finally, if banks are going to lend on medium- and long-term 
and be able to rediscount such paper it will then be possible to combine 
the demand ourves for short-term and long-term credits together and 
the new curve could then be represented by B^ in figure 5*
1. Br. S, Schweitzer, rThe Transformation of Bank Credit and its New 
Forms1. Lecture given at the 6th International Banking Summer School 
1$. 1955 which appeared with other speeches in Recent Evolution of 
the Role of the Banks in the Fponomy. Association Beige de Banques, 
Brussels, pp. 75-98. Extracts are on pages 799 80*
2. Bemand for funds is not enoughs a guarantee of liquidity or market­
ability is necessary to satisfy banks.
II* Financing the Industrial Sector.
Industry in Lebanon has relied largely on self-financing and 
short-term credits, because it cannot rely on the capital market and 
is not provided with cheap long-term finance by credit institutions. 
The capital market is very badly organised and is subject to wild 
speculation which keeps the ordinary small saver « who is normally 
more interested in income and provides the stability^ " - out of it* 
Until the oapital market is re-organised industry will have to rely 
completely on credit institutions for the provision of medium- and 
long-term credit which is the type of credit that It requires, and 
which so far is practically not available*
A plan for a credit institution that would supply such credits
2to industry was put forward in the 1950 fs by the late Fmile Bustani
3but it has so far failed to see the light of day. His plan was to
1* The role of the small saver in this context is sometimes disputed; is 
he a source of stability or instability? But unless there is a 
general panic as in 1929 in Wall Street, it is -unlikely that all small 
savers will act in the same way or direction, and therefore, even if 
speculation rather than income is his intention, he is less likely 
to affect the market prices than the very large speculator*
2* A prominent Lebanese businessman and politician.
3* However, it is now reported (L*Orient. 9^h February 1966) that follow­
ing an Islamic Pact initiated by King Pei sal of Saudi-Arabia and whioh 
is supposed to group all Moslem countries - i.e. not just Arab 
countries - a Development Bank will be created to help finance pro­
jects in these countries. Details have not been worked out yet but 
the idea is similar to that of Mr. Bustani*s.
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create a supranational Arab body called the Arab Development Bank which 
would make loans to National Development Corporations whioh would then 
finance on national levels various development programmes.1 She essence 
of the plan was a planned economic development of the Arab countries but 
to be undertaken by the Arabs themselves and with the oil revenues earned 
by so^e of them and pooled in the Bank for the good of all*
As it turned out the plan was not adopted* Mr* Bustani was over- 
optimistic first about the chances of getting the "have" and ,fhave not11 
countries together, and then about the oil companies* willingness to
1* "What I am suggesting. * • is the establishment of an Arab Development 
Bank, finances by an annual deduction hf ten per cent from the gross 
proceeds of all oil produced in the Arab world, and dedicated to 
furthering sooial development schemes in the transit States* This 
Bank would in effect, be owned and financed jointly by the producing 
countries and the oil companies, who would each be represented on the 
Board of Directors and have voting powers in proportion to their invest­
ments* Once it was launched, a National Development Corporation would 
be set up in every Arab oil-transit State, the national Government hold­
ing $0/o of the shares and the remaining 5Qfo being made available to 
private investors at par*
These Corporations would be entrusted by transit-State Governments with 
carrying out development schemes with the aid of money loaned to them 
by the Arab Development Bankrat a nominal rate of interest - say two and 
a half per cent* Their proposals would, naturally, have to be submitted 
in detail to the Bank and fully approved before the loans were agreed*"
The Arab development Bank "**• would be strictly a business enter­
prise* and it would also "provide loans to privately owned businesses 
in the transit countries, for approved development purposes, provided 
that repayment was guaranteed by the National Development Corporations"*
Provisions were also to be made for safeguards that would have to be 
given by transit countries regarding the protection of the pipelines*
E* Bustani, Doubts and Dynamitet The Middle East Tp-aav* Allan 
Wingate, London, 1958> PP* 140-141* Italios are his* Transit 
countries are those which are crossed by pipeline but do not produce 
oil themselves*
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agree on such a project* Moreover, it is doubtful whether Governments 
would have agreed to submit their various development projects for 
approval by* the Arab Development Bank, which would have been a supra­
national body on the one hand and partly owned and managed by the oil 
companies on the other hand* finally the stress of the plan was mainly 
on government finance, and so private finance was not given enough 
attention*
In any case in Lebanon medium- or long-term credits to industry
oould be supplied by the commercial banks themselves or by investment
banks that could be formed with most or all of their capital subscribed
for by groups of commercial banks* She first possibility has the
advantage of requiring no further financial intermediaries which might
increase the costs of lending, and is quicker and easier to undertake,
especially in Lebanon where inherited business suspicions are strengthen -
ed by the very stiff competition that already exists in the money market*.
^he second alternative has the great advantage that it can permit
a larger scale of operations* Lebanese banks on the whole tend to be 
2
small , and by pooling their funds they could:
a) have more funds available at any one time and thus avoid
1* Another plan, but concerning finance for building only, was put forward 
in 1956 by Mr* Pierre Champion of the Credit Poncier de Prance on the 
request of the Lebanese Government* It was never adopted. Por details 
of the plan see: Le CoEKneroe du Levant of 7th April, 1957•
2# Unfortunately it has been impossible so far to get any statistical 
indication about the size distribution of Lebanese banks, but there
can be little doubt that on the whole they are small*
the necessity of setting up ad hoc consortia efery time a 
big firm asked for a large loan;
b) spread the risks over a number of banks so that no one
bank could actually be identified with a major default; and
c) avoid duplication of work and research, and take advantage 
of economies of scale, which might more than offset any 
additional expenses due to the introduction of an inter­
mediary* Moreover they would have more and better means 
of assessing the credit-worthiness of borrowers and 
investigating the investment to be financed because they would 
be able to afford it*
The idea of an investment bank owned by other banks has recently 
been adopted in Germany* Thus in September 1969 the Deutsche Bank, 
one of the largest banks in Europe and the largest in Germany, and a 
£ew private banks, among them the Bank of Brinkman Wirtz und Co*, and 
B. Metzher Seel Sohn und Co,, which is very well known in Frankfurt 
and which came up with the idea, founded the Deutsche Kapitalbedeiligungs 
Gesellschaft which is intended to “help medium-sized private enterprise 
companies to find partnerships or capital, ^his would aid companies 
unable to approach the capital market for funds. Such enterprises 
would be able to contact the new subsidiary and get new capital by
1 nmeans of participations and also advice*11 ^ach of the owner hanks 
will bring in a capital of 3PM lm* and has promised to submit more of 
its excess funds as necessary to fill the gap that was noticed to 
exist in the provision of long-term finance to small or medium-sized
companies* If their funds were not sufficient, they would also endeav­
our to attract private capital and would advise the companies on the 
best way to get it*
The resources of the Lebanese investment banks, the number of 
which should be restricted in order to group a larger number of 
commercial banks in one large investment bank, will consist of«
a) the capital of the bank which will be subscribed by the 
commercial banks* Private individuals could be allowed 
to participate, but the majority of the shares should 
be held by the commercial banks which will then make sure
that the investment banks do not lend on short-term thereby
creating stiffer competition for the commercial banks, the
2
co-operation of whom is needed#
1# The Times, 24th September, 1965, P* 16* Other information about 
the investment bank and its shareholders was obtained from private 
interviews with merchant banks in London#
2# Foreign participation might also help augment these resources# For 
example, Sohroder-Wagg the London merchant bank has acquired an 
interest in a Lebanese bank, the Rif Bank S*A.L*, of which the other 
main shareholder is the National Bank of Kuwait# Although the Rif 
Bank is a commercial bank, it is likely to concentrate gradually on 
investment and * long-term finance thus getting close to our idea of 
an investment bank# Sohroders acquired their interest in January 
1966#
b) bank deposits* Commercial banks will be able to deposit
surplus funds now invested abroad, with the investment banks. 
These can be deposited in either or both of two formss
i. as a sight deposit bearing interest. The rate will have to be 
calculated so that the sum of the return on the deposits plus 
the expected return on the capital invested by the commercial 
bank in the investment bank, is higher than Yjould have been earned 
if the same amount of money - i.e. deposit plus capital subscribed - 
had been invested abroad. For -^e total return was lower, 
banks would not be induced to employ their funds in Lebanon 
rather than abroad.
ii* as a time deposit against which the investment bank issues a
cash certificate with a maturity date and which is negotiable and
discountable at the Central Bank at a low rate. These certificates
can be used as a means of payment in the clearing office. If a
bank cannot find any other bank to buy the certificate when it is
in need of cash it should be able to sell it to the Central Bank
1
at a penal rate. The discount is intended to discourage such a
1. T ^  penal rate is intended to discourage a bank from depositing money 
in the investment bank^ - - from whose operations it would receive a 
profit if it is a shareholder - and then rediscount the cash certifi­
cate to replenish its reserves and thus increase its own lendings.
If that should happen it would be tantamount to a Central Bank deposit 
in the investment bank.
course of action and to make sure that other ways have been 
tried first. However, a bank should very rarely find itself in 
the position where it has to go to the Central Bank because the 
funds it will be depositing in this way are in the nature of 
long-term savings. Moreover, even if the bank should need the 
cash, the Marche* Hors Banque with its foreign banks should be 
able to buy the certificate. The rate of interest paid on such 
cash certificates should be higher than the one paid on sight 
deposits to encourage banks to adopt this method for*
i. it simplifies the work of the investment banks as they
know they will not have to prepay the certificates before 
1
they fall due.
ii. it decreases further the danger of inflation in so far as, 
if a sight deposit were withdrawn, the investment bank 
might have to rediscount some paper at the Central Bank 
therefore injecting new cash into the economy, while the 
certificate can itself be used as a means of payment with 
no deposits being withdrawn from anywhere. The certificate 
is discountable at the Central Bank but if that should
1. All time deposits are technically not repayable until they fall due, 
but in practice a bank hardly ever refuses to repay a deposit on 
grounds of notice. These certificates will be in fact somewhat 
like the *Bons de Caisse' which are issued in Belgium but to any 
person.
happen a penal rate is charged. Such a loss is not incurred 
in the case of sight deposits.
c. insurance companies deposits. Insurance companies have
large amounts of money at their disposal which will go on
increasing as the country develops and the standard of
living increases# Moreover, their work is not restricted
to Lebanon only but to the whole of the Middle ^ast.
present, their long-term investments have gone mainly into
tangible assets such as buildings and real estate. The
reasons are mainly two: one is the belief that the safest
asset is real estate, and the other is the lack of suitable
alternative investment. Given a reasonable return on their
funds these firms would take up cash certificates, as the
vast speculation that has taken place in read estate has
1discouraged them from acquiring any more. The cash certifi­
cates held by the insurance firms will enjoy the same
facilities as those held by commercial banks; they will
be negotiable and discountable at the Central Bank. This 
means that insurance companies will enter the money market 
every now an<J then, but that should not be frequent.
Information gathered from private interviews witji Insurance firms in 
Beirut in 1964* Firms interviewed included:
Arabia Insurance; L'TInion Rationale; and the Compagnie Libanaise 
d* Assurance s.
The credits granted hy the investment banks will be exclusively 
on medium- and long-term. They will take the form of ordinary bills 
but with longer lives than the usual three monthly ones. However, as 
a large part of their resources will consist of funds taken from the 
money market, the investment banks might be called upon to repay tome 
of these funds at no notice. As already explained this should not 
happen very often, but a safeguard against such an occurrence should 
be taken and it it therefore suggested that the paper that is produced 
by such credits should be rediscountable at the Central Bank.
This means now that both the cash certificates issued by the 
investment banks and their long-term paper will be rediscountable 
at the Central Bank# But the former will be rediscountable by the 
commercial banks while the latter by the investment banks. In 
ordinary circumstances rediscounting should not be heavy, but if re­
discounting from both sides is heavy or increasing, this should pro­
vide a warning’ to the Central Bank that a new situation is arising, 
which might require central banking action.
As noted earlier in this chapter safeguards must be adopted 
to prevent an abusive use of these credits and to make sure that 
funds are granted in a careful and orderly way. Such safeguards 
prevail in France but there it is the commercial banks that lend on
medium- and long-term, i.e., there is not the intermediary role of 
the investment banks which we thought was advisable in Lebanon*^"
Three safeguards can be adopted:
a) A requirement that at least three signatures are needed on 
the bill before rediscounting, one of the signatures to be 
that of a public monetary institution, other than the Central 
Bank* In fact, this means that it is this monetary institution 
that will present the bills to the Central Bank for rediscounting*^ 
The reason for inserting an intermediary between the investment 
banks and the Central Bank is explained later on* Later, when 
the investment banks develop, four signatures could be asked for 
before rediscounting so as to ensure the prior use of surplus 
private funds deposited with other investment banks* Initially 
three should be enough*
The rediscount rate charged to the investment bank must be 
higher than the rate paid on deposits. Otherwise, it would 
prefer to rediscount rather than to endeavour to attract more 
deposits from commercial banks* The danger of inflation is 
thereby reduced*
1* For more details see P. Simon et L. Paves, Le Credit a Moyen Terme 
en Prance. Presses Universitaires de France, 1957*
2* The first two signatures will be the debtor*s and the bank*s and 
the third will have to be the public monetary institution^*
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b) Before the investment bank grants the credit it will have to
obtain the approval of the monetary institution to which the bank 
might have to turn at a later date to rediscount the paper 
oreated by such a credit. A sanction can be applied here 
whereby any bill that is submitted for rediscounting by an 
investment bank at the monetary institution in question, will 
not be considered unless it carried with it the prior approval 
to the credit of the said institution, which will have to 
consult the Central Bank* ®his move would ensure that funds 
lent on medium-term are used for worthwhile projects benefiting 
the public interest*'1' Furthermore the Central Bank and hence 
the monetary institution will give or withhold their approval 
according to the monetary conditions of the country, and to an 
order of priority or projects which the Ministry of Planning 
will have set out* Finally, this procedure will be beneficial
1* A delicate balance has to be struck here between efficient and 
desirable control and stifling bureaucracy# Provided no undue 
delays take place at the monetary institution our suggestion should 
have no stifling effect, for after all there would be only one more 
authority than the normal procedure examining the demand for such 
credits, and this is partly to the benefitnof the banks# If they 
choose not to submit such demands for credit for approval, nothing 
will force them to do so, but they will not be able to rediscount 
paper issued for such unapproved loans# No stifling effect should 
be felt by the borrower as he would contact the investment bank 
only#
to everyone for it will make necessary a thorough investigation 
of the project by the borrower - as he has to present a con­
vincing case - by the investment bank, and finally by the 
monetary institution and the Central Bank. The latter institut­
ions will have to follow up and supervise the use made of the 
credits last their original intended use is abandoned or 
deviated from. The investment bank might disagree with'-.the 
verdict of the monetary authorities, and if it still chooses 
to go ahead and grant the credit, it is free to do so; but it 
will not in this case be able to rediscount this particular 
paper if it should prove necessary to do so at a later date#
At the beginning a five year limit - medium-term only - could 
be placed on the credits granted. This is not an hampering 
limit as the industrial sector, as at present organized, is 
unlikely to ask for longer credits, because it consists mainly 
of light industries where constant change requires qui.dk re­
placement and rapid amortization. The time limit is set to 
reduce further the inflationary pressure that rediscounting 
might cause and to prevent abuse. Moreover, it is beneficial 
to have such a limit as long as the institutions concerned have 
not acquired sufficient experience to forecast and assess risks 
for periods exceeding five years.
It has been suggested above that a separate public monetary
institution be required to give its prior approval to credits if they are
to.j be eligible for rediscounting. The creation of such an institution,
1which might be called the fCaisse Nationals de Reescompte1 oould have 
both psychological and operational advantages* T^e Central Bank is 
looked upon as a sort of police of banks, and for the first time banks 
in Lebanon are now required to submit balance sheets regularly for its 
inspection* To require their subsidiaries i.e., the investment banks 
to ask for its permission before granting certain credits - they do not 
have to, but unauthorised assets are not liquifiable - would not be 
received very well, and a, separate institution with separate funds 
would be more welcome* It might be looked upon as an institution created 
to help them rather than to police them, which is the way they look on 
the Central Bank, and their psychological attitude towards it would be 
very different. Secondly, the Caisse will have a specialised job, its 
primary purpose being the investing of public funds - the origins of 
which are described later. Although in certain under-developed 
countries Central Banks find it necessary to engage in investment, this 
is not necessary in Lebanon, and the advantages of decentralisation and 
specialisation can here be reaped, for it is then possible to recruit 
highly trained experts - not necessarily full-time « in the fields of 
investment whom a Central Bank would not normally possess, and who would
1* Public institutions in Lebanon usually have French names when they 
are not referred to in Arabic.
administer the Caisse within the broad directions they would have received 
from the Central Bank and the Government* Thirdly there is the question 
of interest rates* By creating a separate institution it might become 
easier to dissociate short-term rates from medium- and long-term rates*
The case for dissociating the rates arises from the fact that 
while short-term rates may sometimes need certain immediate adjustments, 
it may not be desirable for them to affect medium- and long-term rates.
A complete dissociation of the two rates is not possible, but some dis­
sociation can be obtained to a significant extent because in the plan 
outlined the influence of the administered rate, i,e., the Bank Rate, 
on the short rate on the one hand, and on the longer rates of the other
hand, will be exerted in different ways. Thus while the effect on short
rates will be felt immediately because the commercial barks rediscount 
direct at the Central Bank which charges the administered penal rate, 
the effect on the longer rates will be delayed because investment banks
rediscount at the Caisse which has funds of its own and whose rate will
be affected by the administered Bank Rate only if in its turn it has to re­
discount at the Central Bank. Thus the effects on the long-term rates 
will be linked to the gradual exhaustion of the reserves of the Caisse*
The introduction of this buffer institution should in fact accentuate the 
slight dissociation that normally exists between the two rates! the 
more temporary the rise or fall in short rates is expected to be:., the
JL
less will it cause'-.long rates to rise or fall* The Caisse should 
help in making this relationship looser* It could he argued that the 
Central Bank could perform this job, i.e*, that there could be a depart­
ment in the Central Bank specialising in this sort of business. But to 
be as efficient as a separate Caisse, this department would have to be 
entirely distinct from the rest of the Bank and it would be very much 
easier if it were given an identity of its own* ^he problem of interest 
rates is not a decisive argument for creating a separate institution: 
it strengthens the argument for having one.
Ihe 'Caisse* will be entirely publicly owned* Its sources of 
funds will consist of:
a) its capital
b) funds deposited with it by public bodies and especially
the public welfare institutions - social security, unemploy­
ment and medical insurance - which have just been created
2and will have considerable funds at their disposal,
c) Treasury advances which can be the proceeds of borrowings
1. See Uewlyn W.T., The theory of Money* Clarendon Press, Bxford, pp* 
117-118, ahd Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Report 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1959* Cmnd. 827, par.
447*
2. As these welfare institutions have just been created, the deflationary 
effect of their coming into being will be offset by the use the 
'Caisse* will make of the funds*
that the Treasury may make in the market 
&) profits from its own operations*
The Caisse will work in close collaboration with the Central Bank
and the Ministry of Planning as already explained* But it should be
free of any political influence, and of any pressure that might be
exerted on it by either the Chamber of Industry or of C o m m e r c e #  However,
the advioe of these two Chambers should be sought when the Caisse1
examines the projects that will be submitted for its approval by the
investment banks* Its board will consist of qualified people with no
tdirect interest in industry or commerce*
How going back to the operations of the investment banks, the 
conditions under which they will grant the credits must be fixed* The 
ordinary rules relating to banking in general will apply here but two 
extra and very important conditions must be respected* They are
1* Something on the same lines is done in France* The French Government 
issues securities, the proceeds of which are deposited with various 
monetary institutions to help them espand their credits* The capital 
market is not very developed in Prance* The possibility of Treasury 
borrowings will be discussed later in the Chapter,
2# In France buffer institutions between banks and the Central Bank 
exist but only because such public monetary institutions have been 
in existence for a long time, and the system has just grown tha/b way* 
It is not as in Lebanon where a new institution has to be created*
l?or details see P* Simon and L* Paybs op* cit* In India a Refinance 
Corporation financed by the Central. Bank, the Government and the 
commercial banks, fulfils the role ascribed to the 'Caisse1.
necessary to prevent abuse and because the risks involved in that sort 
of operation are longer and more difficult to assess than those in­
volved in short-term loans. One condition is that the borrower must
prove that other sources of the same type of finance have proved dry*
The other is that repayment should be made out of profits and not through 
a loan from some other bank. If there are no profits within the specified
repayment period an enquiry will be opened by the bank to help it decide
what steps it should take next. An easy way of detection would be to 
ask for the balance sheet of the borrowing firm, or to consult the 
Centrale des Bisques which was described in Chapter II and which would 
inform the bank about all the loans facilities granted by member banks*
Beside granting medium-term credit, investment banks can help 
industry by underwriting new issues whether of securities with fixed 
rates of interest, or equity shares. This implies the acceptance of the 
principle that these banks may hold such assets in their portfolios*
In fact the principle is officially accepted in certain countries, for 
example, in Ireland where the C o m m i s s i o n  0n Banking Currency and Credit 
saw no objection to the banks' underwriting securities of fixed interest 
provided that the amounts involved represent only what it calls a 
reasonable amount in relation to the total resources of the banks in­
volved. It also saw no objection to a bank underwriting commercial
11 Commission on Banking Currency and Credit, Report 1938* Bublin 
Stationery Office*
issues provided the commercial undertaking was intimately known to the 
hank* Although the practice exists already in certain countries it is 
by no means general, and, on the whole, legislation limits severely 
the proportion of assets that may be held this way when funds come from 
the money market* In Belgium, legislation came in the 1938'ss it was 
found that commercial banks were heavily linked to industry, so the 
law forced them to discontinue this association and to limit their 
activities to short-term loans*^
In Lebanon investment batiks will be able to engage in such busin­
ess because the funds they will be working with have the same character 
as funds which in - say - Britain would have been invested in industrial 
03; government securities anyway. Such opportunities do not exist in 
Lebanon for the small and private person. The investment banks with 
their greater knowledge and experience can underwrite the issues and 
hold whatever is not sold. But in so doing the investment banks will 
have to guard themselves against a possible conflict between their 
interests and the client firm's interests. If the bark underwrites an 
issue for a firm to which it has already granted a credit, it might be 
interpreted as indicating a lack of confidence in the firm's ability to 
repay and the bank might be suspected of having advised it to appeal 
for a public subscription* Tfte procedure will have to be carefully 
worked out*
1* For details see Sayers R.S., ed. Banking in Western Fur ope.'Banking
111 Belgium', by Sylvia M. Johnson and R.S. Sayer, Oxford University
Press, I962, pp. 234-258.
The reasonable proportion of shares and securities which banks 
can safely keep in their assets will have to be determined by exper­
ience.^ But in order to avoid the continuous control of certain firms 
by the banks, and to give all industrial firms a chance to use the banks1 
issuing facilities, the latter can be forbidden to hold shares or 
securities of an individual private firm for more than - say - five 
years, and to buy them again before two years have elapsed since their 
sale•^
The investment banks can a,lso extend the needed short- and 
medium-term credit to the Hotel Industry, which at present can obtain 
only expensive three-monthly renewable credits. Long-term credit for 
the construction of new hotels, which will have to come about with 
the expansion of tourism, would be more appropriately provided by the 
Development Bank which is discussed later*
III* Financing the Agricultural Sector.
The financing of agriculture raises problems that differ consider­
ably from those raised by industry and commerce. This is especially 
so in Lebanon where small land-holdings prevail* Agriculture involves 
heavy investments in illiquid assets relatively to the annual turnover
1* The proportion will be lower as long as the capital market is not 
properly developed and regulated, and therefore the issues not 
very marketable*
2* If this line of the Banks1 business goes totally unrestricted one 
might see a kind of the Japanese style Zaibatsu emerging in 
Lebanon with banks controlling the whole economy*
that can be obtained* A merchant adjusts much of his investment to 
market conditions* With experience he knows how much he should keep 
in stocks and he usually tries to keep them to a minimum* His fixed 
investment is flexible and relatively easily adjustable to market 
oonditions. In the case of industry, and especially in Lebanon where 
light industry is the common feature, a proportion of assets, has to be 
fixed, but in relation to the annual turnover, it is lower than in 
agriculture; the cycle of production is much shorter in industry than 
in agriculture and this usually means a larger turnover relatively to
1 TVfixed capital* the farmer receives the proceeds of his pro­
duction once a year - in Lebanon at least - while he has to spend all 
year round to produce, an industrialist replenishes his cash balances 
more often and a great part of his expenditure on production is 
directly linked to sales. His expenditure -income period is much 
shorter than in agriculture.
Another difference is the kind of security that industrialists 
and farmers can give to receive a loan. A small farmer can offer his 
land or his future produce as collateral. Land is one of the most -Illiquid
of onsets to offer as a collateral and furthermore raises the problem
of valuation. Offering the future produce raises also problems of
1. Sxcepjj in very large industrial concerns where automation has re­
quired an intensive mechanisation of production. In this case, as
in most heavy industry, fixed capital is a high proportion of 
annual turnover#
valuation, for its value will depend on many faotors outside the control 
of the farmer: e.g. market price and crop yields (which depend partly
on the weather)* Also, his cyole of production sometimes may run 
unexpectedly over 12 months or two years. In the case of industry 
more easily realisable and valued collateral can be offered. Present 
stocks are one example, and even when a five year credit is granted, 
industry always keeps a certain amount of its assets in stocks.
therefore agriculture needs permanent credits quite large in 
relation to the annual turnover of production, and for the most part 
repayable on a long-term basis. On the other hand the kind of security 
it can offer is difficult to evaluate and to realise in case of default*
A direct appeal to the money market for the funds it needs 
without a buffer institution would be unlikely to meet any success#
Ihe problem of agriculture is different from that of industry, as 
explained above, and that is why it would be preferable to have a 
separate institution to supply agriculture with the type of credit it 
requires* Ihis institution could be an agricultural bank basically 
similar to those of other countries. But it may be preferable to call 
it the National Development Bank in Lebanon because it will be called 
upon also to provide long-term credits for the construction of hotels*
A completely private institution is unlikely to provide agriculture
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with the type of credit it requires without some sort of guarantee from 
the Government* Moreover, suoh an M B  vail have to attract funds from 
both public and private sectors* therefore, a direct stake by the State 
is neoessary, and a State bank which can sell bonds to banks and private 
individuals oould perform the work* However, a case can be made for a 
private minority equity holding in the MB, at least initially# Since 
the issue of bonds is something totally new in Lebanon it might be pre­
ferable at the start not to flood the market with them but to keep bond- 
issuing for Government finance (which is considered later in the chapter)# 
So, the alternative is for the M B  to try to attract deposits from the 
other banks and this will be easier to achieve if the latter have also 
a stake in it* 3?he same results as if it had been completely state-owned 
will be obtained, for, if the private holding is limited to 4 9 of the 
total, the State still holds the majority of shares and therefore can 
steer the M B  onto the course that is thought to be best, while at the 
same time it attracts funds from the private sector.
However, if banks are to take a minority interest in the M B  they
will need an inducement, ^here are two ways in which this could be done#
rj^he first one is suggested by the experience of the Industrial Bank of 
q
Japan. Ihe State can guarantee to the banks a minimum dividend of 5$
1# For more detaild on this and other such institutions see W# Diamond, 
Development Banks* John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957* Published 
under the auspices of the IBKD.
over a certain number of years. The *?/° figure is an average of what 
the banks get on bills purchased abroad. Another inducement could come 
from the Central Banlu if alteration in reserve requirements were to be 
used as a means of credit control, funds invested in the MB! could count 
as part of the reserves. The great inducement here of course is that
they would be earning a 5$ interest whereas if they had been deposited
at the Central Bank they would have been sterile. Moreover, banks can 
be permitted to deposit money with the MB. Any such money deposited 
before a decision to increase the ratio could count as part of the 
reserves too* r^his should not force the Central Bank to raise reserve 
requirements higher than otherwise unless its aim is to contract the 
total amount of credit outstanding. But generally the aim is to put 
a brake on the expansion of credit, and freezing such excess funds de­
posited at the M B  which could have become the basis for a further
expansion of credit by the banking sector - as opposed to the State- 
controlled M B  - will be just as efficient as it would have been had 
these funds been deposited not with the MB, but with the Central Bank* 
Such a procedure, beside giving the banks an incentive to deposit with 
the MB, need not be a danger to the general policies of the Central Bank 
and the Government, because the State, as a majority shareholder^ in the 
M B  could make sure that a non-inflationary use be made of the funds* A 
close collaboration with the Central Bank would therefore be necessary#
The resources of the M B  will consist of:
a) capital subscribed by the State and the commercial banks
b) loane from the Ministry of Finance
c) time deposits by commercial banks which will receive 
interest. The general public should not be able to 
deposit with the MB, as it should not compete with 
commercial banks if it is to benefit from their co­
operation.
d) debentures which it would issue at a later date to 
supplement the banks' time deposits.
Some of these resources will come from the money market but all 
can be used by the M B  for long-term lending. In effect loans from 
the Ministry of Finance and debentures have fixed and distant maturity 
dates* This makes it easy for the M B  to time its advances according 
to its repayments schedule. The banks1 time deposits could also be used 
for long-term lending’ because beside the nature of such funds which has 
already been described, there is a further incentive not to withdraw 
them from the M B  - except in extreme circumstances of course - because 
they would be considered as reserves by the Central Bank if the need 
arose.
^here is however one problem which may arise when the M B  decides
to acquire more funds by the issue of debentures. We have mentioned 
on several occasions that the capital market in Beirut is underdeveloped 
and that it cannot be relied upon for the provision of funds. One of 
the main reasons is its highly speculative character. Debentures do 
not normally fluctuate very much but a drought in Lebanon could involve 
the HUB in losses - as in sue1'* cases loans snould not be called in « 
which could cause people to speculate on the future of the interest 
payments'** and lead them to sell heavily at any price, unless it is 
known that in such occurrences the NDB would be subsidized by the 
State. However this may not be enough as any issue in Lebanon can 
be subject to speculation because of the lack of organisation in the 
capital market, and thus a guaranteed price on those debentures is 
necessary to convince people to buy them. The main measure that could 
be taken is to give the Central Bank the powers to limit the fluctuations 
of these debentures. This implies that the Central Bank would enter the 
market for such debentures buying when the price falls and selling when 
the price rises* In fact, as the upper limit is automatically fixed by
1. A reduction or temporary cessation of interest payments is not
unheard'of in the world of finance. Thus in the spring and summer 
of 1965 the business conditions in Japan and its balance of pay­
ments position were such that there was a widespread fear that the 
very high interest of Japanese securities - including Government 
securities - 6jr to ’jfo net - might be halved or their payment sus­
pended for some time. There followed substantial sales of these 
securities in the markets where they were issued, and their prices 
dropped sharply*
the fact that this is not a growth stock, only the lower limit needs 
to he checked#
The M B  is designed to meet the credit requirements of the 
agriculture seotor with short term credits up to eighteen months, and 
long term up to twenty years# The eighteen months credits can he used 
to finance current production# Thus they can he used to purchase 
fertilisers, seeds, small tools and to hire labour# The security against 
such loans can consist of the machinery in use or the produce of the 
borrower# They will take the form of ordinary bills but with longer 
lives, and should be rediscountable at the Central Bank in case commercial 
banks face difficulties and have to withdraw their deposits# As the M B  
is. already a semi-public institution with a majority holding by the 
State, no official prior approval of the credits - as required of the 
investment banks - need be required here#
The long-term credits should extend up to twenty years# These 
credits can be used for direct investment in land and for helping 
agricultural institutions such as co-operative societies in rural areas# 
Rough estimates of such new investments were produced in Table XVI# In 
this field of its activities the M B  will have to work closely with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Planning, for in considering the 
demand for such loans the M B  should have regard to the development of 
the region in which the credit vail be spent and thus should work out a
list of priorities* The guarantee for long-term loans can be the land 
of the borrower# It may be inadvisable to make paper issued for long­
term loans eligible for rediscounting in order to make sure that the 
M B  tries first to attract more deposits and rediscounts its shorter 
bills* If it is unable to raise enough funds in these ways, the Central 
Bank can then help it to issue new debentures or advance money against 
the security of long paper* This would give the Central Bank a new 
weapon of monetary control for it could then time such advances, which 
it could not do with rediscounting* The alternative would be to set 
arbitrary ceilings to the amounts that can be rediscounted at certain 
moments*
The M B  will also extend long-term credits to the hotel industry* 
These will be needed as the expansion of tourism will necessitate the 
construction of new hotels* The M B  should be prepared to accept mort­
gages for such loans*
IV* financing the Public Sector
In Chapter III the State five year plan was outlined and it was 
estimated that if the 9*5$ yearly increase in the ordinary budget was
■j
adopted expenditure will exceed receipts by £L 823*1 million# If the
1# fe are assuming that 'new projects' will be carried out* See 
Chapter III pp* 151-1€*>
Planning Commission's recommended annual increase in the ordinary 
budget - 6% - was adopted the deficit will be £L 663*5 million over 
the five-year period*
By spreading its capital expenditure programme over a larger 
number of years, it might be possible for the State to finance its 
development plan without incurring a deficit* But this was rejected 
by the Planning Commission as it meant another delay in the use of the 
country's idle resources* Besides, such a spread would not help to 
solve the social problem described in Chapter III* $o the State is 
committed to carry out its development programme as outlined in its 
five-year plan* What has not been agreed upon is the financing of the 
expected deficit*
One possibility is to increase State receipts by a major tax 
reform, mainly income tax* But this was ruled out by the Planning 
Commission because "it seems that in the economic and social environ­
ment of to-day it is difficult to obtain in the immediate future such 
reform"*'1' Another possibility ruled out by the Planning Commission is 
to resort to a Reserve Fund constituted of accumulated budget surpluses 
and unspent appropriations. The Fund is the reservoir which has been 
used to feed the Treasury in the carrying out of public investments* 
From Table XXIY it seems that the Fund was used only once - 1962 - to
1* Report of the Planning Commission to the Ministry of Finance, 1965* 
Unpublished*
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cover a budget deficit, ^his possibility is ruled out because it is 
expected that the Budget will no longer show surpluses and appropriated 
credits will be spent according to plans, ^he Reserve Pund will thus 
be deprived of its two sources of funds and consequently will no longer 
be adequate to the financing of the development projects*
Borrowing is another possibility, but raises the problem of 
method. The Government could ask the Central Bank for the loans it 
requires and the Bank might supply it with the amounts and the type of 
loan demanded. Judging from the nature of the banks' deposits most 
of them are actually savings; this means that the new savings derived 
from the extra incomes generated by the increased money supply would 
swell banks' deposits further, and this increase the resources of the 
banking sector which were described and discussed in Chapter II and 
earlier in this chapter* In other words such a borrowing would shift 
Sdp and to the right in figures 2 and 5* Om in figure 3> i*e*, 
amounts demanded on short-term, might increase with the new activity 
engendered but Om1 certainly will and this might mean an increase in 
mm1, i.e., an increase in the foreign investment of the banks putting a 
strain on the reserves as Lebanese Pounds would have to be converted 
into foreign currencies* Such a creation of new money would be damaging 
to the confidence in the Lebanese Pound*
Another type of borrowing is external borrowing, ^his is normally 
chosen when the purchase of illiquidity or non-consumption by the State 
at home is either impossible or too costly, or else has undesirable 
effects on the terms on which private debt oan be secured and on the 
level of interest rates. When this is not the case internal finance 
by way of bond issue, which is the third type of borrowing, is prefer­
able since no foreign liability is thus incurred. So if it can be shown 
that internal finance is possible and will have no adverse effects on 
other economic activities in Lebanon the Government should prefer it to 
external borrowing.
At the beginning of this chapter it was shown that in the market 
for short-term funds there is a deficiency of demand at R^ rate of 
interest and that the elasticity of supply is infinite until Om* funds 
are lent. It was also shown that to make up for this deficiency in 
home demand, banks convert their excess holdings of Lebanese currency 
into foreign currencies and invest the proceeds abroad at a rate of 
return Rf higher than R^ because of the exchange risks incurred.
(figures 3 and 4)* So, if somehow the demand curve can be shifted 
to the right they would divert their funds from abroad for investment 
at home. Row the State needs finance capital for its development pro­
jects and the kind of finance it requires is medium- or long-term, which 
means that it will have to issue medium- or long-term bonds* Normally
the demand for such credits is not met with funds from the money market, 
hut it was shown that it was possible and not dangerous to do so in 
Lebanon provided the bonds possessed one of the characteristics of 
short-term paper, namely liquidity. It was also shown why this provision 
was not in itself dangerous. A Central Bank will have a big role to play 
if the bonds are to be marketable. If that can be done it is plausible 
to expect banks to take up these bonds since they buy their equivalents 
abroad, provided of course they receive at least the same net rate of 
return on them. Row if we add^ this demand for medium- and long-term 
credits by the State to B^ figure 3 the result will be a shift in 
the curve to the right* f-^ he intersection point with the supply curve 
will move to the right as a fuller use is made of the country's monetary 
resources.
So far, the case for internal borrowing is stronger than a loan 
from the Central Bank because rather than creating new money, it will 
permit the orderly channeling of the large amounts of savings now 
available in the banking sector into worthwhile projects; and it is 
also stronger than the case for external borrowing which is tantamount 
to the creation of new money too and is therefore subject to the same 
criticism as a Central Bank loan - but with the qualification, that 
reserves to the currency are increased initially with the import of
1. Bee p. above.
foreign funds; it is also preferable to external borrowing because no 
foreign liability is thus incurred.
But would internal borrowing have no adverse effects on the
economy? This will depend on the future shape and position of the
total demand curve ®his curve represents now the total demand
for funds, i.e. short- medium- and long-term from both public and 
private sectors to the banking sector. Ag shown in Chapter III the 
State demand will be substantial and it may be asked whether this will 
not affect the terms on which private debt can be secured, and the 
level of interest rates* It should be clear at this stage that as 
long as the total demand cuive intersects the supply curve Rh^.LL 
at a point between P and there will be no effect on the terms on which 
private debt can be contracted nor on the level of interest rates as 
the amount mm! of the total R^ -C (figure 6) which is invested abroad is 
a residual of what is not invested in Lebanon (figure 4«)* In other 
words the State would not be competing for funds with the private 
sector, as long as the intersection point of the supply and demand 
curves in the local market is between P and R^ (figure 3)> and;.,as long 
as this is the case internal borrowing is not only possible but also
has no adverse effects on the economy*
nevertheless, it is conceivable that the total demand curve for 
the banks1 resources might, after some time has elapsed, intersect
with the supply curve beyond the point F* If that should happen, there
would develop an upward pressure on interest rates. However, on the
one hand, to start with the backlog of demand for medium- and long-term
credits from the private sector will almost certainly be spread over a
few years until the new conditions for granting such credits are well
understood by the potential borrowers* It is very likely that
adaptation to the new conditions will take some time as borrowers were
for example until 1964* never required to produce proper balance sheets,'
and have never been asked to present proper cases justifying their
2
investment projects* Moreover, the issue of Government bonds will be 
gradual and therefore the demand curve will not immediately be either 
shifted or flattened. On the other hand, while demand grows and more 
investment takes place at home thanks to the new facilities, supply 
conditions will change because:
a) the funds available ip the banking sector vri.ll grow at a 
faster rate than before because of the increased economic 
activity* ^his will increase further the amounts available 
for investment from that source*
1* The new law creating the Central Bank does require the banks to ask 
for a balance sheet before granting a credit.
2* An earlier IBRD plan to provide medium-term credit failed to produce 
any result because oases were not properly presented and justified*
insurance companies might he interested in buying suitable 
long-term Government securities* Their funds, though un­
known, must be substantial considering the range and scope 
of their activities throughout the Middle ^ast* 
private Lebanese individuals might consider investing in 
Lebanese securities some of the funds now invested abroad 
and yielding equivalent rates of return. The advantage of 
investing at home is of course much easier access to market 
and -better knowledge* Besides, lower expenses are involved 
in investing at home than abroad.
Foreigners, especially those from the neighbouring countries 
who tend now to by-pass Beirut or use it simply as a sping- 
board for their investments in Europe and America, might be 
encouraged to buy the securities thus offered* This is 
reasonable to expect because until recently their invest­
ments were actually made in Lebanon in real estate and it 
is only when their investment polioies became more sophistic­
ated, that they chose to go to the capital markets of 
Europe and America# where opportunities non-existent in 
Beirut were available. If these opportunities for invest­
ing were made available in Beirut they could be expected 
to take them up because of the proximity of the market and 
the common language*
These supply changes will have two effects: one is to shift
the supply curve S^p in figure 2 $0 the right and with 
This would increase the funds available in the banks thus shifting P 
further to the right, as the intersection point with the demand curve 
moves closer to it# Another effect is to shift some of the demand 
for funds on to new souroes of supply - capital market - thus easing 
the pressure of demand on the banking sector and keeping the inter­
section point with the supply curve to the left of P# Thus it is 
improbable that by borrowing at home the State would cause any adverse 
effects on the rest of the economy, and since no foreign liability 
is incurred with internal finance, it is to be preferred to external 
finance•
But it should not be forgotten that the State will be compet­
ing for funds at present invested abroad, and that although thebanking 
sector will be the main lender, other classes of lenders may appear#
Their preferences vary according to their businesses, personal 
positions and the constraints that their liabilities place upon them#
Thus while banks prefer highly marketable and therefore liquid invest­
ments, insurance companies go for long-term and not necessarily liquid 
investments# Private individuals would be interested in easily liquid « 
ated obligations especially in Lebanon where people are highly influenced 
by changes in the political situation of the Middle ^ast* Therefore, 
competitive terms will have to be offered and the preferences of the
lenders will have to be catered for#
•'The answer lies in a mix of various types of obligations# 
determination of the most efficient mix of public debt 
involves two steps* ^iret, there is the appraisal of market 
preferences, or the cost at which various types of obligations 
may be placed. Second, there is the more difficult task of 
appraising the relative degrees of illiquidity or non-spending, 
that are secured by borrowing a given amount through the sale 
of various types of obligations. Only if both factors are 
considered can Ooe determine whioh mix provides the most 
efficient policy"*
The implications of this for a Central Bank are considered in the
following sections#
V# Ceneral Implications for a Central Bank.
Unlike most underdeveloped oountries Lebanon seems to have funds 
to finance her economic development. But these funds are not available 
in the capital market where they are wanted, but in the short-term 
money market where at the prevailing rate of interest there is a 
deficiency of demands thus while there are no adequate credit facil­
ities at the long end of the market for funds, there is an excess of 
supply at the short end# The main responsibility of a Central Bank 
will be to bridge the two ends# This role can be performed only by 
a Central Bank because of its unique position as the final supplier of 
vash#
1# Musgrave ^»A,t The Theory of Public ffjixance# McGraw-Hill Book Co* 
Inc* Hew York 1959 > PP* 582-83*
Given this responsibility, a Central Bank in Lebanon will have 
to have the power of holding in its portfolio medium- and long-term 
paper instead of the more common practice of short-term paper only*
This is essential if the resources of the money market are to be used 
in the capital market* In particular with relation to industry, under 
the plan set out earlier in this chapter, a Central Bank might be 
calledjupon to rediscount medium-paper to the fCaisse Nationale de 
Beescomptef* Without this guarantee the investment banks would never 
feel safe in lending on medium- and long-term, nor would commercial banks 
commit any funds to the investment banks* With relation to agriculture 
a Central Bank might be called upon to rediscount the eighteen months 
bills whioh the HUB will be holding as a consequence of the short-term 
credit it would have granted* With relation to State finance for 
which again the main source of funds will be the banking sector, a 
Central Bank will have to be empowered to buy medium- or long-term 
State securities to meet an emergency in that sector, or a temporary 
need for cash*
Besides having the power to hold medium- and long-term paper a 
Central Bank will have responsibilities for each sector under the 
plans outlined above* In the case of industry it will have to work 
closely with the investment experts of the •Caisse* and the Ministry 
of Planning since it will have a say in approving or not approving
specific projects. It will be remembered that the prior approval 
by the Caisse of the credit is necessary if at a later date it should 
piove necessary to rediscount the paper issued from such a credit.
In this context the Bank will consider the monetary aspect of the 
projects particularly with respect to the timing. In the case of 
agriculture a Central Bank might have to help stabilize the 
debenture issue the BUB might make.'*’ It could also influence the 
timing of the long-term loans the HUB will make by direct advice to 
the Ministry of Planning and by regulating its advances to the BUB 
against long-term paper* In the case of the State, a Central Bank which 
will issue the State debt will have to determine the most efficient 
mix of public debt as described earlier, and will have to time such 
issues according to the economic conjuncture*
The next thing that has to be considered is the consequences of 
making the new facilities for medium- and long-term credits available 
and the implications for a Central Bank in that respect. If the pro­
posals outlined above are adopted the first such consequence will be a 
shift of investment from abroad to Lebanon. Therefore one such conse-
1* See pp«an-rt. above. This implies that the Central Bank will be 
helping to stabilize the issues of a partly privately-owned 
institution. The action of the Central Bank would here be similar 
to that of the Deutsche Bank which, as holder of what is called a 
•regulating* parcel of 10m. marks nominal shares in Lufthansa, 
the German airline, helps to stabilize the price of the shares.
quence is an increase in domestic investment* This will mean a higher 
level of economic activity, and as the level of imports is directly 
linked to the economic activity of the country a further deterioration 
in the balance of trade is to be expected if exchange rates are kept 
stable But the overall position in the balance of payments presents 
nofproblem in Lebanon as noted earlier* Another consequence of the 
suggestions is that as new investment opportunities are created one can 
expect the capitalists of the neighbouring oil-producing countries 
to take an active interest in them, and no longer use Beirut merely 
as a spring-board for investment in Europe or America* Thus, after a 
few years one may expect an increase in the capital inflow, part of 
which will swell banks* deposits* This will mean in terms of figure 3
at the beginning of this chapter a lengthening of the part of the
supply ourve % P  (as S^p and St,t, will shift to the right)* If the 
demand for funds does not keep pace with the supply at a rate of 
return at least equal to their minimum limit, banks will again find 
it preferable to invest abroad* The reactions of the private individu­
al will be very much slower, but, on the whole, if the prices of
securities go up (the rate of return drops) - as is more or less to be 
expected in a capital market where the supply of funds tends to grow 
faster than the demand for them - any new foreign and private capital
1* For a long time the level of the exchange rate of the Lebanese Pound 
was kept determined by market fortes only although an Exchange Equal­
isation Fund existed (see Chapter V)* However, the new Central Bank 
is expected to take a more active role in the foreign exchange market 
and to stabilize the dollar rate at around £L 3-08*
flowing in will again use Beirut as a spring-board for investment in 
Europe and America and again tend to by-pass it, as is starting to 
happen at present*
However, there is a strong case for not allowing this to happen, 
i*e$, the total demand curve %  should continually tend to approach 
P in figure 3* ^he reason is that it will help to strengthen the 
services sector as will be explained later. 80 the problem is whether 
it is possible to create investment opportunities all the times the 
solution is that if for one reason or another they cannot be created 
in Lebanon, they should be imported. In other words other countries 
should be encouraged to float loans in Beirut, and that is tantamount 
to making Beirut an international capital market* But what are the 
chances of Beirut becoming an international capital market and what 
could the Central Bank do that would help in this direction?
Beirut's geographical position and historical tradition make it a 
natural meeting point for lenders and borrowers of funds* Beside being 
for centuries the link between East and West and possessing all modern 
means of communications, Beirut is in a part of the world where the oil 
industry brings in more revenue than can be spent on developing the 
region, and shares a common language with all the suppliers of funds* 
But natural advantages are not enough as Beirut will have to compete 
with established and powerful capital markets, and so to supplement the
favourable natural factors competitive terms must be provided to 
attract such business. Ho such business can be attracted if bankers 
are not able to provide a comprehensive service* The Lebanese banking 
sector is highly developed and, far from being inexperienced in foreign 
practices and capital markets, banks have had to keep in constant touch 
with them through their foreign investment* eventually the invest­
ment banks described earlier should acquire enough experience and 
know-how in the issue of Lebanese stock and securities to offer their 
services to borrowers abroad* To attract foreign borrowers terms 
regarding interest and costs will have to be made competitive because 
a borrower always seeks to raise money at least cost. Loans raised 
in Beirut may be cheaper and quicker than those raised abroad because 
the proximity of the market allows the lender to make on the spot 
checks of investments not involving expensive long-distance communi­
cations, which can often cause much delay* Tax concessions would 
be granted both lenders and borrowers* A. foreigner who holds 
securities in London, for example, is liable to death duties when he 
dies* Foreigners investing in the Lebanese market could be exempted 
from duch a tax* As regards the costs of raising the money, the invest­
ment banks should aim to keep them at a minimum to attract the foreign 
borrower. Their experience in the domestic market, the smooth working 
of which depends so much on the Central Bank's co-operation, should
help them to keep costs down. A Central Bank in its special position 
at the top of the financial structure of the economy may he able to 
provide advice and information regarding the issue of loans* It 
could also ask the Government - and would have to check on such actions - 
to exempt from taxation any profits made by the investment banks in 
issuing securities for foreigners* finally, a large part of the 
problem is a question of public relations and a discreet campaign 
intended to make the Lebanese banking sector better known abroad will 
help the banks in their hunt for new business* Ihis will again help 
to reduce the banks1 costs and therefore the commission to be asked 
from the borrower.
^rom the lender1s point of view what is required is confidence in 
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the banking sector and especially in its stability. What is also 
required is a guarantee that any loans the banks consent to finance 
are repayable in the same currency, e.g., if a ICuwaiti buys a 
security quoted in dollars he will like to have a guarantee that
at maturity he will receive dollars which he will be free to use the
way he likes, ^his implies that people - at least non-residents - will
continue to be able to have accounts in any currenoy they choose in
1. A bank like the Rif Bank would have no such problems as the technical
know-how of Schroders would be available to it. See footnote
2. Confidence h^e worthiness of the borrower is of course
required but this is independent of Lebanon.
Beirut* ^his is not exactly a guarantee of full convertibility 
although this will he required if private Lebanese investors are to 
take up some of these foreign loans. Another guarantee that will 
be required is the freedom of capital movements, and finally the 
undertaking that no new tax will suddenly diminish the income from the 
securities.^
rfhe responsibilities of a Central Bank in this respect will be to 
strengthen the banking sector and to guarantee the convertibility of 
the Lebanese Pound at least to foreigners* ^he first responsibility 
can be discharged by keeping- a close watch on the activities of each 
individual bank. Although the banking sector in general is very 
liquid not all individual banks are in the same position. If one 
bank fails - as one did in March 1964 - repercussions are bound to 
be felt in the rest of the Lebanese banks for they do not yet enjoy 
the same-*full confidence that people have in foreign banks. A con­
stant watch will not only force a bank to keep its balance sheet in a 
reasonable shape; it will also have a psychological effect on the 
customers of the banks, whose confidence in the banking institutions 
will be enhanced.
1* 2?he Lebanese Pound is not an international currency and it is 
unlikely that loans will be raised in Lebanese Pounds*
2. rfhis has happened recently in Germany, but the aim was to stop 
the inflow of capital and the new tax applied only to domestic 
Deutsche Mark bonds. Foreign loans expressed in Deutsche Markd 
are exempted from the 2*>°fo withholding tax.
Finally, the Central Bank can help the market by talcing an active
part in it* This means that it should be allowed to buy and sell
foreign securities quoted in the Beirut market and denominated in
currencies convertible into gold. This will be possible if the
authorities stop their policy of keeping a JOfo gold bullion cover to
the note issue. This practice has been beneficial in the past as
1
will be explained later , but as people become more sophisticated in 
their investment decision, they also become sophisticated in their 
conception of what is a strong currency and so a high gold ratio 
should no longer be required. present the law requires the Central 
Bank to maintain a minimum of 50$ of the note cover in gold. Therefore, 
without even changing the law a great amount of the gold holdings 
in the note cover could easily be sold and the proceeds used to buy 
foreign securities in the Beifu&k market. These securities which bear 
interest could then constitute part of the note cover.
Beirut does stand a chance of becoming an international oapital
market, especially now that traditional capital markets are nearing 
2
capacity, but official support from the Central Bank is needed at 
least in the initial stages. The role of a Central Bank will not be 
merely to supervise the activities of each individual bank - although 
this is part of its role - but also to help banks to establish a
1. See Chapter V, p. ass
2. See J* Rothschild, “Raising International Funds through London11,
The Times 24th and 25th February 1966.
market which will attract capital to.Beirut even when the domestic 
demand is saturated. The advantages to be reaped from such a market 
will be mainly in the services sector.
%at a Central Bank can do for tourism has already been dis­
cussed in relation to the hotel industry. What it can do for banking 
is to create those conditions under which foreign money will continue 
to flow into Beirut; in other words, it should help the banks to 
start an international capital market. This will help the services 
sector for:
a) Before being invested, accounts will have to be opened for the 
funds with banks in Beirut which will collect the dividends 
and hold the securities. This will mean
b) in extra income to the banks in the form of commissions and 
fees which will
c) Help the invisible earnings which are very important in the 
balance of payments.
d) It will also mean higher deposits as minimum balances are 
usually kept by investors*
e) As banking secrecy is a law in Lebanon, more funds seeking
a financial haven will flow in because of the publicity that 
the market will have given to the banking sector.
f) The financial activity created will increases
i) the re-exports which are important in the "balance of 
payments
ii) the general economic activity in the country and especially 
exports as Lebanese goods become better known* 
iii) the general interest of foreigners in Lebanon which will 
encourage tourism.
Thus by developing the financial potentialities of Lebanon it may 
be possible to help all sectors of the economy* It is no longer a 
question of one sector developing at the expense of another one - as 
the industry versus commerce rivalry seems to suggest « but of all 
sectors developing and expanding and economic activity approaching 
an optimum position. It is true that their order of importance in 
the Rational Income might change but this is just because some sectors 
will be expanding faster and will be able to absorb the resources of 
the economy at a higher rate than others.
This raises another problem. If the plans outlined above are 
adopted, it is probable that in spite of the safeguards provided, the 
increase in domestic investment which will result might cause some 
overheating in the economy and bottlenecks might appear here and 
there calling for central banking action. It is interesting to con­
sider where the inflationary pressures would be most strongly felt* 
as a result of the increase in domestic investment, and a quick look at
the period 1950-1962 might prove useful in this context* In that 
period the purchasing power of the Lebanese currency was kept remark­
ably stable relatively to other countries and in spite of the large 
inflow of capital* Official statistics show that the wholesale prices 
index was practically stable throughout the period: from 100 in 1950
it rose to 101 in 1962* % e  cost of living index rose by 24fo only
1
over the whole period. It might be asked how did Lebanon achieve
this result. Ihe answer lies in the consideration of the Lebanese
consumer goods market, for it shows that the largest part of the goods
consumed is imported: thus their prices depend on factors outside the
2 mLebanese economy, and when demand increases imports are increased. So 
a great extent inflation is imported in Lebanon because the general 
price level is heavily dependent on imports prices* Moreover when the 
prices in one foreign market rose relatively to those in another market,
1* Statistics quoted by Mr. H* Bourguinat in "Regards sur l^conomie 
Libanaise", L*Orient, 9th, 10th and 11th June 1965* -^be Economist 
Intelligence Unit compiles an All Items Index of the cost of living 
in its Quarterly Economic Review, ^rom 100 in I965 (base year) 
the index rose to 117 I n  1 9 5 9 *  '^ he index was revised in 1959 and 
1958 was taken as base year (lOO). On the new basis the index was 
109 in 1963* ^he EIU*s estimate seems to support the point that 
the cost of living in Lebanon rose less sharply than elsewhere* A 
reservation must be made about the accuracy of such indices* they 
are very rough and are obtained by considering prices in Beirut only 
which, however, tend to show the largest increases#
2. Trade deficits present no problems in Lebanon#
the Lebanese merchant was quick enough to switch to the cheaper one 
because of the stiff competition he faced when he came to sell his 
goods at home* This explains why the cost of living rose at a slower 
pace in Lebanon than elsewhere*^
Thus an inflationary pressure in Lebanon to-day is likely to be 
fait most strongly in those few fields where importation is impossible 
or difficult, i*e#, where supply is inelastic and this is mainly in. the 
supply of services and possibly some food products* Housing and 
building might be affected but probably not in the early stages as it
2
is believed there is at present an excess supply of building materials*
A® industry develops and a larger proportion of goods consumed is 
produced locally one could think that the cost of living would become 
more dependent on the economic situation in Lebanon* However, this 
would occur only if highly protective tariffs are imposed, for other­
wise imports would play the same role as they are doing now. But also 
as industry develops and becomes a larger contributor to the national
income there might come a time when it could place a large strain
3
on certain resources which cannot be imported very easily* The price
1* This is one of the arguments that Lebanese merchants put forward 
against industryfs attempts to increase protective tariffs*
2* The issue came up lately wften the Government was considering whether 
to license the building of a third cement factory. The license was 
granted but on condition that the new factory exports the largest 
part of its production*
3* As opposed to consumer goods*
of such resources might go up or alternatively there might he a great 
pressure on the price to go up and this might be undesirable* In such 
circumstances central banking action on bank credit would become 
desirable* Traditional monetary policy would mean the curtailing of 
bank credit by Bank Hate changes - which it is hoped would affect other 
rates - reserves requirements changes with supporting open-market 
operations* The problem now is to consider how effective these 
measures can be in Lebanon*
At present there is not much scope for any of the above measures 
to work in Lebanon, for banks have rarely any recourse to the Central 
Bank for funds* The reasons are that on the one hand they are very 
liquid, and on the other hand the March^ Hors Banque is a formidable 
loophole, as the reserves of the banking sector can always be increased 
by funds imported from abroad by foreign banks*
However, as the new conditions appear, i.e., as banks start buying 
Government securities - whether Lebanese or foreign - in Beirut, and 
investment banks start granting the medium- and long-term credits which 
they can liquefy through the Caisse Nationals de Reesoompte, banks in 
general will gradually become more and more dependent on the Central 
Bank of Lebanon for liquidity, for they will reduce their foreign
investment, and moreover might reduce the liquid balances they keep with 
each other which constitute the basis of the Marche Hors Banque.
However, before rediscounting, the commercial banks will draw on their 
deposits with the investment banks which might then either rediscount 
or appeal for more deposits from other banks holding shares in them.
In this oase the Marche Hors Banque is still important and works 
alongside the Central Bank. But the future importance of the market 
will depend to a large extent on the behaviour of the foreign banks 
which are very active in it. In this respect it is possible that they 
will invest the funds acquired in Lebanon in safe and marketable 
securities which should become available in Beirut, rather than 
continue to do what they are doing at the moment, which is to lend 
most of these funds to Lebanese banks for them tor invest. How the 
answer to whether they will still be willing to lend, and if necessary 
to import funds to lend, to Lebanese banks in temporary need of cash, 
has to be qualified. Whether they will continue to lend for such pur­
poses funds acquired in Lebanon depends on the rate offered, which is 
a function of the supply and demand conditions in the money market, 
but which in turn would be affected by rates offered in the strengthen­
ed capital market, and expectations regarding their future. Ihis 
uaould be a direct consequence of linking closely money and oapital 
markets* As the market for securities develops, Bank Hate should
gradually have more influence on other rates and this would influence 
inter-bank lending, ^hus Bank Rate expectations about its future 
movements would come into the decision whether to rediscount at the 
Central Bank or borrow from the banks*
How, whether foreign banks will continue to import funds to lend 
to Lebanese banks to help them meet claims in Lebanese Pounds is 
doubtful* ‘^his is done at present because Lebanese banks do not hold 
enough paper that can be rediscounted*'*' But with the development of 
the capital market and the widening of the range of paper that can be 
rediscounted at the Central Bank, one would expect banks to make 
much more use of the rediscounting facilities and less use of foreign 
banks»
However, what is likely to continue is the import of funds by 
foreign bankk to lend to Lebanese banks in temporary and sudden need 
for foreign currencies* It is possible that the rate the Lebanese 
bank would have to pay on such a loan would be lower than that which 
it gets on its investment in foreign currencies, or alternatively it 
may prefer to borrow from the foreign bank because selling its foreign 
currency securities may involve a capital loss*
m
therefore, the importance of what has been for a long time the 
effective lender of last resort, namely the Marche1 Hors Banque, will 
gradually decline. But the decline will be very gradual and might
1* See Chapter II p* ^ 1- and Chapter V p*a£>^
take years# Until then the banking sector will still be quite 
independent of the Central Bank for liquid funds and thus the 
traditional measures of control mentioned above are not likely to be 
effective#
It may be said here that if foreign banish were restricted from
importing funds into the country, variable reserve requirements might
be an effective means of control, since in that case, the reserves of
the banking sector could not be expanded without recourse to the Central
Bank# ^here are two objections to the adoption of such means* One
is. that at least in the initial stages - which is the period when it
was said these measures would not work - it could not force banks to
rediscount at the Central Bank because they do not hold the required
paper# therefore, by restricting foreign banks from importing fuhds,
Lebanese banks would be deprived of their effective lender of last
resort and this is a dangerous situation* Another objection is that
legislating against the import of funds by foreign banks is tantamount
to an interference in the free flow of capital in and out of the
country and this should be avoided if the Lebanese capital market is
to establish itself* ^hus as long as foreign banks can import funds
into Lebanon - and it is undesirable to interfere with the free flow
of capital in the Lebanese context - changes in reserve requirements
1wxll not be effective in any form as a means of control#
1* For details of their different forms see Goode and ^horn Variable 
Reserve Requirements. Against Bank Deposits1, BUT Staff Papers,
April 1959, pp 9-45.
Moreover, there is a strong case for not using general means of 
control, i.e., means that affect indiscriminately all the sectors of 
the economy: bottlenecks may appear somewhere in the economy and it
might be desirable to restrain oredit to that part only leaving the 
rest unaffected# A typical example is this* supposing that it is 
desirable to check the expansion of credit to the industrial sector 
because it is expanding too rapidly, and general measures to restrict 
credit are taken* These are going to affect credit to the commercial 
seotor, too, and in many instances could have undesirable effects#
One of the by-products of such a credit squeeze would be to reduce 
certain types of invisible receipts, and more specifically re-exports 
and commissions from triangular trade. As shown in Chapter III these 
receipts are very important in the balance of payments. Business lost
that way is very difficult to get back, and the longer the interruption
2of existing connections the harder it is to resume them*
1# It might be said that triangular trade is transacted in foreign
currencies only and that therefore a general credit squeeze on advances 
in Lebanese Pounds only could not affect it# But to expand a Lebanese 
industrialist has to import machinery which will have to be paid for in 
foreign currency# Since he can get an advance in foreign currency, 
such advances would have to be restricted too.
2# Britain experienced such difficulties following the Bank of England 
ruling that bank and other lending should not rise by more than 5 
As the City Editor of The Times reported on February 28th 1966* "The 
invisible exports now being lost ... may be relatively small, but in 
absolute terms they are not insignificant**# In Britain the situation 
is somewhat different and more difficult to solve than in Lebanon 
because the domestic currency - sterling - is used in third country 
financing and this means originally an outflow of sterling which the 
authorities want to stop in addition to checking domestic demand. In 
Lebanon, foreign currencies and not Lebanese Pounds are used for such 
transactions as the Lebanese Pound is not an international currenoy# 
Therefore there is no outflow of Lebanese Pounds to stop#
Now, as general measures are not re commendable, a strong case 
can be made for particular measures, i.e., measures affecting 
particular sectors and leaving other sectors relatively unaffected.
This calls for the adoption of selective credit controls which "are 
intended to encourage or discourage specific types of investment and 
expenditure by influencing the lending policy of banks and similar 
credit institutions".’*’ This type of control should be relatively 
easy to enforce in the case of medium* and long-term credit to industry 
through the requirement of prior approval of credit by the publicly 
owned Caisse Nationale de Reescompte, and to agriculture where the 
Government-controlled NDB will grant the credits. As regards short­
term credit, a Central Bank could instruct the commercial banks not 
to increase their advances to the sector in need of restraint by more 
than a given percentage. The monthly statements banks would submit to 
a Central Bank would show whether they are complying with its wishes or 
not. Finally, the control of capital issues is relatively easy to 
enforoe too because any increase of capital in Lebanon needs Government 
approval.
Selective credit controls will not reduce the total volume of bank
2
credit as is evidenced by the Indian experience, for although they
1. Patel, I.G., "Credit Controls in Underdeveloped Countries", IMF 
Staff Pacers. September, 1954*
2* For details of how such controls failed to reduce bank credit in 
India, see S.N* Sen, "Selective Credit Controls", in Arthaniti. 
November 1958, pp. 40-61.
succeed in restraining expenditure in particular ohannels, they might 
cause an increase in investment in other directions. But this is 
just what is required in Lebanon* If after they have been in force 
for some time, it is still felt that total advances should be restricted, 
a generalisation of the method by which selective credit controls are 
made effective could be used: a Central Bank could instruct banks not
to increase their total advances by more than a certain percentage, 
and monthly statements would provide the effective check# A direct 
advantage of this method is that it may make it easier for the State 
to raise money at times when restrictions on total advances have been 
imposed. It would not make it cheaper though, because the banks 
would still have the possibility of investing abroad, i.e., the State 
would still have to compete with foreign securities whether issued in 
Beirut or abroad. It v/ould make it easier to the extent that banks 
may be reluctant to convert some of their Lebanese Pound holdings 
into foreign currencies and therefore would rather bay the Lebanese 
Government bonds*
The enforcement of the measures will have to come from direct 
contacts between the Central Bank and the banks. A rediscounting 
ceiling for certain types of loans could be imposed but could not 
really be effective as banks could always rediscount some other paper 
or import funds from abroad and go on lending to the sector to be dis­
couraged. Therefore, the main measure of enforcement will have to be 
moral suasion, which is widely used for example by the Bank of Canada
in its attempts to allocate capital between consumers and investors
1 „ and among the investors themselves* The great advantage of moral
suasion in Lebanon is that it gives the highly independent-minded
banks the feeling that they are contributing to the monetary policy of
the country and that they are not being polioed by the Central Bank.^
Besides, it does stand a chance of working beoause whatever banks
7
cannot invest in Lebanon they can Invest abroad very easily* The 
effectiveness of the measures taken can be checked in the monthly 
returns banks submit to the Central Bank*
Uofr it can be seen why in spite of a good past record^ bank 
returns to a Central Bank will be necessary* The psychological effect 
that foreigners need to have confidence in the custodian of their funds 
is one reason already noted* Another one is that the new programme 
that will be launched by the State, the new credit facilities that
1* For details see E#p# Neufeld, ^The Bank of Canadafs Approach to 
Central Banking", in Canadian. Journal of Economics and Political 
Science* August 1958*
2* This system has been successfully adopted in T*renoh planning. The 
feeling of contributing to a policy makes it easier to abide by it 
and especially in countries where individualism is strong*
5* This is a definite advantage over variable reserveswrequirements from 
the point of view of the banks* The foreign investment of the banks 
would be a real residual and would act like a safety valve*
4* See Chapter II p* vos
will be made available to the private sector and the new investment 
opportunities that will be created, will bring abou$ conditions in 
Lebanon where a discretionary intervention in the monetary system 
will be necessary* So it is with relation to the future that a 
Central Bank is necessary for Lebanon*
^hat remains to be considered is whether the BSL could not 
have undertaken the tasks of a Central Bank as described above,and 
finally whether the newly created Banque du Liban could do so.
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CHAPQ?EH IV APPENDIX
A Case for Lower Deposit Rates
At a future date it might become desirable to lower the interest 
rates paid on deposits in Lebanon* There is no reason why banks 
should not compete for deposits by offering to pay interest even on 
sight deposits. But offering high rates could have two consequences* 
One is that the quality of service given might suffer and the other 
is the possibility of forcing some banks to go for highly speculative 
but, if successful, very profitable investments*
^he first consequence is easily illustrated by the French 
banking system* In 1925 French banks were offering 5 and 6fo interest* 
In order to stop this the 1 Union Syndioale des Banques!, which was 
under the influence of the large credit institutions and the chief 
fbanques d*affaires*, decided to fix credit interest rates and to 
introduce certain charges in the form of commissions* rFhe result 
was that all banks applied in fact the maximum rates so that there 
was no more competition from that side; competition was transferred 
to other fieldss material conditions and standard of banking services, 
expectations of credit facilities, personal relationships, proximity 
of the bank*
1* For more details see Cauboue P, •Competition Among Banks in France 
and the Fixing of Their &ates *, in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review* June 1955 Vol. VIII pp. 86«98#
The second, consequence is more difficult to illustrate because no 
bank would give details about its speculative investments or dealings. 
But it is known that banks in Beirut have sometimes engaged themselves 
ip. highly speculative real estate projects hoping to make a large
1profit. Some of them resorted even to what is called "cheque-kiting".
But how can deposit rates be lowered? The krench experience can 
be of help in this context. Through the Union Syndicale des Banques 
and the -Association Professionnelle des Banques, banks managed to 
transfer competition among banks from rates of interest to quality of 
service. This tendency was further reinforced by the Law of 1941 and 
its 1945 Amendment. In Lebanon the Association des Banques du Liban 
described in Chapter II could similarly initiate such cuts in the 
interest rates and to enforce them it could ask its members to charge 
its non-members, or those banks which do not comply with its recommend­
ations, customers* rates rather than interbank lending rates - which 
are lower. This would be an effective means of enforcement as banks 
rely considerably on the Marche Hors Banque for the provision of
1* Cheque-kiting is the practice whereby, a bank draws a cheque on a 
foreign bank where it actually has no account, and thei cables the 
money needed to cover the cheque when it expects it jjo come up 
for payment at the foreign bank (usually 5 days to give the cheque 
time to go through the clearing process and the post). The cabled 
money may be drawn on another foreign bank where again no account is 
held and which receives the money four or five days later, and so 
on. Cheque-kiting increases fictitiously the funds of a bank but 
is a dangerous practice as a miscalculation can cause a cheque to 
bounce with considerable damage to the prestige of the bank*
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funds when in temporary need for cash, and it would he preferable to 
have much an action initiated by the banks through their own Association 
rather than by the Central Bank - their watchdog*
If deposit rates were lowered one could expect the banks to 
increase the range and improve the quality of the services they offer* 
Moreover one would also expect them to refrain from highly speculative 
investments* ^his should make the banking system more appealing and 
would improve the chances of Beirut becoming a financial centre*
POSTSCRIPT
Since this thesis was written there have been new developments 
concerning the B*C*A.I*F. A Development Bank is to be created to 
which the State, banks and the World Bank will contribute capital.
It is to take over the business of the B#C*A*I.F« relating to
1
industry and tourism* The B.C.A.I*F. will be renamed B#C.A#F* and 
will be allowed to extend medium-term credits to salaried people 
wanting to buy a house,
^wo things are worth noting in this context* One is that the 
World Bank with considerable experience and funds has got a 20$ 
interest in the new Development Bank and one can then hope for an 
improved performance# The second is that the industrial business 
has been separated from the agricultural one* That was one of the 
suggestions we put forward*
However it involves only one institution granting medium-term credits 
to industry, in which banks have only an interest but hot large enough to 
induce them to contribute as much money as they would if their stake had 
been larger* It will not be easy to ask banksato repatriate funds from 
abroad to invest them in an institution in which they have a small 
interest* furthermore, the other activities that we suggested for the
1* Barque du Credit Agricole et Foncier#
investment banks, viz# new issues, obligations for other countries, 
cannot be performed by this Development Bank#
CHAPTER Y
THE BASQUE DE SYRIE ET DU LIBAH AMP THE BMQUE DU LIBAN
The usefulness of a Central Bank in Lebanon was clearly demonstrated 
in the preceding chapter when we discussed the role that such an 
institution could play in the future* What remains to be considered 
now is whether or not:
1# The Banque de Syrie et du Liban - in short the BSL -
could have efficiently taken the place of a Central Bank.
This has to be considered since one of the problems posed 
in the first ohapter was whether there was a need for a 
change of institution*
2* The Bank of Lebanon - the newly established Central Bank - 
will be able, under its present charter, to fill the role 
suggested*
I* The Banque de Syrie et du Liban
The BSL was a privately-owned french institution, established 
after the first World War in 1919 take over the functions of the 
Ottoman Bank which until then had had the privilege of note issue in 
the Lebanon* The 1924 Charter granted the BSL the privilege of note 
issue for fifteen years with the possibility of renewal. The Charter
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was subsequently amended ia 1957 and renewed for 25 years in 1959* It 
expired on 51st March 1964 was n°t renewed* On the 1st April 1964 
the Banque du Liban took over the privilege of note issue.
1
In April 1964 the BSL became a holding company, its main assets
being a large building in the centre of Beirut and half the share capital
■, 2 
of the Society Nouvelle de la Banque de Syrie et du Liban. The new
BSL, which is a Lebanese commercial bank, took over the commercial 
business of the old BSL. We shall first describe the different activ­
ities of the BSL. Then we shall appraise it in relation to what it was 
supposed to do and finally we shall consider whether it could have 
fulfilled the role of a Central Bank in the economic development of 
Lebanon*
1. Activities of the BSL
a. Bank of Issue
The 1924 Statute, which was to last for fifteen years 
separated the Issue Department of the bank from its Banking 
department. The BSL was to be the only note-issuing Bank for
both Lebanon and Syria. The currency issued was known as the
Lebano-Syrian Pound and was divisible into 100 Piastres? the 
rate of exchange was fixed at 20 Trench Francs to the Pound*
1. $Ofo of the shares are now owned bjy* the Banque de Paris et des Pays B&s.*
2. The other half is owned by the Ottoman Bank.
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Total note circulation was limited to a maximum of 25 million 
pounds, and was to be backed by a minimum of 45$ in gold or 
foreign government securities payable in gold, the balance being 
in short terms bonds issued by the French government and commer­
cial bills.
In separating the Issue Department from the Banking Department, 
the 1924 Statute was similar to the Bank Charter Act of 1844 in 
the United Kingdom, which had separated these two Departments of 
the Bank of England* However, the 1844 Bank Charter A.ot put a 
£14m. legal limit on the fiduciary issue, leaving the gold covered 
note issue to vary with the influx and efflux of bullion* Thus 
an influx of gold woiild be accompanied by an equal increase of 
the note issue, and vice versa* T0 the extent that an inf line of 
gold meant increased economic activity and a greater demand for 
notes, the increase in note issue was welcome. There was no 
limit on the total amount of note issue*
In Lebanon, an upper limit was set not only on the fiduciary 
1
issue but also on the total note issue. This meant that an 
increased demand for notes could only be met - if the issue had 
already reached £L 25m. - by an increase in the velocity of cir-
1. As the minimum gold cover was to be 45$ o f the note issue the 
fiduciary issue could not exceed 15,750,000 pounds*
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culation, even if the state of the reserves warranted an increase
in the note issue* Clearly this resulted in an extreme rigidity
in the note issue, which could not he justified even hy the
Currency Principle* This principle had laid down that "the
quantity of notes and coin in circulation should never differ
from the amount of money which would circulate if all the money
were metallic*”  ^ There is no obvious reason for this extreme
rigidity* One could only guess that it was caused by the fear
2of the BSL going wild, irresponsibly over-issuing noted.
Two years before this convention was to expire, it was 
amended* Thus in 1937 the Lebanese Government and the BSL 
signed an agreement basically similar to that of 1924t hut 
separating the Lebanese currency from the Syrian currency and 
altering the composition of the reserves. The maximum of 25m* 
pounds set for the note issue was abolished* A 50$ minimum gold 
cover was not* required, the balance being in commercial bills 
and government bonds* Thus the note issue could be varied within 
the limit set by the state of the economy and the reserves*
1* Feavearyear, Sir A*, The Pound Sterling. 2nd Ed* Revised by ^* Victor
Morgan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965, p* 272*
2* It is the same kind of fear that made it necessary to put a restrict­
ion on the amount of public securities that the new Bank of Lebanon
can keep in its portfolio* In this case it is the fear of an over* 
issue of securities by the State, and an irresponsible and abusive 
use of them*
She new convention which was to take effect in 1939 and to last 
for 25 years, maintained the Lebanese Pound on the French Franc 
Standard* Apart from a minimum 10$ gold cover, the reserves were 
to be mainly in ^rench Francs, French Government bonds, or deposits 
with the French Treasury# This put Lebanon, an under-developed 
nation, in the position of being a creditor to France, a developed 
nation*
The close link with the Franc also had the disadvantage of 
depreciating' the value of the Lebanese Pound with each depreciat­
ion or devaluation of the Franc* Between March 1919 and the end 
of 1926 and with one exception in 1924, the Franc was on an 
uncontrolled floating standard, and was depreciating in terms of 
the dollar. The effect on the Lebanese Pound was described by 
Mr* Yaffis
"Since 1920, the French Franc had depreciated from an 
exchange value of 2 cents to about 0*9 cent in May 1940 
and coincidentally the Lebanese Pound lost - about 70$ 
of its value.
After the war, a severance of the dose monetary links between 
France and Lebanon was felt necessary and a new Monetary Law
1* League of Nations, International Currency Experience. 19449 P* 117
2* Yaffi, T* * A, Case for Banking Reform in Lebanon1, Middle Fast 
Economic Papers. 1958*
came into being, altering the 1937 Convention* Thus the 1949 
Law asked the BSL to maintain a note cover of at least 50$ 
gold and foreign currencies readily convertible into gold, the 
balanoe being in Government bonds, securities and commercial 
bills*^ This took the Lebanese currency off the unstable French 
Franc Standard*
In 1949» the BSL started buying a considerable amount of gold, 
raising the gold proportion in the note cover from under 2$ to'
92*2$ by December 1961* This was made possible by a favourable 
balance of payments* The balance of the note cover consists of 
government bonds and advances guaranteed by the Lebanese Government*
A reason given for a high gold ratio in the note cover is its 
psychological effeot* This point was widely stressed by officials 
of the Lebanese Government responsible for that side of monetary 
policy* The high gold ratio helped considerably in maintaining 
and enhancing confidence in the Lebanese Pound* It is not
immediately apparent why such a high gold proportion - 92$ - was
needed for this* But it is not untrue that it did help* To
understand this, one has to remember that Lebanon is a country
in the Middle East, where until recently, gold was to a great
1* However, it was also stipulated that commercial bills held as note 
cover were not to exceed 15$ of the total note circulation*
extent still used as an internal medium of exchange* Furthermore, 
Lebanon is one of the most stable countries in the Middle East, and 
with a well developed banking sector is a good haven for capital* 
The fact that the Lebanese Pound was backed by gold to an extent 
of over 90$> had certainly some effect on the minds of capitalists 
still used to trading in gold* This was welcome since the large 
inflow of capital made possible a sustained trade deficit*
The Government and the BSL were to share the earning's of the 
note cover* But as the proportion of non-earning assets rose in 
the note cover, the Government relinquished this right, all 
earnings thus accruing to the BSL*
Government Bank*
The BSL was the main custodian of the Government funds 
under both the 1924 and 1937 Conventions. It paid interest on 
Government deposits, but its rates followed those of the Banque 
de France* Demand deposits received a rate of interest equal to 
the discovint rate of the Banque de France minus 2$, and time 
deposits received that rate minus In general, the rates
paid were lower than those obtainable at other local banks, and 
this has been the subject of much criticism* But criticism on 
these lines is not totally justified* There is no one higher 
rate paid by all banks to all depositors, but a range of rates
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varying from one bank to another, and from one depositor to 
another* fhe interest paid is often the result of an agreement 
between the bank manager and the depositor, ^he Government 
could have done the same and re-negotiated the agreement with the 
BSL had it felt the rate was too low*
On the other hand, the BSL granted loans to the municipalities, 
the post office and semi-public institutions when other alternatives 
had proved either dry or too onerous, Ihe rates charged then 
varied between 2-|fo and 4f°9 snd so were substantially lower than 
those charged by other local banks. Ihus the BSL might have 
offered lower rates of interest on public deposits, nevertheless 
it charged lower rates when the public sector asked for advances*
Beside making payments for the Government, the BSL was also 
the custodian of the Government subscriptions to international 
monetary organisations. It was also supposed to manage the 
public debt, but the very little there was of it was subscribed 
completely by the BSL itself. All these services were rendered 
free of charge*
^he BSL was entrusted with the carrying out of decisions made 
by the Exchange Equalisation ^Wd. Ihis Fund, created by Decree 
Mo. 8 of October 19499 was to be administered by a committee com-
posed of the Minister of finance, the Director General at the
Ministry of Finance, the Controller General of Exchange, the
director of the Issue Department of the BSL and an official
appointed by the Minister of Finance# ^he Minister presided over
the Committee* ?^he E.E.F., though constituted in 1949? did not
actually intervene in the market until 1955? when the BSL was
asked to buy United States dollars in the free exchange market*
Ihis move was intended to prevent the dollar rate from falling 
1
below £L 3*20# But the E.E.F* never enjoyed great importance and
when it acted it was merely
*... * because of the pressure of impending economic 
circumstances, rather than a reflection of a pre­
determined policy1*^
0* Bankers* Bank
The BSL performed this role in two wayss
a) by relieving the banks of temporary liquidity shortages, 
and
b) by allowing the banks to keep balances with it for clearing
1# fhe dollar rate had risen considerably (to £L 3«$7) following the
outbreak of the Korean War# It fell drastically when the hostilities 
ended, causing considerable damage to the mercantile sector of the 
economy*
2# Saba, ffhe Foreign Exchange Systems of Lebanon and Syria 1959-1957*
American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1962, g. 122.
purposes.
The BSL helped the banks in need of liquid funds by redis­
counting their paper, by providing them with lines of credit 
or by lending them *en pension*.
i) Hediscounting
lo be eligible for rediscounting a bill had to carry 
three signatures, and its life to maturity was not to 
exceed 120 days, if held in the Banking Department, and 
90 days if held in the Issue Department. Ihe rediscount 
rate followed that of the Banque de France until about 1955? 
and since then has been fixed at yfo
ii) Overdraft Facilities
Ihe BSL opened lines of credit to commercial banks.
Ihis consisted in giving the banks non-secured open credits 
up to certain amounts. Repayment, which was determined by 
contract, was usually extended up to one year, but with an 
understanding that the loan could be revoked with a forty- 
five days notice.
iii) Borrowing !en pension*
Ihis system was developed to relieve banks of minor and 
very short term liquidity crises, and to minimise losses.
(The BSL would buy bills from the bank in need of cash, on 
the understanding that the said bank would repurchase them 
seven days later.'1' ^his system was very practical* and 
bankers have said privately that they made a considerable 
use of it. ^he rate of interest charged on such borrowing 
was
b) Beside managing the clearing office, where all banks sent two
representatives, and keeping deposits for banks for clearing
2
purposes, the BSL administered the Centrale des Kisques* ^his 
office was started under the auspices of the Government in 1953 > 
and was designed to protect the banks from unworthy borrowers, 
thus increasing the safety of the banking sector* Member 
banks who pay for its running are required to submit to the 
Centrale regular information about the loan facilities of over 
£L 25,000 granted to their customers, and the extent to which 
they have been used# ^he information thus compiled by name 
of borrowrer is then distributed to member banks and this helps 
them in assessing the credit worthiness of borrowers. No great
1* Seven days was the usual period but it could vary*
2. The Centrale is now administered by the new Central Bank, the 
Bank of Lebanon.
use could be made of the Centrale until 1962, as many local 
banks refused to join it* However, in that year, membership 
of the Centrale was made compulsory, and in interviews 
bankers have said that this body is highly valuable and that 
great use is made of it*
D* Commercial Bank
As explained earlier, the Banking Department and the Issue
Department of the BSL were separated in I924# ^he two departments
remained two distinct entities until the establishment in 1964 of
the Bank of Lebanon, which took over the privilege of note issue 
1
in Lebanon* It is difficult to assess the magnitude of private 
deposits and advances that the BSL commanded in the Lebanon, as it 
published only combined balance sheets for both Lebanon and Syria* 
Furthermore, the statements never gave separate figures for the 
public sector the private sector and the banks# All those sectors 
appeared under one figure*
It is reported that in the early 1950 fs the BSL commanded 
about half the total private deposits in the Lebanon, and that it 
was responsible for about JQffo of total advances and discounts*
1# ^he BSL stopped issuing the Syrian currency in 1956 when the 
Central Bank of Syria was created#
2. Yaffi, 1'*, op* cit., p# 104*
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By the late fifties, the situation had changed, the BSL share
of private deposits and advances fell throughout that period
mostly because of the establishment of new banks in Beirut. It
is believed that the BSL held only about IQP/o to 15fo of private
deposits in Lebanon when it ceased its activities in March, 1964*
As regards advances and discounts, the proportion had fallen too,
1though not to the same extent. Unfortunately, no exact figures 
are available,
Q?he BSL!s activities in commercial banking were regulated by 
its statutes. It was allowed to extend short term credits, and to 
discount commercial paper, provided the paper satisfied the 
requirements laid down. It was not officially allowed to grant 
credit against mortgages, but it is believed that it did not abide 
strictly by this rule.
In general the Banking Department of the BSL acted like any 
other commercial bank in Lebanon, but i-rilth the difference that it 
held the meagre supply of Lebanese Government bonds. Other banks 
did not have any of them.
1. Ibid, p. 105
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2* Appraisal of the BSL with reference to what it was supposed to do.
It has been common to appraise the BSL with reference to the
1
traditional functions of central banks. This approach is misleading 
for two reasons, one general and one particular. The general reason can 
be found in the first chapters to approach the problem of central banking 
in developing countries in terms of the traditional functions of Central 
Banks is inappropriate and misleading. One should look at the problem 
in the economic context in which the central banks operate* The particu­
lar reason why this approaoh is misleading is the fact that the BSL was 
not intended to be a central bank* It was oreated after the Urst World 
War to take over the privilege of note issue from the Ottoman Bank, and 
it was not to be more than a bank of issue. It had no powers of control 
over other banks, and had no special responsibilities for implementing 
a monetary policy. The 1937 amendments did not alter this position. But 
with time it came to perform certain central banking activities that fell 
to it by reason of the circumstances and conditions in which the Lebanese 
banking sector was working. These activities were described in the 
previous section.
1. Ibid.^Toalc, J.W.J., Monetary and Banking Developments in Lebanon. M.Sp. 
(Econ) thesis at the London School of Economics, i960, typescript* 
Mahmassani, Y.A.A%, A Central Bank for Lebanon, M.A. thesis submitted at 
the American University of Beirut, Feghali Press, Beirut, 1961.
So to appraise the BSL as essentially a central bank expected to 
behave like one* is wrong. It is as a bank of issue that it should 
be appraised. So we shall start with this aspect, then we shall 
appraise the BSL!s 1central banking1 activities, and finally its 
commercial banking*
A. Bank of Issue
In this context there are two points# One is whether the 
private and foreign ownership of the BSL was in any way detrimental 
to the Lebanese economy, ^he second is whether the BSL provided 
some elasticity to the note issue#
Inhere is no reason to believe that the foreign and private owner­
ship of the BSL was in any way detrimental to the economy, at
1 mleast on economic grounds* ™he BSL was based in Paris but did very 
little commercial business in Prance. Even supposing that it did 
carry out such business, it would not have made much difference, 
for the BSL had no access to confidential information that could
1. ^he private and foreign ownership of the BSL was often criticized 
on political grounds* ^hat was done in identical terms by Yaffi, T* 
op* cit*« pp. 111-112, Toak op. cit., p. 157* Mahmassani,
Y*A*, op. cit*. pp 68-83* r^he same criticism was raised against the 
BSL in byria where it was also the note-issuing bank* Por this see 
Ashshy, 0#, ^he Syrian Monetary System (in Arabic) 3£d ed. Damascus 
19591 P* 1505 also *‘ihe Reasons for the Promulgation of the Basic 
Monetary Sygtem and the Establishment of the Syrian Central Bank* 
which appeared in ^he Basic Monetary System (in Arabic) March 1953 
pp. 84*85* Quotations on fp. I £ above*
be of any benefit to foreigners. Begarding its private ownership, 
there is no.-reason to believe that if it had been publicly ovaied 
it would have been better run:
a) it was not a Central Bank and therefore its responsibilities 
towards the economy were quite limited, ^here was no 
monetary policy to implement because the Government never 
had one, and even if it had had one the BSL had no powers
of enforcement.
b) its already limited activities were concentrated in its 
Issuing Department which on the one hand was subject to 
conditions laid down in its statutes, and on the other hand 
was under the constant supervision of the Government*
Now, with regards to note issuing proper, the BSL, in the period 
considered - 1950*1964 * did provide the Lebanese currency with the 
elasticity needed to maintain stability, liable XXV shows the 
growth of the currency issue in Lebanon between 1950 and 1964* ^he 
average rate of increase was 11*7$ a year, but it was by no means 
regular, ^he currency issue responded to economic factors which in 
turn were sometimes influenced by political factors* Looking over 
the figures for 1958 for example, the issue moved from £L 356 
millions in the first quarter to £L 424 millions in the third quarter,
1* Identical to Table X in Chapter II.
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thus increasing at a, yearly rate of Q^°/o, when the average annual 
rate for the whole period was 11.7/&* reason for this sudden
M g  rate of increase was the political crisis of that year which 
brought the economy to a standstill for six months* A large demand 
for cash followed, as explained in the Appendix to Chapter II*
When the situation was normal again the amount currency issued fell
hack to &L 399 millions in the fourth quarter of 1958, and £L 394
millions in the first quarter of 1959* It is worth noting that the
level it fell hack to, in the first quarter of 1959 > represents a
10*7$ rate of increase over a year before. This rate is 1°/o less
than the average annual rate for the whole period 1950“1964>
this is a clear example of the elasticity the BSL gave to its note
1issue, and of its attempts to avoid grave crises of confidence.
Therefore, as a bank of issue and with reference to what it was 
supposed to do, the BSL .was fulfilling its role adequately and any
decision to end its Charter or not to renew it when it expired
1* It is important to stress here the influence of political factors in 
the economy and the need to avoid crises of confidence in the liquidity
and solvency of the banking sector, for it strengthens the point
made in the last chapter that the rediscounting facilities should be 
looked at as an insurance against such crises rather than as some­
thing that will be used all the time#
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T A B L E  XX.V 
CDBBEH’CY ISSUE BT LEBMOH (L.L. Million)
Year Quarters
I II III IV
1950  >  196
1951  ^  208
1952 '----------------- ^  200
1955  >  199
1954   225
4-------
/
at
>* .. - .......\
A
« -------
1955 243 252 264 2 66
1956 270 282 500 333
1957 528 342 347 356
1958 556 407 424 399
1959 394 394 397 400
i960 400 416 427 431
1961 431 431 431 437
1962 437 442 455 470
1965 470 485 493 505
1964 522
Figures for 1950-54 are yearly averages. 
Source 8 BSL, Bapports.
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should really have been taken after an analysis of the future role 
that the BSL would have "been called upon to play. But before doing 
that the various fCentral Banking* activities that fell to the BSL 
by reason of the circumstances and conditions in which the Lebanese 
banking sector was working, should be considered.
B. 1 Central Banking* activities of the BSL
Ihese activities centred round the BSL ad a bankers* bank* This 
should be understood in the literal sense of the phrase, i.e., the 
BSL was literally the bank cf the other banks, rediscounting their 
first class paper, granting them loans and allowing them to keep 
deposits with it for clearing purposes# It did not try, nor was it 
expected to, control the banking sector through the role of a 
bankers* bank.
Ihe discharge of its functions as a lender of last resort has 
1
been criticized for it was noticed that banks in general did not 
make much use of the rediscounting facilities offered by the BSL and 
it is said that the bulk of the rediscounting was-made
*to the French owned or French controlled banks or to 
the small banks and discount houses*•
It is said that banks in general did not rediscount because they
1* See footnote *1, p.7.t^
2# Yaffi, I., op* cit . p* 105# loak, J.W#J., op. cit. p. 122.
they were never sure of the rediscount rate that the BSL would 
charge, and also because the BSL was privately owned, and therefore 
to borrow from it would be a, loss of face* Ihe first reason is 
wrong because the rediscount rate was fixed at j/o  in 1953 and has not 
changed since* Ag to the second, it is not valid either as is evidenced 
by the considerable .use made of the ’en pension1 method of borrowing, 
and the great activity of the Marche Hors Banque where equally strong 
competitors operate, therefore the reason for the absence of much 
rediscounting should be sought elsewhere*
Banks were unable to make full use of the rediscounting facilities 
at the BSL because of the nature of their assets. The BSL could 
rediscount paper bearing three known signatures, and with a maximum 
life of ninety days if held in the Issue Department, and one hundred 
and twenty days if held in the Banking Department. The banks did 
not hold enough of such commercial paperj the proportion of trade 
bills to total money available or lent was very low.'** Lebanese banks 
held a great deal of what is called accommodation paper* It bore 
usually two known signatures, but when it fell due it was often 
renewed* It was a form of medium term credit that the banks were 
willing to extend* The BSL was reluctant tofcrediscount such paper, as
1. There were no Treasury Bills and 110 short dated Government securities 
in Lebanon. Also see Chapter II, p* VL for falling ratio of bills 
to total money lent.
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its life was in fact longer than the maximum life allowed by its statutes* 
On the other hand Lebanese banks held a great deal of assets in the form 
of unsecured advances and loans against mortgages or stocks* They also 
accepted and discounted hire purchase bills* All these assets could not 
be rediscounted at the BSL for in this respect it was restricted in much
the same way as are central banks* Therefore an alternative lender of last
1 * resort had to be found and this is why the Marche Hors Banque which*, as we
showed in Chapter IX could act like a lender of last resort* became? so
important, in spite of the higher rates that had to be paid in it* Thus*
if banks did not make much use of the rediscounting facilities at the BSL
it was because they could not satisfy the requirements which were set by
the Government for rediscounting. To deviate from its bye-laws, the BSL
had to have the authority of the Government, and this was done on three
2
occasions, in 1956, 1958 and 1964*
1* It has been suggested, that banks kept wastefully high cash ratios because 
they did not want to rediscount* This is not true as can easily be seen in 
Chapter II*
2* 1956 was the Suez war year* The hostilities brought about fears that English
and French banks might be asked to cease their activities in the Lebanon and 
that their deposits might be frozen. Substantial amounts of money were trans­
ferred from these banks to local ones within three days* English banks re­
ceived some help from their head offices but had to ask local banks to provide 
them with additional credit* Jftcench banks suffered more severely as their 
head offices were unwilling to commit more funds in the circumstances* Local 
Lebanese banks rescued them*
f In 1958, the same thing happened but in the other direction. Depositors 
feared that local banks would be unable to withstand the heavy strain of the 
political upheaval of that year and transferred their deposits to foreign banks 
This time, it was the turn of foreign banks to help their Lebanese colleagues* 
In 1964 a Lebanese bank was declared bankrupt* A slight crisis of confid­
ence ensued and the reserves of certain Lebanese banks dwindled to dangerously 
low levels* Foreign bankers helped those which were solvent but faced an 
unusual run of their deposits*
No figures are available in support of what has been said about the 3 
crises* All this information was compiled from private interviews with 
bankers.
The reason why it was felt necessary that the BSL should 
deviate from its statute springs from practical considerations*
In effect one could argue that in emergencies the MHB would help 
only if foreign hanks were confident as to the outcome of the 
crisis* One would then suppose that if they were not confident 
they would he reluctant to invest money in the country. Their 
combined inaction could deprive Lebanese banks of one of their main 
sources of funds, and were this to happen, a situation analogous 
to that in the United States in 1907 would occur, for, with no 
other intervention, the supply of money to meet the sudden demand 
for it would be limited to the reserves of the banks* Son on the 
three occasions mentioned above the Government instructed the BSL 
to rediscount freely - i*e* with less regard to its bye-laws, - 
and guaranteed the operations with the public deposits held at the 
BSL* It was a sort of stand-by arrangement or, using an expression 
from the preceding chapter, a sort of insurance against the risk of 
withdrawal of funds outstripping the available supply or reserves* 
This confirms further the point made in the previous chapter, 
namely that the Central Bank*s redas counting facilities will be more 
a kind of insurance to the stability of the banking sector than a 
source of permanent finance.
What all this shows is that when the authority that imposed 
restrictions on the rediscounting facilities of the BSL relaxed 
them, it could act like a lender of last resort• What it also 
shows is that if in normal times and even in emergencies, banks 
did not make much use or as much use as expected, of these 
rediscounting facilities it was, to repeat, only because banks 
could not meet the conditions set by another authority than the 
BSL - the Government - and had found an alternative source of funds - 
the MHB. This we hope proves two points s-
a* that the cause of the lack of rediscounting was not 
that the BSL was privately instead of state-owned;
b. that the need of a lender of last resort was not 
relevant to the decision whether or not to endow 
Lebanon with a state^ -owned Central Bank - or alternatively 
whether or not to renew the BSL charter. This used to 
be one of the chief.'arguments for a state-owned Central 
Bank* It was alleged that not only would it be convenient 
for the banks to have a lender of last resort but it 
would also make possible the implementation of a 
monetary policy. In March 1964 there was no need for
1. Yaffi, T. op.cit. p* 110. Toak, J. W. J. op.cit. p. 148, 149* 
Mahaassani, Y. op.cit. Chap. IV Section IV.
a conventional lender of last resort* The importance 
of this point is great# For it means that the mere 
provision of a state-owned Central Bank could not be 
expected to cause the banks fully to use the rediscounting 
facilities offered, thus making a traditional monetary 
policy possible* The case for a state-owned Central 
Bank lay elsewhere#
Therefore, here again, in relation to what it was supposed 
to do and what it could do, there was no justification for 
criticising the BSL, and if the conditions prevalent in the 
period 1950-1964 were to continue into the future there is so 
far no reason on economic grounds why the BSLfs privilege of 
note-issue in the Lebanon should not have been renewed#
Commercial Banking of the BSL
There are two points to consider in relation to the 
commercial banking activities of the BSL:
(1) whether its activities contributed to the economic 
development of the country; and
(2) whether as a bank of issue it should have conducted 
commercial activities*
As regards the first point, it may well be that the BSL's 
commercial activities did contribute to the economic development
of the country. As recently as the early 1950!sf the BSL was
still responsible for about JOfo of total advances and discounts 
1in the country. lo have deprived it of its commercial business 
on the grounds that a bank of issue should not compete with other 
banks would probably have been a setback to economic development.
In effect the BSL was filling a gap in the economy, for although 
the banking sector was developing rapidly, this growth was taking 
place mainly in the nine teen-fifties, and the banks were still 
small and lacked the experience and expertise of the BSL; thus 
there was a case for it to retain its commercial activities. But 
as the decade passed, and many other banks opened up and started 
commercial business, the BSL*s share of total advances and discount 
fell. So, in 19&4* the gap the BSL was filling was not as wide as 
in the fifties and one could then question the desirability of 
associating note-issue with commercial business after 19&4*
If conditions were not to change, and if the BSL was to have 
its privilege of note-issue renewed, a case dould be made for it
1. Yaffi, T. on.cit. p. 105*
to retain its commercial activities. On# the one hand, the
conflict between the private and public interests that may arise
in this cxmntext because the bank is privately owned, may arise
even if it is state-owned. State-owned Central Banks in general
are no more insensitive to the attractions of sound and profitable
loans than their commercial colleagues: *Xn some instances the
banking department [of a Central Bank] has been a leading contri-
1butor to an excessive expansion of credit1. On the other hand,
this aspect of its work was beneficial in one important respect in
spite of its falling share in that business: it was the only
reliable means by which the BSL could keep in constant touch with
the market. This is essential if the appropriate measures that are
2
the responsibility of the Issuing Bank are to be taken. “On the
whole the evidence warns us to be cautious in developing the
ordinary banking business of a Central Bank, rather than to say that
3
there should be no such business.u
1. Goode and Thorn, *Yariable Reserve Requirements against Bank Deposits1
IiM.F. Staff Papers. April 1959*
2. It has been reported recently in financial papers that the Bank of
England itself is thinking of reviving its commercial banking activities
to Influence the policies of the joint stock banks. It must have been 
felt that in spite of intensive rediscounting practices and many other 
devices of control and checking, whioh the BSL does not share, a closer 
and more direct touch with the money market was necessary to provide
the joint-stock banks with a lead.
5# Sayers, R. S* *The Central Bank as a Banker1 2nd of three Lectures
Central Banking in Under-developed Countries, delivered on the 
Anniversary of the Rational Bank of Egypt in April 1956 in Cairo.
In conclusion, we could say that the BSL was fulfilling its 
purpose adequately and properly. If conditions were not to change 
in the country and thus no new functions were envisaged for the 
BSL there was no reason on economic grounds why its charter should 
not have been renewed when it expired in 19&4*
5. THE BSL M P  THE POST 1964 CONDITIONS
In Chapters III and IV the changing conditions of the Lebanese 
economy and the role that a Central Bank could play to promote the
economic development of the country were discussed. A Central Bank is
needed in the new context and this implies immediately that the BSL - 
essentially an issuing bank - was not adequate for the future as it
stood. Two lines of action were then open*
1. either to make the BSL into a Central Bank and therefore 
radically change its charter; 9r 
2* to create a new state-owned Central Bank with powers adequate 
to deal with the future economio conditions of the country* 
Therefore, whatever line of action was adopted a new charter had to be 
adopted and the problem of whether the BSL should be the new Central 
Bank or not becomes basically whether the new Central Bank should be 
state-owned or not.
The strongest argument for a privately owned Central Bank in 
Lebanon is perhaps the general distrust of any publicly owned or
2? 7.
publicly controlled institution. The argument is not an economic one
but can have economic consequences. These relate mainly to the relations
the Central Bank will have with the State. The distrust leads to a
constant fear of collusion between the State and the Bank, i.e. the fear
that the Government in power might use the Bank to further political
objectives without regard to economic objectives. However close the
contacts are between the Government and a privately-owned Central Bank,
it is likely that it would offer more resistance to political interference
1than would a state-owned bank. Therefore, if a state-owned Central
Bank was to be adopted stiff measures would have to be taken to ensure
that the Government could not sacrifice economic objectives for political
ones, and this means tying the hands of the Bank in so far as Government
2finance is concerned, as indeed happened in Lebanon in April 1964*
But the case for a state-owned Central Bank is very strong, because 
of the future role it could be called upon to play. The case is strong 
with respect tos-
a. The local capital market.
As discussed in Chapter XV a main task of the Central Bank 
is to bridge the gap that exists between the short-end of the
1. It has been said (Yaffi, T., op.cit. p. 112) that an advantage of making 
the BSL a Central Bank was the continuity of service, which would be 
provided by the same personnel. Thi^ however is no strong argument 
because those responsible for the note issue at the BSL could be taken 
by the new Central Bank.
2. See Chapter I, ahd below p.2^0
market for funds, which at the prevailing interest rates has excess
supplies, and the long-end of the market where there is unsatisfied
demand. This implies the powers to rediscount medium-term hills,
to give directives to the Caisse Nationals de Reescompte, to help
the NDB in its debenture issues^ and probably support their prices,
to help the state finance its programme, and to time everything in
the best interests of the economy, i.e. to allocate the funds
available in the most efficient way. This role is best achieved
by a governmental institution for the risks involved in what
1amounts to 1 underwriting the economic development' of the country 
are too large either to be acceptable to a private institution or 
given to a private institution.
b. The international capital market.
In this context the Central Bank will have to offer expert 
advice to investment banks, full guarantees to lenders, and create 
a favourable climate for such a market by working in concert with 
and advising the Government. In Lebanon a state-owned institution
1. Expression borrowed from Nevin, E., Capital Funds in Underdeveloped 
Countries: The Role of Financial Institutions. MacMillan & Co. Ltd.,
London, 1961, p. 89.
is eminently better placed to carry out such functions because a 
privately owned institution might still be looked upon with 
suspicion.
c. The future economic conditions
The evolution of the Lebanese economy and of the banking 
business in general will bring about new economic conditions where 
central bank action regarding the banks migh$ be necessary* In 
Lebanon much such action might have to rest on personal contacts 
between officials of the Central Bank and bankers. "Moral suasion" 
would be required and it would obviously be much more effective if 
the Central Banker was not just another banker with certain 
privileges, but a state-owned institution with the full authority 
of the State behind it. This is important if commercial banks 
are both to co-operate with the Central Bank in formulating a 
policy and to abide by it. Furthermore, a monthly control over 
the banks' balance sheets will be necessary. Bankers will he 
more willing to submit their monthly position if the Central Bank 
id not privately owned, lest information benefiting private 
individuals becomes known, nor a competitor in the field:"*" it is
1* Supporting evidence for this argument can be found in the earlier 
history of the Bank of England and the more recent history of the 
unsatisfactory relations between the Australian trading banks and 
the Commonwealth Bank.
easier to submit a balance sheet to a non-competitor than to 
a competitor. Thus, although for other reasons it might be 
desirable to allow the Central Bank to compete with other banks 
in commercial business, such as to keep in touch with the market, 
it would be preferable if it was not allowed to£ at least 
initially, and one can hardly ask a privately-owned Central Bank 
to stop commercial business overnight - as would have happened if 
the BSL had become the Central Bank.
Therefore, in spite of the risk of political interference in 
the monetary affairs of the country, there is a good case for the 
Central Bank to be state-owned rather than privately-owned. The 
risk of political interference can be diminished by providing the 
Central Bank with some independence from the Government, and 
especially with a strong Governor. This is partly why it is 
desirable that Commercial banks should be consulted on matters of 
monetary policy: by doing so the private sector could help to
counter-balance political interference from the publie sector.
Summing up, a State-owned Central Bank with no ordinary 
commercial business is therefore what was needed to replace the 
BSL when its charter expired on the 31st March, 19&4 - a Bank that
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could keep in close touch with the money market and the 
different economic sectors, for a Central Banking system should 
always be appraising major developments affecting the whole 
economy. As a President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
said:
'Central Banking is a public service which requires 
of its practitioners continuous contact with economic 
processes, and with people in the market places of the 
country as well as with the representatives of Government 
at its centre*
Lebanon did get a State-owned Central Bank in April 1964 
and this ended the reign of the BSL. But will this Bank, 
described in Chapter I, be able to fulfil the role that will fall
to it, or in other words, is the Banque of Lebanon a well-adapted
Central Bank* It is to this question that we finally turn?.
II THE BANK OF LEBANON
This section will be dealing with the newly created Bank of 
Lebanon (or BL) which was described in Chapter I. In particular, we 
shall appraise the BK in relation to the future role it will be called
upon to play if it is to help in financing the economic development
of the Lebanon*
1. Sproul, A. 'Reflections of a Central Banker'i Paper read at a joint 
meeting of the American Finance Association and American Economic 
Association, on 29th December, 1955i in New York City. Published in 
Journal of Finance, March 1956, Vol. XI. Mr* Sproul was the president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the vice-chairman of the 
Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System*
1. NATURE OF THE INSTITUTION
If the Central Bank is to be state-owned but still free from
political interference, it requires a highly independent Board*
The BL is owned by the State, for Article 15 of the 1965 Banking
Legislation specifically states that the capital is provided
entirely by the State, and that any future increase will also come
from the State* -Ifereover, the principle of independence was
accepted by the authorities:
'The nature of the Bank of Lebanon naturally created 
a problem of choice. Should the Central Bank be a 
purely State institution or an independent institution 
but subject to certain State controls? But the dangers 
that face monetary institutions with state administrations, 
and the desire to maintain her traditional liberalism, 
made Lebanon choose to give her Central Bank great 
independence•'
But whether in practice the principle will still hold is not very 
certain, for it seems that it will all depend on the personalities 
involved. In effect the Governor is appointed by the Government and 
so are the three Deputy Governors. But their long terms of office - 
6 and 5 years respectively - make it possible for them to be
1. Takla, P. Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, extract from a 
speech delivered at the Rotary Club in Beirut on 25th May 
1964* It was reported in L' Orient on 27th May. It was the 
first official speech of the Governor of the Bank. Translation 
from French is mine.
relatively free of interference from the Government of the day* 
Therefore, depending on the personalities of the Governor and the 
Deputy Governors, the Central Council, which decides on matters 
of monetary policy and whose membership includes the Director 
Generals of the Ministries of Finance and National Economy, 
could be prevented from politically interfering with the Bank's 
staff as the latter hold the majority of the seats* This should 
not be considered as an argument for excluding the Director 
Generals from the Council, for close contact and co-operation 
between the Bank and the Ministry of Planning, which in this 
case could be represented by the Ministry of National Economy, 
is necessary* On the other hand as Article 28 mentions, the 
two Government officials will not be acting as agents of the 
Government but simply as members of the Council in charge of 
monetary policy* But it must be realised that these two Directors 
are more liable to be pro-Government than not and that is why 
although close co-operation is needed between the Bank and the 
Government, the Governor and his Deputies should be independent 
and strong enough to distinguish between the truly worthwhile 
Government decisions and the short-term policies dictated by 
expediency* The mechanism for decision-making in the BL makes
it possible for the Bank's top executives to work that way but 
there is no guarantee of it, and it might have been preferable 
to give more say in decision-making to non-governmental bodies. 
Banking, Commerce, Industry and Agriculture are already represented 
in the Consultative Committee which also includes a professor of 
economics, but they have no power, their role being merely advisory.
2. THE BL AND THE NON-BANK PRIVATE SECTOR
The essential role of the Central Bank in this context is to 
help divert some of the resources of the money market into the 
capital market. The ancillary role - which is also very important - 
is to create in Beirut Bonditions which will attract for investment 
in Lebanon funds from the rest of the Middle East seeking investment 
opportunities. We have described how this might be done. Will the 
BL be able to perform this role?
For these purposes the BL must be able to hold medium and 
long-term paper, for, whatever plan is adopted, no adequate and 
local medium or long-term credit will be available from the banks in 
Lebanon if there is no guarantee that in an emergency the paper 
can Be liquified. As the Central Bank is the only final supplier 
of cash it alone can give that guarantee - or insurance - and if it 
cannot rediscount and hold medium and long-term paper, it cannot
give this guarantee in which case banks will not accept such paper 
either. It is not a peculiarity of the proposal made in Chapter IV* 
that makes it essential for the BL to be able to rediscount 
medium and long-term paper; any proposal to make use of the 
potentalities of the banking sector in Lebanon will require similar 
assurance. To ensure the availability of the medium and long-term 
credits that are needed in Lebanon, it is essential that:
1* banks should not be required to match their assets too 
closely with their liabilities. This is feasible in the 
Lebanon*
2, the Central Bank should provide the guarantees needed f or the 
liquidity of the assets.
The new Law is quite elastic with respect to 1. In effect 
Article 156 states that the banks must adapt the lives of their 
investments to the characteristics of their resources* Now, if it 
is agreed that most of the resources of the banks are in fact medium- 
term resources - as we tried to show in earlier chapters - this 
provision of the law will not stand in the way of the provision of
medium- and long-term credits* But Article 156, though 
necessary, is not sufficient to ensure the provision of medium- 
and long-term credit because the BL should be able to guarantee 
the liquidity of the paper issued with such credits; but the BL 
does not provide such guarantees nor can it do so, by Law, as 
Article 100 of the Code de la Monnaie et du Credit, which established 
the BL, forbids the Bank from discounting commercial industrial and 
agricultural bills with lives exceeding 90 days* Therefore, if 
the banks are to grant the medium- and long-term credits that are 
badly needed in the economy, they will have to do so at their own 
risk and without a guarantee of liquidity from the Central Bank - 
and for that matter without the control of the Central Bank* It 
could be said that in emergencies Article 100 could be relaxed or 
suspended, just as the BSL rediscounted more freely in 1956, 1958 
and 1964* But this is a different context for the suspension of 
Article 100, unlike the BSL facilities, needs to be approved by 
Parliament and delays may be harmful* Furthermore, even if the 
Article can be suspended in time, the Central Bank Blight find
If the first draft of the Law had been adopted, the problem would not 
have arisen in the same way, for it was intended that there should be 
two categories of banks: commercial banks specialising in short-term
credits, and investment banks specialising in long-term credits. But 
this was not adopted because no criteria for making a distinction could 
be agreed upon by the Government and the Association des Banques du 
Liban* Article 156 was the compromise*
itself foroed to rediscount long-term paper representing a 
credit which it would not have approved of had it been consulted 
before it was granted.
Thus, the BL as at present set up will not be able 
adequately to assist economic development. In particular, it will 
not be able to help the investment banks nor the KDB in the issue 
and marketing of debentures, nor to rediscount its medium-term 
paper if the need arose* Although the BL is empowered to assist 
the public sector - the HDB would be semi-publio - in contracting 
a domestic loan, it is not allowed to buy or rediscount securities 
with more than three months to maturity; since the BL will not 
buy them in an emergency, these securities will not be easily 
marketable and therefore, both financial institutions and private 
individuals will be reluctant to buy them. Here again, the resources 
at the disposal of the banking sector whichjcould be used to help 
the agricultural sector of the economy and tourism (through the 
construction of new hotels) will not be available for such uses*
Although rediscounting is not the only way by which the 
Central Bank can 'underwrite* the economic development of the 
country, it is essential because it provides a link between the 
Bank and the banks that must finance the development* The banks
need that link to guarantee their liquidity, and the Central Bank 
can use that link to see that the funds go into worthwhile projects 
and do not create inflationary pressures in the economy.
Therefore, as it has been created, the BL can do nothing to 
help provide the Lebanese economy with the medium- and long-term 
credit it badly needs and which is widely realised* At present 
all the BL can do in this respect is to guarantee some loans which 
specialised institutions, such as the B.C.A.I.J?*,, might need to 
replenish their resources. This is not a satisfactory arrangement 
and it is very similar to the,, one existing while the BSL was still 
the issuing bank, and which proved to be totally inadequate*
3* THE BL AM) THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The question to consider next is whether the BL can help 
the State to finance the deficit it expects to have in providing 
the country with the infrastructural equipment it needs. Domestic 
borrowing is possible and is preferable to foreign borrowing or 
to an increase in taxation. But the active co-operation of the 
Central Bank is necessary, as only a Central Bank can guarantee 
the liquidity that is essential if the public issues are to be 
takffin up*
Article 97 of the Code provides that the BL will assist 
the Government in raising loans and will act as this latter*s 
agent* But while the usefulness of a National Debt is recognised 
and the BL is its manager, the scope for using it is limited by 
Articles 106 and 108* Article 106 limits to 3 months the life 
of the securities that the BL is allowed to buy or keep in its 
portfolios* Thus any issue of medium- or long-term obligations 
will lack that essential requisite to make it successful - a 
guarantee of marketability which can only be provided by the BL*
As long as the Bank is not allowed to deal in this type of security
there will not be a market for them and the State will not so
easily get the type of credit it requires* In this respect the 
BL is again ill-adapted to assist in the development of the economy*
As regards the short-term loans or renewable Treasury Bills 
which the State could issue to get round Article 106, here again 
their marketability is hdavily restricted. This time it is by 
Article 108 which stipulates that the BL cannot hold in its 
portfolio public securities in excess of its capital and its 
Reserve funds. Its capital is £L 15 million, and its Reserve 
funds were £L 1,560,000 i# December 1964 - and therefore will be
negligible for a few years to come* Thus, only about £L 16 million
worth of public short-term bills are actually marketable enough to
be accepted by investors. In view of the requirements of the 
public sector the amount is clearly negligible and thus here 
again, the BL can be of no help to the State*
One of the reasons lying behind these restrictions on the 
marketability of a National Debt is a distrust of the State. It 
was feared that the State might over-issue its securities to 
avoid increasing taxation. This fear may be well-founded but 
the Code provides the Bank with the powers to advise the Government 
on financial and fiscal matters (Article 92); and if a strong 
Board with non-governmental bodies well represented in its 
decisions runs the Bank, this fear should be reduced. On the 
other hand, the State is committed to carry out the projects 
already described; if it cannot raise the money locally it will 
have to raise it abroad and there is no guarantee that the State 
will not incur external debt to avoid an increase in taxation, 
even when the latter course is possible.
4. THE BL ABD THE SERVICES SECTOR
The need for diversifying the services sector was brought 
out in Chapter III: as old services decline in importance new
ones have to be created as this sector is extremely important
in the balance of payments. It was also suggested that banking, 
finance and tourism could well be the services that could be 
developed in the future. How that might be done was discussed 
in Chapter IV and the proposals were that as far as tourism was 
concerned banks could provide the eighteen months credits required 
by the hotel industry while the NDB would provide the long-term 
credits needed for the construction of new hotels. As regards 
the development of banking and finance, the idea was to attract 
funds from the rest of the Middle East for investment in Lebanon 
either in Lebanese securities or in foreign ones, but issued by a 
Lebanese investment bank in Beirut. The development of the services 
sector was to be a consequence of the developments of the other 
sectors of the economy.
However, the proposals put forward implied specific 
responsibilities for a Central Bank and in this chapter it has 
been shown that the BL is not able to assume these responsibilities 
with regard to the industrial*: agricultural and public sectors. 
Since it cannot assist in the creation and development of the 
investment banks, the EDB and hence a capital market, there is 
therefore again not much it can do to help the services sector.
It may be argued, however, that the fact that the balance 
sheets of the banks are now scrutinized by the BL will strengthen 
confidence in the Lebanese banking sector, and thus encourage 
people to deposit more money in the banks* This is a very 
narrow view* Although it is true that supervision of the banks 
may enhance confidence in their solidity, it will do little to 
increase or even maintain the r elative importance of the banking 
sector* As already explained, the holders of the funds are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated in their investment decisions, 
and eventually will no longer be content simply to keep accounts 
with banks in Beirut* They will be seeking more profitable and 
suitable investments, and if they cannot find them in Beirut, no 
matter how solid Lebanese banks are, they will go straight to 
other financial centres. Therefore, here again the contribution 
of the BL cannot be relied upon.
5* THE BL AND THE BANKING SECTOR
One last thing to consider is whether the BL will be able to 
control the volume of credit issued by banks in Beirut. This-is 
interesting to consider, because, apart from the "national 
sovereignty" argument, it seems to have been the main impetus for
the establishment of the BLs
“At least to us economists, the Law of 
August 5 1965 has deprived us of one of 
our major topics of criticism; the non­
existence of a Central Bank in Lebanon ....
Is then Lebanonfs banking sector ~ the 
altar of its economy - like any other 
banking sector in any other country, 
subject to control by a hideous, impressively 
domineering creation of modernistic trends - 
the Central Bank?“l
The BL received all the traditional tools of monetary 
control, as can easily be seen from Chapter I - discount rate 
changes, ceilings on rediscounting, open market operation, 
variable reserves requirements# These are the measures mentioned 
specifically, but it is noted - Article 76 - that the Bank has 
the right to take any measure felt necessary to regulate bank 
liquidity and the volume of credit* However, the emphasis is 
mainly on those traditional weapons of control, and in Chapter IV 
we tried to show why these measures will not work, and why other 
measures - such as limiting the percentage of advances and 
selective credit controls - were preferable* These could still 
be adopted under Article 76 but in the very short time the BL 
has been working it has already imposed a ceiling on rediscounting*
1* Saba, E* “Lebanon's New Banking Law", Middle East Forum* February March
1964, pp* 12-lJ.
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This move quite apart from being ineffectual as far as the 
volume of credit is concerned, is going to make the banks more 
eager to be independent of the Central Bank for funds, and to 
rely still more heavily on the Marche Hors Banque. It will make 
the traditional weapons of control even less efficient*'*’
We conclude that even in the field of monetary control
the BL is ill-adapted to the requirements of the country* As it
is, it will be little more than an Issuing Bank, although the
2intention was to make it a Central Bank.
1* Article 7 stipulates that the reserve ratios to be imposed by
the Central Bank will be calculated on deposits in Lebanese Pounds 
only. This may well encourage banks to prefer even more foreign 
currency deposits to Lebanese currency deposits, and might induce 
them to increase further the interest differential that exists at
present between the two. On the one hand this might weaken the
position of the Lebanese Pound in the foreign exchange market, as 
people buy foreign currencies and sell Lebanese Pounds. On the other 
hand it might well prove ineffective as banks do lend significantly
foreign currencies which can be used for any ordinary transaction in
Beirut.
2. In contrast with the BSL which was intended to be an Issuing Bank and 
came then to assume certain central banking activities.
CONCLUSION
We should now he able to reply to the questions posed in 
Chapter I* These were, whether or not the system with the BSL was 
adequate for the economic development of the country and if not, what 
sort of a change was required. It is clear that the BSL - although it 
fulfilled its role proper1y - was no longer adequate for the future. A 
Central Bank was required for the future development of the country and 
the role that such a Bank would play was described in Chapter IV. Lebanon 
was given a Central Bank, the Bank of Lebanon, but as we have tried to 
show there is little it can do to promote the exploitation of the financial 
potential of the country for its development.
It may be asked whether anything was achieved by the establishment 
of the BL. There are two answers to this question depending on how we 
interpret it. If it is taken to mean whether the BL by itself has made 
much difference, the answer is clearly ■no*, for economic matters - as 
opposed to political matters, such as national sovereignty and prestige. 
Although on paper the BL has more powers than the BSL, it cannot in 
practice, do much more, as we have tried to show.
But, if we consider the question whether anything was achieved by 
the creation of the BL in a wider context, including the whole of the 
Code de la Monnaie et du Credit which set up the Central Bank, the answer
is different* In effect, what was achieved was the creation of a 
financial infrastructure with the BL at its head* As described in 
Chapter II banking in Lebanon was totally unregulated, and although 
its performnce generally speaking was good, certain regulations and 
checks had to be imposed to stop abuse and the dishonesty of some bankers 
which could cause harm to the whole banking sector, as indeed happened 
in March, 1964* This was achieved to some extent in the Code and the 
new set of rules described in Chapter I govern the establishment of new 
banks, their structure and their investments, and balance shfcets have 
now to be submitted monthly to the BL for inspection.
Finally, if all that was intended was the regulation of the banking 
profession in Beirut, without creating a Central Bank, a banking commission 
at the Ministry of Finance could have performed the job. However, the 
original intention was to create a Central Bank that would do more than the 
BSL, and that would take an active part in the economic development of 
the country. But the part it was to play was still visualised as the 
control by traditional means of commercial banks with the object of 
stabilizing the economy. In Chapter I we discussed the implications of 
s\ich an approach. Now we see how it produced in Lebanon a classical 
model of a Central Bank that conforms to general descriptions of the Bank 
of England and other central banks of highly developed countries with 
different problems to deal with, but is ill-adapted to the needs of the 
country in which it is to operate.
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